Q&A: Autonomous Halakhic Ruling as a Value
Autonomous Halakhic Ruling as a Value
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Recently I heard in one of your lectures from the series For the Perplexed of the Generation that the source of the value of autonomous halakhic ruling comes from examples in the Talmud where there is harm done to another person’s decisional autonomy. From that I understood that you inferred that there is also value in a person not harming his own decisional autonomy by nullifying himself before great halakhic decisors. But regarding harm to one’s own autonomy, there is no real harm here at all, because when a person harms his own autonomy, that is harm within his own domain.
I thought it might be possible to explain the logic of autonomous ruling by saying that this way protects against the entrenchment of halakhic errors that arise as a result of one great authority’s ruling, which then causes a chain effect in which the decisors who come after him all fall in line with the first ruling, even if most or all of them actually think otherwise. In addition, this can protect against hidden printing errors in the rulings of medieval authorities (Rishonim). So in practice I am claiming that there is no value in autonomous halakhic ruling in and of itself; rather, it is only a means of getting closer to the halakhic truth. What do you think of that, and are there additional grounds for the value of autonomous ruling beyond examples of the kind I mentioned above?
With blessings,
Answer
Hello Oren.
That is an interesting and correct suggestion. But as for your main point, I don’t recall having grounded the value of autonomy in a prohibition against harming autonomy. If anything, the dependence is the other way around: there is a prohibition against harming autonomy because there is value in autonomous ruling and action.
Discussion on Answer
The source is reason itself. In the Talmud itself you can see this in several places. First, “It is not in heaven.” Second, the fact that they did not rule in accordance with Rabbi Meir because his colleagues could not get to the depth of his reasoning (even though it is clear that he was right, since he was wiser than they were). And third, from the very fact that it is forbidden to deny a person autonomy, even when in my opinion he is failing in a transgression (such as eating outside the sukkah).
And what about the value of “autonomy” in the law of the rebellious elder?
With blessings, S.Tz. Levinger
The value of halakhic autonomy exists only when there is no genuine authority
Indeed. The law of the rebellious elder comes to carve out an exception to the value of autonomy when there is authority by force of “do not deviate.” By the way, even regarding the rebellious elder, the contradictions are already known in the law of “one who errs while performing the commandment to heed the words of the sages” (see Horayot 2 and the commentators), and “to the right” when it is right, etc.
Right, now I remember that you illustrated it through the Talmudic examples of harming another person’s autonomy. But still, harming someone else’s autonomy is more severe than harming your own autonomy. Beyond that, how do we know there is any value at all in autonomous halakhic ruling?