Q&A: Again Regarding the Ontological Argument
Again Regarding the Ontological Argument
Question
You interpreted “greater in thought” to mean believing in something that exists. And that is because, apparently, the neurons involved in the brain when one believes in something that exists are different from those involved in mere knowledge without belief. And I wondered whether this does not undermine an argument that purports to be made of pure logic. Because here a component of science inferred from observation enters the picture. And if research were one day to show that there are actually more special neurons that operate דווקא when one does not believe in something, then the whole argument would collapse. For then it would no longer be “greater in thought.”
Answer
In the booklet itself I explained why this is not pure logic. But here I’m not sure. I don’t really need the scientific fact that there are such-and-such neurons. I only need the claim that the conception of something as existing is different from the conception of the concept by itself.
Beyond that, even if there were neurons that operate in unbelief, that would change nothing. The number of neurons that operate does not determine the greatness of the concept being grasped.
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t understand the question. Even if in fact X does not exist, in a debate over whether X exists or not, whoever denies the existence is denying its existence. But why is that interesting? It’s just empty semantics.
We adopted the view that everyone agrees about the definition of God, and they differ only about His actual existence. Can the atheist not retract that assumption? Since the definition leads him to a contradiction, he can claim that he really does not agree with the definition, and that from his standpoint God is something than which something greater can be conceived of on the mind—namely, a God that exists. And why should the claim contradict his denial rather than contradict his very agreement to the definition? At first he did not see things that way, but in retrospect it turns out that he also disagrees with the definition.
I explained this in the booklet. One cannot disagree with a definition, because a definition claims nothing. I posit a definition, and from it prove its realization.
At most, he can dispute that one can conceive of something than which nothing greater can be conceived.
Since you already answered me, can you explain to me why it is not correct to say that he denies the God as understood by the believer, but he does not deny the God as he himself understands Him? After all, he understands that He does not exist, and that he does not deny; rather, what he denies is the existing God as understood by the other person.
I didn’t answer that, and not by accident. Nor will I answer. I don’t have time to play nonsensical word games.
I’m claiming that the wordplay is in the ontological argument. What does it mean to deny a non-existent thing—isn’t that wordplay? But I won’t waste your time for nothing (?) Thanks anyway.
Lately I’ve been thinking a lot about the argument, so I hope I’m not being a bother. I just wanted to ask whether it makes sense to say about someone that he denies the existence of something that does not exist. That is, when we say of a person that he denies a God who does not exist, we are really claiming that he denies the existence (because that is what he is actually denying) of a God who does not exist. Since the concept “does not exist” is already included in the word “denies,” this is a kind of strange duplication and sounds like nothing more than wordplay.