Q&A: The Criteria for Truth
The Criteria for Truth
Question
Hello Rabbi. When we look for an explanation for certain phenomena and several theories or approaches stand before us that try to explain them, what are the criteria by which one can determine that a certain approach is more justified, or more correct, or better proven?
I mean criteria like: consistency, logic, predictive power, and the like.
Thank you in advance.
Answer
Assuming that all the explanations account for all the phenomena, then clearly they are all consistent, otherwise there is no explanation here. Predictive power is something relatively well defined, but logic is also not clearly defined (simplicity, Occam’s razor). It is hard to give criteria. In general: simplicity and predictive power.
Discussion on Answer
That is a great riddle, but it turns out that what we call simple (which itself is not unambiguous) correlates with what turns out to be true.
See here:
Rabbi, what in your opinion is the relation between the following argument and the scientific principle of Occam’s razor?
Something is exemplary, more proven, when it is more general. That is, a principle, line of thought, or method that explains, in greater logical continuity, more phenomena—the more general it is, the more correct it is. The more many phenomena are explained systematically, the more justified the claim is compared to a claim that, according to its line of thought, explains fewer phenomena, and the certainty of its correctness increases.
Is the relation one of similarity? Of identity?
I would be glad to hear an answer.
Is that from Rabbi Kalner?
The generality of an explanation makes it simpler (because one explanation accounts for more phenomena). Simplicity has no clear criteria. For Occam, the intention was an explanation with a minimum number of entities. Today, Occam’s razor refers to a simple explanation in a general sense, without going into definitions.
I think I understood, and yes, that is from Rabbi Kalner’s book "The Criterion for Truth."
Have a good week, Rabbi. Continuing the conversation about Occam’s razor—would it be correct to say that at least part of the reason it requires (the principle) “not multiplying entities beyond necessity” is so that the scientific (or general) outlook will be based on facts and on real reasons to hold onto, and not on things lacking any factual/real basis, such as gut conjectures, thinking from the gut, and the like?
I did not understand the question. Suppose you built a theory that explains X facts using 3 entities, and another theory explains them using 2 entities. Neither one is grounded in observation (= a factual basis, in your terms). And still we prefer the second over the first.
It is not clear to me what the connection is between the simplicity of a method and its correctness. How does the fact that one method is simpler make it more correct than a more complex method that includes a larger number of concepts and laws?