The simplest solution is to accept specific exceptions to veganism.
That way one can be vegan except with regard to putting on tefillin, mezuzot, Torah scrolls, and megillot.
And there is logic to that: killing an animal for selfish pleasure is fundamentally different from killing animals for the sake of Heaven.
Whereas in the first case there is some reason to see a flaw, the second is proper from the outset.

The problem is not the killing but the torment that animals undergo during the raising process.

It is true that there is a serious problem with the suffering caused in the industry, but in any case they do not slaughter an animal for tefillin (or add suffering to it for that purpose).
Rather, an animal that is slaughtered for food has its hide used for tefillin.
In other words, buying tefillin does not add suffering, not even a little.
The suffering comes only because of the enormous and demanding demand for meat for food. Without the demand for meat for food, there would be far fewer animals and much less demand, and conditions would be decent.

The instruction to make the passages and boxes from animal hide was established in a period when there was almost no alternative material for making tefillin.
Today, when there are synthetic materials, using animal products is literally a commandment that comes through a transgression.
It is possible to make tefillin from leather-like materials and still preserve the commandment. The tefillin would look exactly the same.
The idea behind the command is to remember the commandments constantly. It makes no difference whether the object that arouses and symbolizes that constant remembrance is made of this material or another.

Ron, demand still determines how many animals are raised, and the more profitable it is, the more are raised. You are right that hide consumption is marginal, and it is likely that raising is determined mainly by consumption for food.

Shlomi, this is a complete misunderstanding of Jewish law. According to your logic, one could just write a passage or poem that reminds us of the commandments and thereby fulfill the obligation of tefillin (and also tzitzit). On the contrary, that would remind us much better than tefillin do, so I would have expected the Sages already to recommend it. Not to mention the halakhic discussions about the details of the laws of tefillin, which are completely irrelevant according to your approach. About this it was said that we do not expound the reason for the verse, and according to Maimonides at least, that is true even when the reason is stated explicitly in the Torah.

Shlomi

A solution somewhat like yours is, if I remember correctly, proposed by Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi of blessed memory, and he discusses this issue in his book that was translated into Hebrew; at the moment I don’t remember its name.

He was one of the major thinkers in the U.S. and a deeply committed spiritual guru.

He definitely has something to say on this issue, and it is worth checking.

P.S. None of this means that I identify with abolishing the commandment as it is, even though I think that at the level of the written text it is metaphorical. Not like Rashbam, that one needs to remember it in the heart, but rather the Torah’s intent is that you should write what stirs your heart at that time. Exactly like the commandment to write the Torah on the stones at Ebal—the intention is selected passages or the speech of the commandments. I always found the paragraph of Shema difficult: whichever way you take it, if it is talking only about Shema, then there is no source for the commandment of studying the entire Torah, since it is taken up by the instruction of the commandment of reciting Shema. And technically too, it is difficult for there to be a commandment about reciting Shema within Shema itself. But on the other hand, if we are dealing with the whole Torah, and there is a source for Torah study, how are they supposed to write all of it on mezuzot and tefillin? The simple solution is that according to the book of Deuteronomy it does not really matter; the main thing is to write reminders from the Torah—whatever you choose, or the things that are defined as the main ones (literarily? structurally?). The main thing is that you review and study. Thus you can write on the mezuzot the Shema or the Ten Commandments or the ‘credo’ from chapter 6 and the like. Proof of this: writing the Torah on the stones at Ebal means only the speech of the commandments or selected passages. Obviously.

If the Torah were given today, it would command you: “And you shall set a reminder on your smartphone, and write notes on your refrigerator, and manage your day in light of your to-do lists,” and so on. What will you write? How much, and how? That is completely flexible.

But as with the other commandments, the Oral Torah gave clear definitions, and from that one should not depart.

That is not similar.

The determination of what to write in tefillin is stated explicitly in the Torah.
The norm of “what to write on” is a norm that took root as a result of historical constraints.

Another thing: a substantial change in the content of what is written damages the religious-historical continuity, the chain of generations. A marginal change—what material to make it from—does not create a sense of rupture. It is like the difference between changing the symbol on the state flag and changing the material from which it is made.

