Q&A: Autonomy in Jewish Law
Autonomy in Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Regarding autonomy in Jewish law:
Can we really be sure that we even know the language of the Talmud the way the medieval authorities (Rishonim) knew it, such that we can decide between the Rishonim (and all the more so according to the view of Maharshal, who holds that one can even decide unresolved doubts in the Talmud)? Seemingly, this question is important to the whole discussion. Even if we assume that, in terms of greatness in wisdom, we are allowed to disagree with earlier generations (by the way, it seems to me that Igrot Moshe explains that a sage may disagree even with those greater than himself), still we need to know the language in which we are conducting the discussion.
For example, can we know where it is possible to establish a forced interpretation and where not, when a question is merely a difficulty and when it is a conclusive refutation, and so on?
This question raises an even more complex one: what is the language of the Talmud בכלל? There is no doubt, in my humble opinion, that the style of analysis used today would have been foreign to the authors of the Talmud. Doesn’t that shut the door on our ability to discuss the words of the Talmud at all?
It should be noted that apparently the modes of thought of Rashba and Ran were also foreign to the authors of the Talmud; among the Geonim there is no hint of a similar kind of thinking to theirs. And nevertheless, the Rishonim did not refrain from analyzing Talmudic passages according to the style of thinking accepted in their own time. Do you know of anyone who has dealt with these points?
Answer
We certainly cannot be sure of anything, including whether we know the language of the Talmud as the Rishonim knew it. On the contrary, it seems they were closer to it and therefore had an advantage, although we have tools they did not have—philology and the like. But there is no need for certainty here, because the Torah was not given to ministering angels. We are supposed to act according to our own understanding, even if it is mistaken. And contrary to the way it is usually explained, in my opinion that is the meaning of “It is not in heaven.” When a heavenly voice issues from heaven, then the truth is certainly with it. The principle of “It is not in heaven” means that we are meant to follow whatever seems right to us, not the truth as such. The accepted explanation is that heaven has no authority, but without relating to the clash between autonomy and truth. The practical difference is a case where I have some tool that is not from heaven and I assume it is truer than what I myself think. According to my view, one still should not follow it. And there is proof for this from the beginning of tractate Eruvin: they did not rule Jewish law like Rabbi Meir because his colleagues could not get to the depth of his reasoning. If he was such an enormously great sage, then each of them certainly assumed that if Rabbi Meir disagreed with him, Rabbi Meir was probably right. And nevertheless they did not rule like him. From here it emerges that autonomy takes precedence over truth.
See what I wrote here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94/
And here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%90-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA/
Therefore there is no need for Igrot Moshe in order to say that one may disagree with those greater than oneself, because that is completely obvious. On the contrary, let anyone who says it is impossible bring proof. Authority in Jewish law belongs only to the Great Court, and to the Talmud, which is regarded like the Great Court, apparently by virtue of public acceptance.
Methods of analysis are not relevant here. Maimonides too would not have understood, or even imagined, Rabbi Chaim’s mode of analysis, and that does not mean Rabbi Chaim is wrong. Rabbi Chaim offers an analysis that reveals Maimonides’ intent. Maimonides himself was not aware of those tools and that language, and therefore did not think in that way. But there is still room for the claim that this is the formulation of Maimonides’ view in our language and terminology.
I do not know of anyone who dealt specifically with these points, although I touch on them from time to time, but to me it seems simple and in no need of special treatment.
I know the proof from Rabbi Meir—that they did not rule according to him even though he was apparently greater in wisdom. Maybe I saw it in your article on “These and Those Are the Words of the Living God,” which I read a few years ago. As I recall, the Ketzot also speaks about this in his introduction.
However, I have some thoughts—good ones—about this proof.
A. This saying appears at a transitional stage between aggadic material and halakhic material, so perhaps this is only aggadic material after all. (Your view of aggadah is of course known to you.)
B. One could explain that Rabbi Meir did not render decisive rulings, but rather showed arguments for prohibition and for permission, and that has some support in the words of the Talmud. We find something similar in Meiri—I do not remember where at the moment—where he complained about great sages in the Talmud who did not know how to decide Jewish law.
According to your understanding, there is a major novelty in the general rule mentioned in Avodah Zarah 7a, that Jewish law follows the one greater in wisdom. According to what you are saying, it is speaking of someone greater—but not too much greater. Perhaps, according to your understanding, the rule that Jewish law follows the one greater in wisdom applies only to someone who is in doubt, but not to someone who clearly sees reason to disagree with that greater sage.
I’ve kept it brief because I’m in a rush and today’s commandment—the whole day of the waving offering—lies before us.