Q&A: Psychopath, Punishment, and Morality
Psychopath, Punishment, and Morality
Question
Is a psychopath who has no emotions (but does have a brilliant mind) grounds for leniency in punishment, when that same psychopath acted immorally?
Apparently yes. That is the accepted view, since he has no emotions. But in light of your view—which is correct—that morality is located in the mind, then there is no reason at all to reduce the punishment! Do you agree?
Answer
Absolutely not.
A person who lacks empathy has grounds for leniency in punishment (even to the point of complete exemption). Empathy provides a person with the data that must then be weighed in the mind (in the intellect). See Column 259. A person who does not feel the other does not understand his suffering and the significance of his own actions with respect to the other, and therefore has difficulty making moral decisions.
Discussion on Answer
A. Can’t the psychopath understand Kant’s categorical imperative?
B. Is judgment the factor without which there are no grounds for punishment? A person does not need to make moral decisions. It is enough that he know what to refrain from doing (and even that is not correct according to the law, because ignorance of the law does not exempt one from punishment). If the purpose of punishment is as a deterrent, then in any case there is no need for judgment. If there is a death penalty for excluding women and I exclude them even though I have no clue or understanding of what it feels like to be excluded as a woman, would I be exempt from the death penalty?
C. If we say that the basis for liability is judgment, then it follows that the punishment will always be identical despite differences between the forbidden acts and their consequences.
A. Hazi, I explained this. We are not talking about understanding the categorical imperative, but about understanding that such an action causes suffering to another person and the meaning of that suffering. A sociopath also does not necessarily have an intellectual impairment.
B. Refraining is also a decision. And indeed you would be exempt from punishment if you do not know. Coercion in one’s beliefs is coercion, and it exempts from punishment.
C. Not true. Negligence that leads to death is not the same as negligence that leads to injury or monetary loss.
All these topics have been discussed on the site ad nauseam in the past.
A. I’m only saying that according to Kant there is no basis for being lenient with a psychopath. Does the Rabbi agree? If not, why not? Understanding the other person’s inner world is not a parameter in Kant’s world. (I understand that, to the extent that the Rabbi tries to erase the world of emotions, they are in fact what shape his moral world—is that possible?)
B. What does the concept of decision have to do with this? Since when does an unintentional sinner become someone acting under coercion? Why doesn’t the Rabbi agree that it is enough simply to know that the thing is forbidden (regardless of who decided the prohibition or whether the person committing the act decides that it is forbidden)? The whole point of the prohibition is that people refrain from doing it, and in order to achieve that goal one needs to know what to avoid, and in order for that to be enforced there must be punishment as deterrence. What is incorrect about this presentation of the matter? (As for the Radbaz and coercion of belief, I did not find it according to the source cited in the link the Rabbi sent. Could you please indicate the location for me? Is there only one responsa collection of the Radbaz?)
C. Thanks. Where?
A happy Hanukkah, full of light
I’ll answer one last time, because we’ve exhausted this.
A. I explained.
B. Knowledge is enough, but if you are coerced in your beliefs then you do not have knowledge. I am speaking about essential lack of knowledge (when you could not have known, because you took into account the best considerations available to you), not about an unintentional sinner.
See Radbaz responsa, vol. 2, sec. 187.
C. Search.
See more on these matters here:
I searched both online and in the book itself and couldn’t find such a section in volume 2. Volume 2 begins with section 589.
A mistake. I meant vol. 4, sec. 187:
“And I found no reason to exempt him from punishment other than that he errs in his reasoning, and his attempted correction is itself his corruption. And this case is no worse than one who errs in one of the principles of the faith because of his flawed reasoning, who is not therefore called a heretic. For Hillel too was a great man and erred in one of the principles of the faith when he said: ‘Israel has no messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.’ Yet because of this error they did not consider him a heretic, Heaven forbid, for if so, how could they cite a teaching in his name? And the reason is clear: since his denial stems only from the fact that he thinks what arose in his reasoning is true, he is therefore under coercion and exempt.”
Ah, nice. Thanks for the answer