The fact that there are complicated discussions over the tiniest detail is, of course, rabbinic obsession. The idea of tefillin is pretty simple; similar acts existed in various cultures at the time the Torah was given, and obsessing over peripheral details only empties it of its content.

gil, your proposal has advantages and disadvantages.

On the one hand, you point out that it makes sense that the command in the Shema would refer to passages outside it. And it makes sense that it would refer to the whole Torah, or to its essentials (the Ten Commandments).
The weak point is that the commandment is not defined. Not the commandment of tefillin, not mezuzah, and not the writing on the stones at Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal. Can we assume that the boundaries of this command are so flexible?

In previous discussions I already mentioned Dr. Granot’s view, and I recommended that you read his words (did you read them?).
According to his conclusion, we also gain the solution to your weak point: the definition of the command is the same in all these commandments. In tefillin and mezuzot, in the king’s book (Mishneh Torah), at the assembly ceremony, and at Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal—in all of these, the command was to write the same text: the speech of the commandments plus the covenant (the blessings and curses).

Where is there room on the head and hand for the speech of the commandments plus the blessings and curses? Was the commandment of tefillin and mezuzah given to giants? And how is one of the people of Lilliput, who is not as lofty as Dr. Granot and is only three cubits tall, supposed to put on frontlets? 🙂

Regards, the humble S.Z. Levinger

You are right.
Even so, regarding tefillin and mezuzot we would need to say that the command was to write only part of the speech of the commandments, or that the intention is purely metaphorical, like Rashbam.
So we have not gained a precise definition for the content of these commandments, only for the others: in the king’s Torah scroll, in the commandment of assembly, and in what was written at Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal.
By the way, if I am not mistaken, Dr. Granot does not address tefillin and mezuzot. I mentioned him as a continuation of a previous discussion connected to these commandments.

Thank you, Aharon! I think I read Tamir Granot’s proposal (about the finding of the Torah scroll?), but I will answer briefly that the undefined command is not at all flexible; I deliberately gave examples. The idea that Deuteronomy introduces is that one must study Torah in every situation and remember the love of God and His oneness. That is very well defined. Only the specific content that is to be written is not defined, because that would undermine the idea itself—the moment you write one fixed text, it may become routine, like the Amidah for readers of the Shalem edition (just kidding…). Therefore the Torah intends that you make reminders for yourself. Not necessarily something fixed. Notice the words as understood in the tradition of the Sages: “and you shall speak of them” (in whatever Talmudic topic you choose), “when you walk on the way and when you lie down and when you rise” (always, always devote yourself to Torah like Rabbi Steinman). This is the meaning of the verses according to the Sages, and it may very well also be the plain meaning of the text. And in this sense Rashbam is indeed right that it is a metaphorical commandment. Or half-metaphorical, since it wants you to place the words of the Torah upon your heart, and the way to do that is aided by physically writing its words on parchment and repeating them at all times. (By the way, it is quite clear that tefillin, if taken literally, are supposed to be an open container from which you pull out the text and recite it. Or look at it.)

With God’s help, 15 Tevet 5778

To gil—greetings,

The tefillin are also “for a memorial between your eyes, so that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth,” but they are also “a sign upon your hand.” The sign is a symbol of the uniqueness of the bearer of the sign, and of the covenant between him and his Creator. So the blood was a sign on the houses so that the destroyer would not come, and so the Sabbath is “a sign of the covenant between Me and you, that you may know that I am the Lord who sanctifies you.”

And before the description of the Israelites’ going out with a high hand, the dimension of “and for frontlets between your eyes” is added. Which of those who left Egypt did not know the ddft, the uraeus-serpent symbol with which the kings of Egypt adorned themselves to symbolize the protection of their idol over them? Let all who left Egypt know that they are not slaves but kings, upon whom the name of the Lord is called—the Lord who brought them out with a mighty hand and prevailed over the kings of Egypt and their idols. And on their head is not a cunning twisting serpent, but the form of a sanctuary. Every Jew is a king in that his head, heart, and hands are a dwelling place for his God.

