Q&A: Rules of Halakhic Decision in the Talmud
Rules of Halakhic Decision in the Talmud
Question
Hello, honorable Rabbi:
We find in the words of the Sages, in the Talmud and the Mishnah, disputes in which the deciding factor is not the actual content of the positions, but rather a certain rule establishing that when there is a dispute between two tanna'im, the Jewish law follows one of them. (Of course, I am not referring to cases where there is a dispute between majority and minority, and the like.)
For example: (Eruvin 47b) "Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan in exactly this wording: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda. Between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosi. And it goes without saying that between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosi."
There are certain rules of decision here, but it does not say what the parameters are by which these rules were established. In fact, I found several possible ways to understand these rules of decision. One could say that: A. we assume that the reasoning of a certain tanna is closer to the truth, and therefore we rule in accordance with him.
B. the Talmud decided in favor of a certain tanna for various reasons, such as his importance or even his righteousness, and not necessarily because his words are closer to the truth. An example of such a decision can be found in the Talmud above (13b), which says that the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel against Beit Shammai because they were pleasant and humble.
All of these are not reasons that, one would assume, would be accepted in the legal world as grounds for deciding in favor of one opinion or another. So my question is, is there some parameter—something that systematically characterizes a certain tanna—such that his opinion is therefore closer to the truth? Suppose the Torah has some kind of outlook according to which, on a certain issue, that tanna's personality traits or political approach or some other parameter would make him more likely to be right than his colleague?
(In today's terms, suppose in a given debate there is a "liberal side" and a "conservative side," and the court, because it favors a liberal worldview, would give more weight to the opinion of, say, a scientist than of a religious person…)
Thank you very much in advance. And thank you in general for the wonderful site and books.
Answer
One can discuss what exactly the nature of these rules of decision is: are they summary rules (after each individual dispute was decided on its own, they summarized the results into a rule), or guiding rules (meaning that this is how one should always rule)? Some rules seem to be of one type, and some seem to be of the other. For example, the rule that the Jewish law follows Rava against Abaye except for the six cases denoted by the mnemonic Ya'al Kegam, and the rule that the Jewish law follows Rabban Gamliel in the Mishnah except for Arev, Tzidon, and the last proof, seem like summary rules. But the rule that the Jewish law follows Shmuel and Rav Nahman in monetary law, and Rav in matters of prohibition, is a guiding rule (since it is based on areas of expertise).
The Talmudic rules in Eruvin (there are many rules deciding between tanna'im) are rules without exceptions (unlike Ya'al Kegam) and without explanation (who is wiser than whom, and in what area). So there is room there to hesitate about how to classify them.
This is discussed by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Shiurim on Bava Batra, and he brings proof that these are guiding rules. His proof is precisely from the passage you quoted:
For example: (Eruvin 47b) “Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan in exactly this wording: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda. Between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosi. And it goes without saying that between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi—the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosi.”
This passage assumes transitivity—that is, if the Jewish law follows A against B, and the Jewish law follows B against C, then necessarily the Jewish law follows A against C. In a summary rule there is no necessity for that at all. But in a guiding rule based on the sage's superior wisdom, there is.
As for ruling like Beit Hillel because of their humility, that is not necessarily a decision based on an external consideration, as you assume. The author of Kelalei HaGemara and other commentators explained that this too is a guiding rule. Someone who gives precedence to the words of Beit Shammai before stating his own view, and who is humble, will arrive at a more correct halakhic conclusion. I have discussed this in several places; see for example here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%90-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA/