Q&A: Types of Existence of Entities
Types of Existence of Entities
Question
Have a good week!
Thank you very much for the full response here to my question about the Flood,
On Friday I saw a video, I think by William Lane Craig, about Leibniz’s argument as part of the cosmological proof.
Leibniz divides all entities into two categories: things that exist necessarily and things that exist contingently. I also saw references of this sort on the site, but I didn’t understand the concepts.
I wanted to ask whether the Rabbi could explain a bit what these things mean?
I) What does it mean, in general, for things to exist necessarily? Is an eternal thing something that exists necessarily? Do the laws of nature exist necessarily? Does the Rabbi have an example of something that exists necessarily?
II) What does it mean for something to be the cause of itself? Is that just another word for something that exists necessarily? After all, if it does not exist necessarily, then how is it the cause of itself? Are the laws of nature, for example, self-caused?
III) What does it mean for something to be eternal? Is an eternal thing something that is self-caused? Something that exists necessarily? Can an eternal thing cease to exist at some point, or must it always exist?
Sorry for the trouble; it’s just pretty important for me to understand these distinctions in plain words—whether they are really different matters or one expression for all of them.
Answer
A thing that exists necessarily is something whose existence is compelled. It cannot fail to exist.
Something that is “the cause of itself” means that it does not need a cause outside itself.
An eternal thing is something that has always existed.
As for the relationship between these concepts, many identify them with one another, but in my opinion that is far from simple. Clearly, whatever is necessary has always existed, because it cannot fail to exist. But whatever has always existed is not necessarily necessary. It may have always existed contingently (and could have failed to exist). “Cause of itself” is a trickier concept, because one can think that it might not exist; only if it does exist does it not need a cause outside itself, but perhaps it is possible that it not exist. Still, in the simple sense, “cause of itself” means that its existence does not require a cause—that is, it is necessary and has always existed.
As for the laws of nature, it is not clear that these are things or entities at all. In the simple sense, they are modes of behavior of entities, not entities themselves. The laws of logic and mathematics are necessary, and therefore have always been true (but they do not always exist, because they are not necessarily entities). By contrast, it is commonly thought that the laws of nature are not necessary; they could have been different. Otherwise, the natural sciences would be a branch of mathematics.
Discussion on Answer
No. I already explained that there is a difference.
Beyond that, you are assuming that the conclusion that this is a necessary existent is the result of observation, and therefore you claim that it can always be interpreted differently. But here we are talking about the conclusion of a logical-philosophical argument (such as the cosmological argument and the like).
As for self-cause / eternity, that is a logical result of the cosmological and physico-theological argument.
Thank you very much!
If we assume that an eternal entity exists, do I then have to assume that it is a necessary existent?
How can one identify that the entity is a necessary existent? After all, about anything I can think: perhaps it could be otherwise / perhaps it would not exist. So I can never assume that the entity that really is a necessary existent is in fact a necessary existent.
Does the Rabbi really think that such entities exist?! Fine, self-cause maybe—but necessary existence….