In the passages in the book of Exodus, the “strength of hand” with which the Lord brought Israel out of Egypt is emphasized. Seeing the mighty hand that the Lord performed in Egypt leads to “and they believed in the Lord and in Moses His servant.” In the passages in Deuteronomy, the dimension of love of the Lord is added, bringing one to speak of the faith in all situations and to devote oneself to His service in all situations, which will bring eternal life to the people in its land. To leave Egypt, awe is enough; to hold on to the Land, love is required!

On the ddft of the kings of Egypt, see the article by Prof. Moshe Weinfeld, “The Meaning of the Biblical Shema” (on the CET library website), chapter 6. See also the article by Dr. Avi Dantalsky, “On Women and Tefillin—from Witches to Our Day,” which cites Rabbi Uri Sherki, that the square tefillin, symbolizing morality, are the antithesis of the serpent symbolizing the power of the forces of nature.

Regards, S.Z. Levinger

The black square reminded those who left Egypt of the Tabernacle, whose exterior showed only the somber goat-hair curtains, “like the tents of Kedar.” The blue, purple, and gold were visible only to one standing inside, and the multicolored tachash skins only from above, beyond the control of the human eye. This teaches us that the splendor of the Lord’s Tabernacle is only in its inwardness.

In the comment “Source citation,” paragraph 1, lines 2–3:
… in the article by Dr. Avi Dantalsky, “On Women and Tefillin—from Witches to Our Day” (on his blog “The Land of the Hebrews”), which cites…

“Why do you ask my name, seeing it is wondrous?” (Judges 13).
And in the midrash:
The angel said to him: I do not know how to tell you my name, for according to the mission with which the Holy One, blessed be He, sends us, He gives us a name. Thus, “and it is wondrous”—according to each wonder and wonder He performs through us, He gives us a name.

So too with our angel Levinger: in answer to the website’s question, “your name?”, he answers according to the matter at hand—sometimes “And all this is to be placed on the head and the hand,” sometimes “Not just a reminder,” sometimes “Source citation,” and sometimes “Corrections.”

Thus, it is wondrous.

We have found that it cannot be said that “and you shall bind them for a sign” is an allegorical expression, for in every place in the Bible where something serves as a “sign,” it is something tangible.
Thus with the rainbow, which is a sign. Thus “and this shall be your sign that I have sent you: when you bring the people out of Egypt, you shall worship God on this mountain,” and thus the signs Moses performs before the Israelites and before Pharaoh. Thus the Sabbath is a sign between the Lord and the Israelites, and thus the firepans of the congregation of Korah were made into a covering for the altar “as a sign to the rebellious children.” Thus a prophet performs “a sign or wonder” so that they will believe him (Deuteronomy 13). Thus Isaiah gives Ahaz a sign: “behold, the young woman is with child and shall bear a son” (7:14), and Hezekiah: “and this shall be the sign to you from the Lord that the Lord will do this thing that He has spoken: behold, I will turn back the shadow on the steps…” (38:7–8).
Regards, S.Z. Levinger

Certainly Rashbam also held that the commandment of tefillin is from the Torah, and his intention is that putting on tefillin is not merely a technical act, but is meant to internalize faith in the heart and mind.

In your opinion, Rabbi, is there any justification for the custom of wearing a shtreimel “in honor of the Sabbath,” or is that a commandment that comes through a transgression, because of the suffering of the dozens of animals killed for the sake of maintaining that custom?

Obviously, if it causes suffering to animals, there is no justification or permission for it. We cry out over eating, so wearing a shtreimel?! True, the killing itself is hard to forbid, because killing animals for human use is permitted. But causing suffering definitely is not.

Do you remember the controversy around the fur law and shtreimels in 2009?

In my opinion, both on the issue of the shtreimel and on the issue of tefillin, religious fundamentalism does not allow rethinking and finding alternative solutions to the issue of preventing animal suffering.

With a little goodwill, it would have been possible to find a way to make shtreimels and tefillin from synthetic materials and prevent unnecessary suffering to masses of animals.

Never mind shtreimels, but it is settled Jewish law that tefillin are made from leather?!

And throughout the whole discussion, you are starting from the assumption that killing animals is the main and most important prohibition, and “the tefillin will somehow manage.” Do you have a practical proposal (halakhically valid) for producing tefillin from synthetic materials?

