Can one say that this follows from the fact that, in terms of the definition of a reason, one could argue that the mere fact that it is possible that I am mistaken is not included under that definition (but is at most a description of a situation, for example)? Or is that indeed a reason by definition, just not a “sufficient” reason?

That is mere semantics. You can decide as you wish.

But where does this trust in intuitions come from? You would surely argue that anyone who wants to believe always starts from fundamental assumptions that have no explanation, and the skeptical claim is like an infinite regress of skepticism. And on the other hand, belief in fundamental assumptions is not necessarily arbitrary.
But still, why accept this assumption…

The question of where trust in intuition comes from is based on a mistake. The meaning of intuition is that this is what I think. So you are asking why I should accept what I think? With what tools do you propose that I answer that? This is a skeptical claim, and I am not troubled by such claims.
To my mind, this is similar to someone asking: true, I understand that morality forbids theft, but it is still not clear to me why not steal? That question expresses a lack of understanding. When one says that morality forbids theft, one is thereby saying that we ought not steal. Someone who asks that does not really understand that morality forbids stealing. For him, it is a descriptive statement (= people think that it is forbidden to steal). But a moral claim is not descriptive but prescriptive (a prohibition against stealing).

Thank you, but I did not understand your argument in the debate about determinism.
You argue that if a person’s system of beliefs is forced on him, there is no reason to think he will draw conclusions correctly. Because most systems will not draw the correct conclusion.
But you too agree that there are fundamental assumptions that you have no way to ground. Just as judgment itself is built into some mechanism that can distinguish truth from falsehood, even though you have no outside knowledge that it is indeed correct.
The same idea exists for the determinist. He too has a system of fundamental assumptions, but the difference is that for him he derives the conclusions deterministically, without additional judgment. And according to the libertarian view, only the fundamental assumptions are forced on him, but the rest of the conclusions he derives with the addition of judgment?
And therefore, just as you regard the fundamental assumptions as reliable and not needing additional grounding (also because you do not have any), so too the determinist regards the system *as a whole* as reliable and not requiring additional grounding.

This is exactly what I keep explaining here for the tenth time. There is a difference between “there is no reason to assume it is true” and “there is reason to assume it is not true.” When I hold some position, you can argue against me that maybe it is not correct (= what is the reason to assume it is correct?). That is negative doubt. When you hold an absurd position, that is, choose one option out of a million others, that is positive doubt, because there is a positive reason to say that you are mistaken.
If I were arbitrarily adopting one fundamental assumption out of a million possible ones (that is, making a random selection), you would be right. But I adopt one of them because I think it is correct; here you can only ask why I think so.

Why do you think so?

Just because.

If so, why is that reliable? After all, most positions, whatever they may be, are mistakes. So in column 175 you wrote (unlike here!) that to solve this, you assume in the background a subject/control system that is not computation according to criteria. Judgment of that sort is by definition free, and precisely because of that one can trust it. Because you simply see that it is correct, and that is that.
But the question can be directed at that too. Most subjects make mistakes. So in all these discussions you have only pushed the skeptical question one step back…

I will explain once more and stop here, because it seems to me this has been squeezed dry to the last drop of blood.
When I say “just because,” I do not mean something arbitrary. I mean something that cannot and need not be justified. It is self-evident. It is what I think. You ask why I think so, but it is not clear what answer you expect. After all, when I give a reason, you will again ask why. This chain stops at a point that is self-evident, that does not need a justification underlying it. When you ask about that, I will tell you, “just because.”
By contrast, in positive doubt the claim is that your “just because” is arbitrary. You are adopting something that is not reasonable, and for that there is no explanation of “just because.” I decide that there are 1,473 fairies above the tree in my yard. Why? Just because. I have no way to see fairies and ascertain their existence, certainly not to count them. So why did I decide on 1,473? Because I felt like it. That is an unreasonable position, and regarding it I will not accept an explanation of “just because,” because it is an arbitrary “just because.” Here the doubt is positive, and it requires an explanation. But to the question why I believe what I see, I will accept an answer of “just because.” Because at least in my view I do have access to my sight and can judge it. Maybe I am mistaken, and about that the skeptic may wonder. But that is negative wondering, and I am not troubled by it.
And it really does not matter whether an overwhelming majority of the possible positions are errors. I chose this position because it seems true to me, not by lottery. So why should I care about the distribution? It is like the example of the piece of meat in the market with a seal, where clearly we would not follow the majority of stores in the city. But I have already explained all this ad nauseam, and I am in an advanced state of exhaustion.

Thank you very much for the answer; I hope you have not moved into a very advanced state of exhaustion.
It is understood that fundamental assumptions do not require further grounding by definition, as fundamental assumptions. Likewise, the claim is understood that positive doubt can also easily challenge fundamental assumptions.
The question I still have is why negative doubt is not a good objection. After all, everyone agrees that most systems are defective, so when I ask whether vision is reliable, you will argue that it is, and that in your view too you have access to your sight and can judge whether it is reliable. But when we ask about the control system itself, there will no longer be a good answer there. Does that hesitation not turn the doubt into positive doubt?
(And therefore, I think that in fact there is no difference in the force of the skepticism between your claim that the subject is reliable from your point of view, and a determinist, by contrast, claiming that the whole system is reliable from his point of view. But in any case, on that part I think we can agree to disagree.)
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Yes, I am exhausted, and pardon me, but this is the last time I will answer here (because it has already been explained several times). A probabilistic calculation of the number of systems in general and the percentage of them that are reliable is relevant only in a place where I am making a random draw. In a place where I choose one system because it seems correct to me, those probabilities have no significance at all. See my explanation in the original thread about the piece of meat with the seal. Probability comes to compensate for lack of information. When there is information, probability has no significance. If I know that the die came up even, it is not correct to say that the chance it landed on 3 is one-sixth. At that point it is one-third.

Thank you very much, and have a good week!
But there is something in this answer that is not clear to me. If the chance of producing a good system is so low and negligible, then as long as I do not place full trust in my choice (say, only 90%), does that not still mean that the chance that I ended up with an unreliable system is significantly high?
Or by another analogy that I think is similar: if I place 90% trust in my eyes, and right now I see a certain item, for example a prayer book, the chance that the prayer book really exists before me approaches zero (the number of Jewish prayer books in the world relative to all the items in the world is far less than one in a billion). Does that tiny chance not outweigh my 90% trust in my eyes?

Thank you very much, and have a good week!
But there is one point that is not so clear to me in this claim. If the chance that the control system is defective is significantly high, then even if I place a high degree of trust in intuition, should the probabilistic claim not still be preferable?
I thought of another analogy for the same idea. If I place 90% trust in my visual system, and right now I see an uncommon object like a prayer book, the chance that I encountered it out of all the other objects in the world (including those of the gentiles) approaches zero.
Is it still not statistically more correct to attribute what I saw to an optical illusion? After all, the chance of that is negligible.
And on the other side, when would it be reasonable to argue that there is an optical illusion (like a mirage in the desert), if we always place high trust in the visual system?

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