Q&A: A Clarification in Two Carts
A Clarification in Two Carts
Question
Hello Rabbi,
On page 44 of your book Two Carts, third edition, you write regarding the interpretation of the third case in Leibniz’s clock parable: “Or this is merely coincidence, in which case it drops out of the discussion.”
I didn’t understand why coincidence drops out of the discussion.
Can’t the answer to the question of the fit between the external world and the a priori intellect be “coincidence”?
Answer
It’s possible, but it isn’t likely to be coincidence. Especially if you take into account the “theological” formulation (see the fourth booklet, part two), where I show that you have no way of knowing that this is indeed the case.
Discussion on Answer
– People try to justify the principle of causality as valid for the external world. Isn’t that begging the question, in that they are looking for a cause in order to justify the coordination between the intellectual and the real? In other words:
What is the justification for causality?
–> There is coordination between the intellectual and the real
Where does it come from?
From some c.a.u.s.e. (theological, coincidental, epistemological)
They’re looking for a cause in order to justify causality.
A bit vague, but I hope it’s understandable..
Like the High Court of Justice deciding that it itself is right. We have no tool other than self-reflection. The claim that this too is mistaken is the essence of skepticism. I have nothing to answer skepticism except that I don’t agree with it. In the same way, you could also claim that our senses justify themselves.
An explanation is not a cause. That’s a conceptual confusion. The principle of causality is not based on itself. It is simply true by virtue of some rationale or justification.
Thank you very much.
Does an analytic position accept a synthetic argument
(induction and so on) only on the a priori plane?
I didn’t understand the question. A purely analytic position does not accept induction or synthetic arguments at all, except perhaps as a behavioral rule, but not as a tool for knowing reality.
In the example you bring regarding geometry:
The assumption that two lines never meet seems to me to follow from induction. (Maybe it only seems that way to me, and it’s simply an assumption,
so I’m mistaken.)
Still, it seems to me that there is use of induction in mathematics (infinity and so on).
So how is it only an analytic domain?
My question is that if there is use of induction or synthetic arguments in purely a priori fields (like mathematics), then how can one become convinced of their validity, since there is no experience that could refute them?
An axiom does not follow from induction. No one ever followed parallel lines out to infinity to check that they don’t meet. It is an assumption of common sense (an immediate intuition of the idea of parallel lines).
In mathematics there is no use of induction whatsoever.
I didn’t understand your questions, but in any case the assumption on which they are built is incorrect.
Have a good week.
You claim that only a synthetic proposition has content.
A proposition like “A dwarf is small” is indeed analytic (analysis of the definition), but it does have content.
How is that possible?
An analytic proposition does have content. My claim is that the content is not novel (it is embedded in the concepts and assumptions).
Two more small questions:
– The discussion about the different cases of coordination between reason and real reality is, it seems to me, itself on the a priori plane. So how can an “a priori” discussion itself give validity to the very question of its validity regarding real reality?