A.H. (“wife of a scholar”?),

You are right—let’s first see the Hasidim from Agudat Yisrael agree on the shtreimel issue, and then we can discuss tefillin.

In the shtreimel controversy they dug in their heels and fought with all their might against the idea of forbidding the production of animal-based shtreimels.

Why not “Animal Lover”? 🙂

Let’s say I agree on the shtreimel issue. What next? Do you have a proposal for producing tefillin?

I don’t understand—if in any case it is agreed that tefillin are produced by virtue of the fact that there are cows and meat consumption, what is the difficulty? What additional suffering is caused to the hide of carcasses? And even if they actually slaughter specifically for this, we are talking about a Torah commandment, and I do not accept the claim of “rabbinic obsession.”

The question arises: what is this sudden aversion to thousands of years of meat consumption, which is foundational to human existence, to the point of turning man into the supreme judge, even over what is permitted—namely meat—that enters his mouth?

And is using a donkey for plowing also suffering?
Is the tiger that eats a newborn cub cruel?

There is no end to these matters, and space is too short even to begin speaking, from a biological perspective, about the basic need for meat.

By that logic there is also no problem with consuming meat. But vegans (and not only they) think there is, because it supports an industry that is very cruel and very problematic. According to that view (which I agree with), there is a problem with consuming leather just as with consuming meat.
What level of suffering justifies this is another question. It depends on how much you need the thing, how much suffering it involves, whether it can be done without suffering, what the price of giving it up is, and so on. But even if you do not have a definition, that does not exempt you from the obligation not to assist cruelty.
And of course there is no ethics for tigers. Therefore the discussion of whether the tiger is cruel or not is pointless and meaningless.

Nowadays there is no problem even putting on “vegetarian” tefillin, as I will explain; let me begin with a little joke.
A friend told me that once he ran into someone who refused to put on tefillin because they are made from animal hide, and he was vegetarian and opposed to such use of animals. So he told him to wait a minute and he would bring him vegetarian tefillin that were not made from hide—and then he put them on.

“As a vegetarian person but also religious, I always had dilemmas on Jewish topics. Whether it was the need to use animal products in preparing Torah scrolls, tefillin, mezuzot, and shofars; whether it was the attitude toward sacrifices (when the Temple is rebuilt speedily in our days); the (mistaken) notion that people must eat fish on Rosh Hashanah; the question regarding the morality of the Jewish method of slaughter; and more.

The topic of Judaism and vegetarianism has already been examined in many ways by people much smarter than me from almost every possible angle—philosophical, halakhic, technical.

So I דווקא want to talk about one issue where Jewish law and vegetarianism actually do get along, even if it seems they really don’t. A topic that I personally discovered too late, unfortunately. I want to talk about tefillin.

You are probably saying: ‘Tefillin? Surely it is obvious that tefillin must be made from hide. There is no way this law can fit with vegetarianism; we’re not Reform here.’

So yes, tefillin must be made from hide, but there is one thing they do not have to be, and that is the hide of an animal killed by a human being. Yes, tefillin can be made from the hide of an unslaughtered carcass.

Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah: ‘One may not write scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot on the hide of an impure domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird; but one may write on the hide of pure domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds, even if they are carcasses or animals with fatal defects.’

When I reached bar mitzvah age, even though my father was vegetarian, the possibility of using vegetarian tefillin never came up at all. We immediately bought regular tefillin. Truthfully, at the time I did not think about it at all.

Many years later, I discovered that there are several shops in Israel that produce vegan tefillin, ones made from the hide of carcasses. So Jewish law is still observed, but no animal was harmed. If I had known that then, that is what I would have bought, and when I celebrate my son’s bar mitzvah, God willing, I will buy him this kind of tefillin.

As mentioned, there are several shops around the country that sell vegan tefillin. In some of them you need to ask for it specifically.

So yes, being vegetarian and Jewish can be difficult, but sometimes there are very simple solutions, which were hiding right under our noses all this time.”

By the way, arguably, if one specifically insists on the hide of a carcass because of “vegetarianism, veganism, or other meshugaas” (quote from one of our great rabbis), it may be that he violates bal tosif.

All that length just to write what already appears at the start of the thread?…