Q&A: Marital Relations Through Marriage with an Arab Muslim Woman
Marital Relations Through Marriage with an Arab Muslim Woman
Question
Honorable Rabbi Michael Abraham, greetings,
I have a question of Jewish law: is it permitted to live a married intimate life with an Arab Muslim woman, based on the sources I will cite below? I saw a responsum of yours that forbids marriage with non-Jewish women, but I did not see any reference to these sources.
Avodah Zarah 64b:
“Who is a resident alien? Anyone who accepted before three associates not to worship idols; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: anyone who accepted upon himself the seven commandments that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves. Others say: these have not reached the status of a resident alien; rather, who is a resident alien? A convert who eats carcasses, who accepted upon himself to observe all the commandments stated in the Torah except for the prohibition of carcasses. One may set aside wine with him, but one may not deposit wine with him, even in a city whose majority is Jewish. But one may set aside wine with him even in a city whose majority are idol worshipers, for his oil is like his wine. His oil is like his wine, could that enter your mind? Does oil become libation wine? Rather, his wine is like his oil. But in every other respect he is like an idol worshiper. Rabban Shimon says: his wine is libation wine, and some say: it is permitted for drinking. In any case it teaches: in every other matter he is like an idol worshiper. For what halakhic purpose? Is it not that he may nullify idolatry like an idol worshiper? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, for granting permission and nullifying permission.”
It therefore appears that a resident alien, who according to the Sages is defined as one who keeps the seven Noahide commandments, is considered like a Jew in every respect except for granting permission and nullifying permission. If so, seemingly we would say that it should also be possible to marry a female resident alien.
I will also bring a source from another angle, from Avodah Zarah 36b:
“Returning to the matter itself: Bali said that Avimi of Nehardea said in the name of Rav: Their bread, and their oil, their wine, and their daughters, all of them are among the eighteen decrees. What is the issue with their daughters? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They decreed that their daughters are menstruants from their cradle. And Geneiva said in the name of Rav: They decreed all of them because of idolatry. For when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: They decreed regarding their bread because of their oil. What advantage does oil have over bread? Rather, they decreed regarding their bread and their oil because of their wine, and regarding their wine because of their daughters, and regarding their daughters because of something else, and regarding that other thing because of still another thing. Their daughters? But that is from the Torah, as it is written: ‘You shall not intermarry with them’! By Torah law, that refers to the seven nations, but not to other idol worshipers; and they came and decreed even regarding other idol worshipers. And according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who said: ‘For he will turn your son away from following Me’—this includes all who cause turning away—what is there to say? Rather, by Torah law the prohibition is marital relations by way of marriage, and they came and decreed even relations by way of promiscuity.”
It should be noted that here, as I understand it, it really says “gentiles” and not “idol worshipers,” and this is due to Christian censorship. Still, the reason for the prohibition is “because of something else,” that is, incitement to idolatry. Rashi writes: “And their daughters are forbidden because of something else—idolatry.” And that is also clearly the reason from what was said in the quotation above: “to include all who cause turning away,” where seemingly Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai did not even say that all non-Jewish women are forbidden, but only those who lead one to idolatry.
If the reason is indeed concern for incitement to idolatry, then in a case involving a nation that affirms the unity of God and does not even accept the doctrine of partnership, like Christians, it would seem that this reason does not apply. Here I would say, just as we say that women are permitted to serve as prayer leaders because nowadays there is no issue of “the dignity of the congregation,” and likewise that homosexual men are forbidden to sleep under one blanket because even though they are Jews they are still “suspected of male homosexual relations,” so too where there is no danger of idolatry in marriage to a non-Jewish woman, since she and her nation affirm the unity of God, the rabbinic decree forbidding intermarriage is not relevant to her.
In my opinion, it is clear from the passage that the matter of menstruant, non-Jewish woman, maidservant, and married woman applies only within the discussion of intercourse by way of promiscuity, not marital relations by way of marriage (which may also be interpreted, formally in Jewish law, as concubinage). This is a continuation of the discussion in: “Rather, by Torah law the prohibition is marital relations by way of marriage, and they came and decreed even relations by way of promiscuity”—that is, they decreed regarding promiscuous relations within the categories of menstruant, non-Jewish woman, maidservant, and married woman.
Support can also be drawn from Meiri there—Beit HaBechirah, Avodah Zarah 36b:
“We already explained above that ordinary gentile wine was originally forbidden because of intermarriage; but once they saw that fondness for libation was strong among them, they were stricter with it regarding prohibition of benefit and minor impurity, as was explained. And this is what they said in the last chapter: the wine of a resident alien is like his oil. And although it is possible to explain this because he is not particular about the touch of a gentile, most commentators agree to explain it because of intermarriage; and from there the later sages learned in these regions to forbid the wine of certain nations for drinking even though they are not idol worshipers and they affirm divine unity, as was explained.”
According to Meiri, there are two reasons to forbid the wine of a resident alien:
A. Because of the touch of a gentile (say, a friend of the resident alien who is not himself a resident alien, as Rashi says regarding a resident alien in Avodah Zarah 64b: “His wine is libation wine—because he is not particular about the touch of an idol worshiper”).
B. Because of intermarriage. The reality Meiri describes is that in certain places the sages forbid the wine of resident aliens (Muslims and Christians).
If only one of the reasons were enough to forbid the wine, then the wine should have been forbidden everywhere. But Meiri writes “in these regions,” meaning by combining the two reasons together, and then it is understandable that there are places where the wine is forbidden only because of gentile touch, except that this reason alone is not sufficient, because the very touch of a gentile in wine is forbidden only because of intermarriage, as stated: “and regarding their wine because of their daughters.” And specifically in that way, the wine is forbidden.
According to this understanding, Meiri was not at all concerned about intermarriage with a resident alien, but only about the touch of an idolatrous gentile on the wine of the resident alien, which is forbidden because of intermarriage with the idolatrous gentile.
Thank you in advance,
A.
Answer
I can’t get into the details right now, so I’ll answer briefly.
The first argument is too speculative a textual inference to build on. The only distinction in the context under discussion is nullifying permission, but that does not mean there is no other distinction.
The second argument is problematic in my opinion, because there is a concern here about incitement to non-observance of the commandments. The fact that nowadays there is no idolatry does not materially change the situation. In addition, one would have to discuss here the issue of deriving the law from the reason given in the verse.
There is also the issue of procreation. It is not clear to me whether a person fulfills the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying with non-Jewish children. Opinions differ (see here) as to whether procreation applies among gentiles. And one could, with some difficulty, distinguish between a Jew who fathers gentile children and a gentile who fathers gentile children. Beyond that, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree (Yevamot 62a) as to whether a gentile who converted has fulfilled the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying. The commentators there wrote that this is only where his children converted with him. Although in practice we rule like Rabbi Yoḥanan that he has fulfilled it, straightforwardly that is only in the direction of a convert who converted, not a Jew who fathered gentile children.
However, from the standpoint of procreation, one could discuss living with a non-Jewish woman without having children, or in the case of someone who already had children with a Jewish woman.
Discussion on Answer
He is considered like a Jew in every respect of a certain kind. Not with regard to marriage. Meiri also writes that an enlightened gentile is like a Jew in every respect, and he certainly does not mean to permit marriage to him (or other things). The issue here is not his personal status, but the halakhic implications of his being a gentile.
Thank you to the Rabbi for the answer. The Rabbi wrote, “The only distinction in the context under discussion is nullifying permission, but that does not mean there is no other distinction.” I don’t understand—why does the Rabbi think the mention of domains is only according to the context? The discussion in the passage beforehand was not about domains at all.