I am utterly astonished by the Rabbi’s words here. The points I asked about here do not appear in the notebooks on faith, and they are a highly significant part of the discussion of the physico-theological proof in particular (question B), and of the vast majority of proofs in general (question A).

A. The Rabbi writes here that it does not matter what the probability is that there is a God, but the Rabbi of course forgot that if I have a hypothesis but it is not plausible, then even if its explanatory power is strong and its explanatory scope is broad, in the end, so long as it is not plausible in itself (for example, it is too complex / cumbersome), its correctness falls away immediately!
And therefore we must investigate whether the claim that there is a God (on the a priori level) is more plausible than the phenomena themselves.
(C. [a new question related to what follows here]) And can one derive from the statement that there is a God, on a deductive level or at least in a plausible way, that such a world would come into being? That is, even if indeed the concept of God is plausible, it still also has to be plausible that He would want to create such a world.

And that is why I asked the second question, which comes to rescue the proof from the sea of inquiries (which the Rabbi brushed aside with a wave of the hand).
B. There is a tremendous practical difference in the distinction between whether the criterion of complexity is A) mere uniqueness or B) something beyond that:
A) For even a unique world, however unique it may be, when we do not find that the hypothesis adequately explains the world (because the hypothesis itself is too complex, for example, or because one cannot derive from it that the world would indeed be created), then it is preferable to assume that there is no explanation for the special phenomenon we have found rather than insist on a more complex explanation that in any case will itself require another explanation….

But if there is something deeper embedded in the criterion of complexity—when a person sees something complex, he sees within it the “soul” of the designer—then the hypothesis of whether or not there is a God does not matter at all. Whether we have reason to assume that He wants to create the world or not.
We have already attained God from the world itself.
In the sense of: We saw His reflection and heard His spirits from within the world itself… (based on Deuteronomy)

I can only repeat what I already said, and if your “utter astonishment” remains and you still think I am ignoring a great many things, you will have to look for answers elsewhere.
There is a complex world. Before you are two possibilities: 1. It has a composer. 2. It does not have a composer. Without getting into the question of who that composer is. I choose A. That is all.
Even if I ask what the probability is that rolling a fair die will give a result greater than 1, the answer is 5/6. Now you can argue that the probability that a result greater than 1 will come up is, in your opinion, negligible. Why? “Just because.” So then don’t accept the calculation. Good for you.