Q&A: Consultation
Consultation
Question
Hello Rabbi,
A young man approached us with questions about the Oral Torah. He has 2 questions that I’m somewhat unsure about.
1. Interpretation detached from the plain meaning — he argues that the verse "If a matter is too difficult for you" grants interpretive authority only in cases where the law is unclear, not for taking things out of their context.
2. According to that verse, the authority of the religious court applies only when it sits in Jerusalem, and from the time the Sanhedrin went into exile there is no longer an obligation to heed it. And if we tell him, "We accepted the Talmud upon ourselves," he will surely say that this is true regarding decrees and customs, but not regarding interpretation that uproots the plain meaning. It does not make sense that the people could accept upon themselves an interpretation detached from the text by a body that has no authority for that. And in fact, see Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 8b, in the last lines, which implies that if they are not in Jerusalem perhaps they have no authority.
I started writing him various things, but I wanted to hear your opinion.
Thank you.
Answer
These are not two questions, but really the same question. The verse grants authority to the sages in every matter whatsoever (there is a discussion on my site with someone who argued otherwise), except that your questioner claims that taking things out of context is an illegitimate act (against the intent of the lawgiver), and therefore there is no authority for it, just as there is no authority simply to declare property ownerless for no reason. Sages who take things out of context are not engaging in interpretation but in invention, and for that they were given no authority (only to interpret and to legislate).
So the answer is also one and the same: the assumption is that such interpretation is not a removal of the verse from its meaning, even if it takes it away from its plain sense. If indeed that was not the intent of the verse, I fully agree that they have no authority. They are not authorized to invent a new Torah.
But three remarks are important here:
A. My trust in the sages leads me to assume that even if I do not see why this is connected to the plain meaning of the verse, I assume that they did understand, and therefore I include this within their authority.
B. In the background of all this, one must know that midrashic exposition does not have to fit the plain meaning. We were given four parallel modes of interpretation (Pardes), and each one is not bound by the others. Therefore, when dealing with derash, one should not measure it in terms of plain-sense interpretation. In this context it is interesting to read Henshke’s series of three articles (HaMa’ayan 5737–38 / 1977–78) on the relationship between derash and peshat. I am attaching what I have on hand (I think it is not actually all three articles): link to the first, link to the second, link to the third, link to the fourth
C. Sometimes the appeal to a verse is merely a textual support, and in fact we are dealing with a rabbinic law (legislation, not interpretation. And that is an authority in its own right).