As you wish. Broadly speaking, it seems that Navat is redefining faith. If until now we thought that faith was a fixed, solid framework attached to religion—that is, a rigid faith meant to ground accepted halakhic religion—Navat comes along and declares: there is no place nowadays for such faith. Faith today is supposed to be a worldview that “speaks” to a person, that he identifies with inwardly, and yes, one can and should try to give it some logical foothold. But one should not expect it to be proven, and apparently not even to be solid and uniform, since a faith based on inner identification may vary from person to person and from time to time.

Following your post, Daniel, I looked at the site.

It is worth noting that the site is structured so that there is a main article on a certain topic, followed by several secondary articles in the same area.
The main article there is called “On Apologetics,” and it warns against various failures that contemporary apologists fall into. In my estimation, the Rabbi would agree with what he says there; it is somewhat similar to what he wrote in column 36.

The secondary articles, in my opinion, really do contradict his approach. Especially the article you mentioned. I will quote a few sentences from it:

“The truth of religion is supposed to be presented the way one presents the truth of a work of art or a musical composition. We must give up the pretension of speaking too much in terms of ‘right and wrong.’ The question is not whether religion is a correct conclusion, whether it presents persuasive arguments; the question is whether it expresses truth. Is it the right ‘event’? Does it express something authentic?

If that is the discussion, everything is supposed to move to a different plane. We should not be engaging in apologetics at all, but in religion itself. When we try to ‘represent’ religion, we are not supposed to be its good lawyers, presenting ‘good’ arguments that defend religion, as they would have done in the Middle Ages. What we are supposed to do is present religion as an ‘event,’ as a true occurrence within being. We are supposed to present its face, what it is, its perspective.

Just as viewers of a work of art are impressed, receptive, understanding, sensing, and experiencing what it expresses—so too is the inner movement of the soul in relation to religion. To the same extent that it would be ridiculous to present a work of art as a series of arguments and truths, so it would be ridiculous to present religion as something similar. In order to grasp religion, we must grasp precisely its expression.” End quote.

The comments at the end of the article show that the author argues that there is no possibility of proving religion. In practice, this contradicts the system of proofs the Rabbi built here on the site (in the notebooks).

This is what I was afraid of. The argument is not well defined and uses concepts that can be interpreted in different ways. If he means to argue that religion or faith should not have to be proven, the question is what he means by proof. Mathematical certainty? Probability? Or is it just something subjective? The first is absurd. The second is trivial. And the third is not faith at all. It is true that there are people for whom experience is an indication that there is truth in it, but then we are back to the question of probability—that is not subjectivity.
Such arguments do not say much. One needs to bring a specific example of an argument he opposes and what he proposes as an alternative, and then it can be discussed.
Navat tends toward existentialism, and I generally see existentialist discourse as worthless psychologistic verbiage. My sense is that sometimes people who talk this way mean something else—that is, they do want to make some claim—but they do not really do so. In my opinion, this is usually an escape from dealing with the issue. When someone attacks your arguments, you flee to the comfortable regions where no arguments are needed and it is all like art and so on. That was also the way of Rabbi Shagar. In my view, this kind of discourse is usually one of two things: 1. disguised atheism. 2. laziness or lack of intellectual skill. Any argument with real substance can be formulated in ordinary logical language, and everything else is empty of content. See my lecture on YouTube: Is There a Hand for Religious Postmodernism:

Rabbi, it seems to me one should say: the first is trivial, the second is absurd. Right?

Here is another quote from the author:
Questioner:
Do you disagree with Nachmanides and the Kuzari and other great sages throughout the generations who presented the argument from testimony as a proof?
Rabbi Navat:
I disagree with it as evidence; I do not disagree with it when it comes to expressing a sense of belonging.

No. Mathematical certainty is absurd because it cannot be attained in any field, and not in faith either. Probability is the trivial criterion. And subjectivity is not faith, just chatter.

Indeed, the argument from testimony is a fairly dubious proof if you present it in its simplistic form that a father does not lie to his son. But with additional elements, it definitely carries weight. And again, if one is looking for absolute certainty, then certainly not. But a feeling of belonging is subjective nonsense from a covert atheist. A person who does not believe in God but feels a sense of belonging to the Revelation at Mount Sinai is an atheist in the fullest sense.

The Rabbi’s direct remarks were quoted there in response to Rabbi Navat’s article, and only then did he deign to respond to the repeated arguments against his existentialist position.
Anyone interested is invited to take part in the discussion there:

http://iyun.org.il/article/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%99%D7%A9-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%94/#comment-564

A person was created in such a way that the “good” and the “beneficial” are accompanied by a good taste that encourages a person to do what he should. Even if food were completely bland, we would still need to eat it in order to receive the nutrients and vitamins needed for the body’s development and functioning, and nevertheless, when there is good taste, the motivation to “fuel” the body increases.

And so too with spiritual and social needs. There is value in the existence of social life—within us was implanted the desire to belong and be connected to society; there is a need for thought—within us were implanted curiosity and critical thinking, which bring a person to thought. As with physical food, so with spiritual nourishment: a dry and boring text, however correct it may be, will not create motivation to read it.

This is all the more true when it comes to value judgment, where the judgment is more complex than a simple “yes-no, black-white,” and where the good and the truth need to be presented in a pleasant and friendly way. And all the more so with religion, where a substantial part of its values are not self-evident without divine revelation, and it places a heavy yoke of commandments on its believers, and involves a constant struggle against nations and religions hostile to its unique path—certainly a great deal of trust and a sense of belonging are needed to make the choice of this difficult and complex path easier.

Best regards, S.Z. Lavinger

Does your comment belong here, or is this a mistake?

The question that was asked was whether it is logically possible to ground a halakhic religion without a basis of revelation.

What does that have to do with the way the good and the truth are presented?

And my answer was, as is my way, a “resolution” that gives place to both of the competing views: on the one hand, the factual grounding is essential and cannot be dispensed with (and as Rabbi Michael Abraham explained, there is no need for mathematical proof); and on the other hand, one cannot give up the emotional and experiential side, because we are human beings, and dry, bland truth will not “get through” to a person, and he will find 999 excuses and “arguments” to reject it.

Best regards, S.Z. Lavinger

As for the new question you raise—“Can one ground a halakhic religion without a basis of revelation?”
My opinion is this: if that legal system does not claim a divine source, but rather presents itself as a method created by wise people in order to achieve personal and social wholeness, then it is no different from any other psychological method. Judaism claims revelation, and brings 600,000 witnesses for it.