Q&A: Clarifications Regarding the Rabbi’s Approach
Clarifications Regarding the Rabbi’s Approach
Question
Hello and blessings.
Over the past few months I’ve been visiting the site a lot, and I’m very much enjoying it and being enriched by it. Thank you.
I wanted to ask the Rabbi a few questions about the character of his approach.
1. It’s impossible not to notice the puzzling combination in the method the Rabbi presents here (and in the booklets and his books) between an ontological perspective and Kantian subjectivism. How can there be a jump from one to the other in your worldview?
2. Another puzzling matter is why the Rabbi accepts that it is not the place of reason to validate the details of the commandments (for example, is there really such a thing as an evil spirit that rests on the hands and requires us to pour water over them every morning), while when it comes to thinking about the foundations of faith, the Rabbi immediately calls on everyone to use their reason and examine every word found in the literature of the Sages.
If reason has nothing to say regarding religious functioning in all its details (since these are divine commands, etc.), why does the Rabbi not approach the world of thought in the same way as well, and adopt for himself the uninvestigative perspective that most Jewish sages seem to have adopted?
3. On the left side of the site here there appears a paragraph by Rabbi Kook of blessed memory about the fear of thought.
Does the Rabbi really think that Rabbi Kook’s intention in those words is identical to what the Rabbi means in his criticism of the religious world that glorifies fear of thought?
After all, it is not as though Rabbi Kook’s approach is based on rationalism and on constantly putting beliefs to the test of criticism.
It seems to me that he meant something else.
Many thanks and more power to you.
Answer
Hello.
- Kant is not subjective. I’ve written about this in several places on the site (for example in the latest column).
- The factual basis of Jewish law is certainly subject to examination by reason. Therefore, in my view, there is a complete prohibition on killing a louse on the Sabbath. If I become convinced that there is no evil spirit (perhaps it’s psychology?), then a Jewish law based on that is also void. But in order to nullify something, especially without a Sanhedrin, one must be certain. By the way, specifically regarding the washing of the hands at the end of a meal, quite a few halakhic decisors did in fact nullify it because there is no Sodomite salt, and there are other examples as well. The difference is not between thought and Jewish law, but between facts and norms. I’ve explained that too in several places on the site.
- That really doesn’t matter to me. I am not intending to claim anything at all about Rabbi Kook, only to use his words as an illustration of my policy on the site.
Discussion on Answer
Regarding no. 3: if you’re not making a claim about him, and it’s only an illustration, then what’s the point of all this? Just write your view and that’s it.
Almost no norm is based on dry facts alone. The question is how likely it is to get confused about “He causes the dew” in a way that justifies repeating it. But as I wrote to you, in a place where the basis is a clearly factual determination, and it is clear to you that it is mistaken, the Jewish law built on it is void.
And if so, what then is the place of the concept “when the reason is nullified, the enactment is not nullified”?
Not related. “The reason is nullified” is a different situation from a case where from the outset the reason was never correct. The second case is an enactment founded on an error, and it is void on its own, like a mistaken transaction. If the sages who enacted it had known this, they themselves would not have enacted it. A case where the reason is nullified is one where the enactment was originally correct, but now a new situation has arisen.
Beyond that, it is possible that the nullification of the reason is not effective because one cannot know with certainty that this really is the reason and that it has indeed been nullified. But if one knows with certainty that the reason has been nullified, perhaps this rule does not apply. And after all, the halakhic decisors bring dozens of examples of enactments and decrees that sages nullified once their reason was nullified (such as the decisors who permit medical treatment on the Sabbath because there is no concern one will grind herbs, or those who permit uncovered water, or exempt from washing the hands at the end of a meal, and many more examples. See the last chapter of Neria Gutel’s book The Changing of Natures, and my article here on the site about nullifying enactments).
But a norm too is based on a certain assessment. What happens if today psychology has a different assessment?
For example, the law regarding someone who is in doubt whether he forgot to say “He causes the rain to fall” includes the rule of up to thirty days, etc. What happens if today, in light of more precise assessments, we arrive at a different conclusion regarding recollection—would the halakhic norm change? And so on.