Haha, not long ago there was a discussion here about this. And now I’m asking the Rabbi, on the subject of meaning, a somewhat similar question.

If I understood correctly, you hold that there are only two reasons to serve God: A. because of some kind of religious feeling—if you have it then great, and if not then you can’t be persuaded. B. because of gratitude for your very existence, since everything comes from Him. Right?

It’s not a religious feeling, but an understanding that there is a religious obligation. If you don’t have it, maybe there’s nothing to be done—just like someone who has no sense of moral obligation.

A moral feeling is a feeling that has logic behind it—not to harm another person. But here I know that it won’t add anything to God, so even if I have some feeling toward Him, reason should tell me that I ought to overcome it.

How do you know that? Who revealed this secret to you? He Himself explicitly tells us otherwise: “Do you thus repay the Lord, O foolish and unwise people? Is He not your Father, your Master? He made you and established you.”

Why isn’t the command itself enough? God commanded, and that’s that. The question of what the obligation is to fulfill the command is not significant in relation to the command itself. The command exists. I command Rabbi Michael Abraham to practice tango dancing for two hours a day. Does the Rabbi want to fulfill the command? He has free choice. But the command remains in force—that is, as my command. I commanded even without obligations of gratitude and so on. God also added punishment and reward (as incentives?) and created in us free choice: whether to carry out His command or not. The factor that makes one listen to His command does not matter for understanding the command at the theological level. God asked something of you, and you can comply and you can refuse. Why give legitimacy to the well-known four-year-old’s question, “Why?”, regarding fulfilling the command?! From here on, it has to do with each person’s own considerations, whoever he may be. The fact that the verse brings an argument against those who shirk His service, may He be blessed, goes beyond the command and is not the reason for the command. The verse says that there are also bad character traits here. I feel like I’m missing something in understanding the Rabbi’s words.

I didn’t understand this point, or what you’re missing. The question is why there is an obligation to fulfill the command. The existence of the command is a mere fact.

I am commanded and bound by the command. I am not indebted. Why assume that beyond the command there is an obligation?

Take morality. A divine command regarding morality is a fact. But it still doesn’t follow from that that if I didn’t act that way, then I did something wrong. That is the obligation, and it goes beyond the mere existence of a command.

The Rabbi wrote: “But it still doesn’t follow from that that if I didn’t act that way, then I did something wrong.” Fine—but that doesn’t scare me. “Wrong” is not a Torah parameter. The Torah said not to desecrate the Sabbath, and if one desecrates it, he is to be stoned. There is no description saying that the desecration is “wrong.” The Torah said not to lie with a male, and if one lies with him, he is to be stoned. And it is an abomination. When we found descriptions, we found them; and where there are none, there are none.
And I also didn’t understand the point the Rabbi emphasizes, that a command is a fact. True. And the fact tells us that God commanded us. The content of the fact is that one who acts according to 613 certain laws is acting according to the Creator’s command. (And doing it for its own sake is a separate issue: a manner of performing the act, not the engine behind the command.) A command is just a command, with no engine at all. The king commands you to bow. You are not obligated to bow. But you are commanded. You can choose yes or no. And the king also adds punishment or reward. Instead of getting tangled up in what the obligation is, let’s solve the problem by saying that there is no need for obligation at all!

That is simply not correct. See Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 67, and read it carefully.

There’s one problem here that needs solving! Namely, when the response gets long, it shortens the rest of the “Leave a Reply” area, like clicking the “Reply” button. Oren, are you listening? And therefore, in my abundant kindness, I’ll split my response in two. Here it comes:
So here’s the thing. The meaning of my words—that there is a legitimate option to violate a command, only it carries punishment—was completely shattered by Sefer HaChinukh. Good thing I didn’t mean that. And since the Rabbi asked me to read carefully, who am I that I should not fulfill what his mouth has said, and as is well known, the fear of your teacher should be like the fear of Heaven. So I thought maybe the Rabbi is trying to infer from his wording, “aside from violating His will, which is the hardest of all.” Maybe from here the Rabbi concluded that this is such a grave thing because of “Do you thus repay the Lord, O foolish and unwise people? Is He not your Father, your Master? He made you and established you.” And according to how you read Sefer HaChinukh, a command by itself cannot be so severe. Necessarily, then, its severity stems from the meaning of the great force of the obligation. I admit that at first glance I liked the inference. On second glance I still like it, but old difficulties are harder than new ones, and I have to challenge the understanding of Sefer HaChinukh because, once again,

in my view the whole issue is violating the command. And that itself is the severity of any command whatsoever, no matter from whose mouth it comes. And violating someone’s command is more severe in terms of my crime against him than being punished by him. (I have to note that this is inspired by Kant—I don’t know exactly what he says about the categorical imperative, but from there I got the idea that violating a command is violating a command. And my thanks go to the Rabbi, who made me aware of the categorical imperative in his book!!) So I sin against the commander when I transgress His will. And that is the hardest of all. Because the whole prevention is His will. If the Rabbi meant a different inference, I’d be happy to read about it. I had already started writing about rejecting another possible inference that I didn’t think the Rabbi intended, but I decided to spare you. Thank you very much.

If the “Reply” button disappears on you, don’t panic. Write your whole response, and then press TAB and the “Reply” button will appear.

As for your point, the inference from Sefer HaChinukh isn’t important here (even though it is correct). There is no way to explain that a command has force just because there is a command. The question is why fulfill the command? The same goes for moral values: the mere fact that there is a command about them does not create moral obligation. The moral obligation stems from the fact that they are “right.” The categorical imperative is also composed of these two elements: the existence of the command (by virtue of a commander) and its being right (the content of the command).
From another angle: you agree that violating the command not only brings punishment, but is itself problematic. The question is why. Perforce, you arrive at “right” values—that is, valid and binding ones (such as obeying commands). So either way, you’ve arrived at the plane I’m talking about.
I think we’ve clarified it, and let the chooser choose.