Q&A: Hullin 102, 103
Hullin 102, 103
Question
In honor of my teacher and master, the great Rabbi Michi, may he live long and well,
A) Hullin 102:
Come and hear: If one took a bird that did not contain an olive-bulk and ate it, Rabbi exempts, and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon obligates. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon said: “If one is liable for a limb taken from it, then for the whole of it all the more so.” If he strangled it and ate it, all agree that liability is only for an olive-bulk. Up to this point they disagree only because “one master holds that while it is alive it stands to be divided into limbs,” and the other master holds that while it is alive it does not stand to be divided into limbs. In any case, according to all, we do not require an olive-bulk.
See Rashi, s.v. “and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon obligates” — because he holds that when it is whole, “you have no greater limb-from-a-living-animal than this,” and for a limb I do not require an olive-bulk.
Seemingly, from the language of the a fortiori inference, and also from Rashi’s wording, it is explained that the reasoning is that many limbs are no worse than one limb. However, from the continuation of the Gemara — “while it is alive it stands to be divided into limbs” — a different reason is explained, and this requires clarification.
B) Hullin 102:
Rashi, s.v. “rather only one” — because it is one prohibition, and since it is with one act of eating, one warning, and one prohibition, he is liable only once, “and so too in all of them.”
Rashi’s intent requires clarification.
C) Hullin 103.
Rashi, s.v. “according to Reish Lakish it is difficult” — for after all, “even” according to him they are derived from two verses, so he should be liable twice.
Seemingly the word “even” requires clarification, and he should have said: “for after all, ‘also’ according to him,” etc.
With great respect,
Answer
Hello.
A) It can be explained that while it is alive, it stands to be divided into limbs, and therefore there is a prohibition regarding a limb. Consequently, the reasoning applies that the whole creature is also considered a limb as well (not that many limbs include one, as you wrote. Rather, the whole thing is regarded as one large limb). But if it does not stand to be divided into limbs, then even if the whole creature is like a limb, there is no prohibition in that, since there is no prohibition of limbs in it.
B) The Gemara explains that we are dealing with one prohibition. But Rashi was troubled by this, because even with one prohibition it is still possible to incur liability twice, if he ate them with two separate warnings and/or in two separate dishes, etc. Therefore he adds that this is speaking of one warning and one act of eating (one dish).
C) Perhaps his intent is to say that if both prohibitions had been derived from one verse (“flesh in the field, torn”), then according to Reish Lakish he would be liable only once even though they are two prohibitions. Therefore he writes that according to Reish Lakish we are dealing with something derived from two prohibitions, and therefore “even” according to his view one should have to impose two liabilities here, just as according to Rabbi Yohanan.
Discussion on Answer
It seems to me that he means to say that this is so for all transgressions: one does not incur double liability when they occur within one single lapse of awareness / one single intentional act.
Many thanks.
B) I was asking about the phrase “and so too in all of them” in Rashi.