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Q&A: Possibilities

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Originally published:
This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

Possibilities

Question

Hi,
It is accepted by everyone, I hope, that there is no meaning to a claim that expresses a thing and its opposite. A Jew either has a long nose or a non-long nose. The claim about the “existence” of some “other” Jew (who simultaneously has both the property of a long nose and the property of a non-long nose) is meaningless.
But it seems that everyone also accepts the following principle, which is almost the opposite:
The possibilities of the Jewish nose (in terms of its length) exist simultaneously side by side. After all, we are not talking about an actual nose with actual dimensions, but only about the nose’s “capacity” (possibility) to have those properties. According to this, a Jew’s nose has the potential to exist in infinitely many different lengths.
And in a more fundamental philosophical formulation: potential properties can contradict one another.
Now my question is: how does this wonder work with potential properties? After all, we regard the three laws of thought as a necessary logical foundation from which one cannot deviate, yet here, seemingly, we have deviated from them. There is supposedly a thing and its opposite here, and yet it is still meaningful.
Or would you perhaps say that the way I framed things was incorrect?

Answer

I don’t see the problem. As far as the laws of nature are concerned, clearly genetics determines it: either there will be a long nose or there won’t. But there are principled possibilities that the genetics could have been different. I can decide to do X, and I can also decide to do Y (= not X). What contradiction is there in that?

Discussion on Answer

Doron (2020-01-01)

So, in your view, statements about potential properties are compatible with the three laws of thought?
There is no difference, relevant to my question, between claims of this type and claims of that type?

Michi (2020-01-01)

You cannot say both “possibly x” and “it is not true that possibly x.” But there is no contradiction between “possibly x” and “possibly not x.” Possibility and negation are not commutative operators.

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