Did you mean to write that the cosmological argument assumes that the principle of causality does not apply to Him, rather than proving it? Right? Because you wrote the opposite.

No. Surprisingly enough, I meant exactly what I wrote.

Then I didn’t understand. Seemingly you’re writing contradictory sentences:

1. "If the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world, it is reasonable to infer that He had some purpose in doing so. In essence, this is an application of the principle of causality: if something was done, it was done for some reason or for some purpose." Meaning, the principle of causality applies to God.
2. "The cosmological argument proves that the principle of causality does not apply to Him" meaning, the principle of causality does not apply to God.

Daniel, distinguish between a cause and a reason.

What’s contradictory? There is no cause, but there is a purpose.

Until now I understood the principle of causality to mean that every event has a cause. You’re basically expanding the principle and adding that purpose also falls under the principle of causality.
And then you say that the principle of causality in the sense of cause does not apply to God, but the principle of causality in the sense of purpose does apply to God.

Did I understand correctly?

Correct.

Where in science can we encounter the principle of causality in the sense of purpose?

First of all, who said it has to be encountered in science? Second, it certainly can be. In many cases science gives purposive explanations (mainly in fields above physics and chemistry, from biology to psychology, history, and sociology). But even in physics there are such explanations, like minimum principles, and in fact in my view they are broader than causal explanations. See the third notebook, chapter 11, on this.

Okay. I understand that I don’t sufficiently understand the principle of causality. I’ll do my homework.

Another point: why, in this case, do you think it is reasonable to attribute a human trait to God, when usually we do not attribute human traits to Him?

Because this is not a human trait but logic. One doesn’t do something if there’s no benefit in it and it has no purpose. A human trait is getting angry when someone upsets you. That’s human psychology.

The Rabbi writes that one doesn’t do something if it has no benefit, and that this is logic and not a human trait. But a hurricane takes place even though it has no benefit or purpose. And so does the rest of inanimate nature.

First, you don’t know whether it has a cause or not. But beyond that, this is not an action of someone who decided on it, but a natural occurrence. That has a cause, not a purpose.
You are apparently assuming that everything that happens in the world is done by the Holy One, blessed be He, and that is not so. I wrote about this here (search for the question of evil).

The Rabbi wrote that I don’t know whether it has a cause or not. True, and until I know that as I know it in the case of human beings, I start from the assumption that this exists only among human beings and not in other things. So it makes sense to say that this is a human trait.
The Rabbi wrote that this is not an action of someone but a natural occurrence. It seems from the Rabbi’s words that I wasn’t understood as I wanted to be. I didn’t mean to argue that if God, at the beginning of creation, assigned a purpose to creation, then every natural action has a purpose. Rather, I meant to prove that setting purposes is a human trait. And the proof is that all non-human natural things do not set purposes for their actions, as far as we know—for example, a hurricane. I very much hope I understood the Rabbi.

It is a trait of entities that make decisions, not of human beings specifically. Natural events are not the product of a decision. One decides to do something if it has a purpose.

That’s exactly the problem. Human beings decide in order to reach a certain purpose. That’s as far as our knowledge goes. Why should we assume that other decision-making entities also act that way?

I already explained. If you don’t agree—that’s fine. But what’s the point of repeating the same thing again?!

The point is the point of a student who has absorbed the principle the Rabbi emphasizes so much—begging the question. So it’s hard for me to accept that we simply disagree.
Have a good day!

Purpose belongs to entities within the time system. In the present I am at point x, I want to be in the future at point y, so I do an action that will lead me to the goal. But if there is no time and no change, then it makes no sense to act for the sake of a future goal.
And seemingly, with the Holy One, blessed be He, there is no time and no change.

And let us say amen.
In my opinion, absolutely not.

And in general, who told you that He is not within the time system? (assuming you and I even understand what that means)

So let’s not use the concept of time if it complicates things.

Maimonides writes that there is no change in Him, and whoever is not subject to change cannot be said to act for the sake of a purpose. Because achieving a purpose is necessarily a change—a change from a state in which the purpose has not been achieved to a state in which it has been achieved.

Maimonides also writes various things about our purpose in the world and about the purpose of the Holy One, blessed be He. If you accept his premises, I don’t understand the discussion. If you are putting everything to the test of logic, I don’t understand why you accept that He is above changes but don’t accept that He has a purpose.
Specifically, I disagree with Maimonides and with your conclusions from him on several levels (and here I will indeed bring in the concept of time):
A. In my opinion, change can apply even to a perfect being. There is no problem with that. In two ways: 1. A change between two states of equal perfection. 2. His perfection is a function of time and not momentary (He is above time, remember?)
B. Even if change did not apply to Him, that does not mean that time does not apply to Him. Time has an independent status irrespective of changes. Change usually happens along the axis of time, but time does not depend on change.
C. The fact that change usually happens along the time axis says nothing at all. Simultaneous causality is בהחלט possible. Quite a few philosophers have pointed out that every change is like this (for if it is not, then there is some time at which the cause occurred but the effect did not, and that contradicts its being a cause. Of course this can be analyzed and rejected, but this is only an example).
In fact, as far as I’m concerned, there can even be change backward in time. The cause is at time t=3 and the result at time 2. The fact that this doesn’t happen for us is because we exist within time in a certain way. And even among us there are philosophers and physicists who toy with time travel (though in my opinion that is problematic, and I even devoted a column to it). Concepts like choice or condition contain an element of going back in time in the legal sphere.
Notice that now you are anthropomorphizing the Holy One, blessed be He, after having begun by accusing me of doing so.

Clarification: wishing you a good day was not, God forbid, sarcastic. It truly comes from appreciation for the enterprise the Rabbi has built here.

All good. And sarcasm is also perfectly fine. I’m the last person who would object to a bit of refreshing sarcasm.

Why does the Rabbi assume that the first cause has a will?
And even if you hold that He has a will, it’s important to remember that for Him everything was "permitted" and He legislated everything, so if so how can He choose for the sake of a purpose? Either because He legislated all the values, or because for Him it’s all just picking.

Because a complex and purposive product is produced by intention and planning. As with the second law of thermodynamics. I explained it there.

Thank you very much for the time and patience. I didn’t understand everything the Rabbi wrote, but I got food for thought.

In your last response you wrote:

"As with the second law of thermodynamics. I explained it there." Where is "there"?

In the third notebook