Q&A: Counting the Omer Twice Due to Doubt
Counting the Omer Twice Due to Doubt
Question
Hello and blessings.
There is a well-known question regarding a person who is unsure which day he is up to, and which count of the Omer he is supposed to count. Many later authorities argue that a doubtful count has no significance, so one cannot count: "Today is four days of the Omer, today is five days of the Omer," and thereby fulfill the obligation whichever way it turns out. In their view, the counting is a clarification and not merely a verbal statement, and counting out of doubt is not considered counting (Sha'arei Yosher, Dvar Avraham, Dvar Menachem in the name of the Chiddushei HaRim, and others).
On the other hand, in practice many later authorities ruled against this reasoning because of an indirect proof from the Ba'al HaMaor (Pesachim 28a in the Rif pagination). He asks why they did not institute counting twice out of doubt nowadays in the Diaspora because of the calendrical doubt about the day, and answers: so that people should not come to treat the holiday of Shavuot lightly when they count the Omer on it. From the fact that he did not answer that there is no such concept as counting out of doubt, it follows that in his opinion one can in principle count twice, and someone who is traveling and does not know which day it is should count twice (though this proof can be analyzed further).
- What is your opinion in principle: can one count twice out of doubt?
- What is your opinion regarding the proof from the Ba'al HaMaor? Is it valid?
Answer
In my opinion there is no logic at all to this approach of the later authorities. I do not see why one cannot count in a case of doubt: on the possibility that it is so, I counted this way, and vice versa. How is this different from any condition attached to commandments (about which there is indeed also a dispute, but that is a different dispute)?
Discussion on Answer
Boaz, if on the Torah level counting in doubt is not considered counting, why would the Sages be able to enact counting twice out of doubt and uproot Torah law? The counting is still due to doubt about the day, and one would still not fulfill his obligation. The fact that the doubt applies to the entire Jewish people does not make it an "inherent" doubt, or at least not a "personal" one.
Dear Citizen,
Only just now I saw your words.
This can be explained in two ways:
A. The enactment of the Sages to observe two festival days is not a full-fledged doubt, but rather an enactment to treat it as a doubt, even though the root of the enactment is indeed because of doubt.
B. It is possible that the enactment is not counting twice out of doubt, but rather two separate counting systems.
In general, even enactments of the Sages based on doubt are treated by us as certainty. For that reason we recite a blessing over Kiddush even on the second festival day in the Diaspora, and there are other examples as well, but this is not the place to elaborate.
Perhaps we will merit that the master of this place will enlighten our eyes.
Regarding the blessing over Kiddush on the second festival day, it is not clear whether this is a blessing on the day or on obeying the voice of the Sages (as in: where did He command us? In "do not deviate"). It is clear that once the Sages enact something, it is an enactment and one may recite a blessing over it, and it makes no difference whether it is founded on doubt or on some other reason. At this point there is an enactment, and one recites blessings even over rabbinic enactments such as Hanukkah (and according to some opinions, even over custom, such as the blessing on Hallel). So leave enactments out of this.
However, regarding doubtful counting, seemingly according to what I wrote there really is no proof from Rabbi Zerachiah HaLevi that doubtful counting exists (because he is speaking about the Sages instituting it—and in that case it is not considered doubtful counting). But that is not so, because counting itself is what I am discussing. In counting, unlike a blessing, the claim is that a doubtful count is not a count, and therefore here there is no distinction between enactments and personal doubt. And if these are two separate counting systems, then someone who is in doubt could also maintain two separate counting systems (after all, the doubts on all the days are all one result flowing from the other. These are not separate doubts but one doubtful system).
Even if I accept that, the Sages still have the power to institute a blessing arbitrarily over things that are not a commandment.
For example, in tractate Shabbat (69?) it is explained that someone who does not remember when the Sabbath falls observes Sabbath every seventh day of his own count, and the Ritva wrote (if I am mistaken, then one of the medieval authorities) that he recites a blessing over Kiddush.
In general, I do not think one can derive such a halakhic conclusion from Rabbi Zerachiah HaLevi's question, because his question is a conceptual one. It may well be that if they had enacted counting multiple times out of doubt, this would itself have led to the conclusion that there is no point in counting at all. Rabbi Zerachiah HaLevi's main goal is to explain why they nevertheless did not enact counting multiple times.
Regarding the proof from Rabbi Zerachiah HaLevi, it seems there is a clear distinction between a personal doubt of a private individual and a doubt that is inherent, as part of the Sages' enactment.