Q&A: Persico on the Good
Persico on the Good
Question
What does the Rabbi think about these things that Persico wrote?
Tomer Persico on the proof for the existence of a metaphysical good that governs the changes of creation and morality:
And here is my proof for the existence of a metaphysical good.
Let us begin with two starting assumptions, which it seems to me will be accepted by all of us as facts. First, life developed by way of natural selection, according to fixed principles, over hundreds of millions of years. We will not get into the details; broadly speaking the story is understood, and I hope accepted. Second, another fact: people want to be good. Here we are dealing with the phenomenon (wonderful and awe-inspiring, in my opinion) that the overwhelming majority of human beings seek to be good and to do good. People will of course define the good in different ways, but aside from rare cases of various psychopaths, human beings strive toward the good and seek to do good.
These are the starting assumptions. And now the question: why would the evolutionary process produce that same aspiration toward the good? Would it not have been simpler, and evolutionarily cheaper, to direct human beings toward the efficient? That is, is there not something strange in the fact that we all seek the good, and are not simply drawn to the efficient (or the effective, or the worthwhile, or the profitable)? Why exactly do we need the good? Is there not, then, something puzzling in the fact that we carry within us an aspiration toward the good? Is there not something even stranger in the fact that the aspiration toward the good sometimes even comes at the expense of the efficient, when we cling to our principles even when, from an egoistic standpoint, it would be better for us to let them go?
Why were we not programmed by natural selection to pursue the efficient? To do at every moment what is most efficient for us and for others? Why were we not programmed for survival-efficiency, for us and for our tribe? Why do we not feel an attraction to maximizing at every moment the greatest efficiency that reality offers us and our community? Why did we not develop in such a way that at every opportunity and in every choice we would do what is most advantageous for our survival and for society?
It seems to me that logic would say that such creatures, efficient and active, would be much easier to program, cheaper to operate, and generally much more, well, efficient. If the evolutionary process is based on natural selection through the genetic replication of the fittest, is it not logical that creatures like us would have developed without a yearning for the good (abstract and concrete), but only equipped with uncompromising determination for efficiency?
Wait, I know what you are thinking. Look, you say, apparently we need some such concept, “the good,” in order for motivation truly to arise in us to do efficient things. Apparently, if you simply call it “efficiency,” it will not move us in the evolutionarily optimal way to do what is required. It is simply too weak, not attractive enough, it does not motivate us efficiently enough. For that reason, over the course of the evolutionary process, this concept, “the good,” took shape, and it is nothing but an efficient illusion—and it is what moves us to action.
But ah, I say, your answer begs the question. Think about it: why is what is merely efficient not attractive enough to us? Why do we need something beyond, something exalted, a category that is not satisfied with what is profitable and rises to what is binding? Why does efficiency not plant sufficient motivation within us? Does living only for what is profitable not arouse in us that same passion? Why is there no choice but to aspire to the good?
My answer is that the good exists. The good exists, and therefore a long process of natural selection “identifies” it in reality and acts accordingly; that is, creatures are formed that are directed to survive in a reality in which it exists. This happens just as natural selection “identifies” gravity and sunlight and tends to develop creatures that fit the reality in which they exist. The good exists as a constant in reality. As if it were a physical force or a chemical element. Or like time. The good exists. And creatures that develop in a universe in which there is good develop accordingly. They grow senses that identify the good, and they grow into creatures that aspire toward the good.
Answer
The argument is old and not his. I agree with it partially. One can argue that the good is the useful thing (for the survival of the gene, not the individual person), as people say regarding the survival value of altruism. I argue this on the basis of the concept of the good and its validity, not on the basis of the tendency to do good. See the fourth notebook, third part.
Also, his formulation seems strange to me. He wants to prove the existence of a metaphysical good. Is this an object or a phenomenon? As an object, this is what people call God (that is what I assumed in my fourth notebook). If he means the phenomenon of metaphysical good, the proof is not clear to me, because it begs the question. He argues that the good is not practical but metaphysical (because it is done without benefit), and from this he proves that… there is a metaphysical good. Well, obviously—those are the facts. The question is what the explanation for them is.
Of course, one can speak of moral realism (the existence of the Idea of the Good, the recognition of which motivates action), but if this is a fact, one cannot derive a moral obligation (a norm) from it, because of the naturalistic fallacy. And if this is a loaded fact (one that motivates action, not a neutral one), then as far as I am concerned that is a synonym for God. In the notebooks I pointed out that every argument assumes a different definition of the God whose existence it proves. The argument from morality assumes Him as the basis of moral validity.
Discussion on Answer
The fact that God exists is a fact like any other fact. No norm or obligation follows from it. But if God created an Idea of the good, then its existence is indeed enough to obligate, just as the divine command (which is also only a fact) obligates. If God exists, that in itself does not create obligations, but from there the possibility opens up for the existence of such an Idea, which is a “loaded fact.”
I have a few points that I would like the Rabbi to clarify, if possible:
1. Regarding the naturalistic fallacy: if recognition of the Idea as a fact does not entail moral action, then why would the fact that God exists entail moral action?
2. What is the difference between a phenomenon and an object on the metaphysical level? After all, an object belongs to the physical, and therefore the metaphysical is necessarily some kind of metaphysical phenomenon.
You wrote: “If this is a loaded fact (one that motivates action, not a neutral one), then as far as I am concerned that is a synonym for God.”
I do not understand how God motivates action, and why specifically a metaphysical good is necessarily God… Is it because it is the only thing that receives evidence for its metaphysical existence, and therefore this points to its being the first cause?
Thank you,
Or