Q&A: The Ontological Proof
The Ontological Proof
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
In the first booklet dealing with the ontological argument, Anselm tries to prove the existence of God solely on the basis of definitions and not on the basis of logic (since logic is built from premises that can be measured empirically). This proof tries to demonstrate the existence of a perfect being (God) purely through conceptual analysis. First, Anselm argues for his definition of the concept of God as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. That is, if something greater than it existed, then presumably there would be a contradiction here, because that cannot be. He then distinguishes between two kinds of cognition in the intellect: cognition of a being in imagination (which does not necessarily exist in reality), and cognition of a being that does exist in reality. To sharpen the distinction between these two kinds of cognition, you bring the example of the painter: cognition of the first kind is the picture the painter raises in his mind even before he paints it, whereas cognition of the second kind exists only after the painter has put the painting onto paper, and then not only does the painting exist, but another kind of cognition is added to the painter’s mind as well: cognition of the being (the painting) that also exists in reality. Later in the argument, Anselm infers the existence of God based on this claim: if God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, then God necessarily exists. This is because we can conceive of a cognition of a being that also exists in reality, and cognition in our mind of a being that exists in reality is much greater than cognition of a being that exists only in our imagination and does not exist in reality; therefore God exists. How can this be correct? We cannot conceive of cognition of an existing being before we have experienced it as real; just as the painter could not have had in his mind an idea of an existing painting before he saw the painting visually; just as Mary could never have in her mind an idea of an existing yellow color, because she is incapable of seeing such a color. One can only argue that it is indeed possible to raise such an idea in our mind, but that does not make it true, because I cannot cognize a being that exists in my mind if it does not exist in reality. I can only imagine, but that leaves the being strictly within the realm of imagination. Anselm claims that this can indeed be done. What is the justification for that?
Answer
I did not understand the question. Please write more clearly and more briefly. If you assume that only what we have experienced can be brought to mind—I do not agree with that. It is possible to bring God to mind even though we have not experienced Him.
Discussion on Answer
Now I think I understand.
I think one has to distinguish between the question of whether this is justified and the claim that this is begging the question. As for the justification, you have to decide that for yourself. In my opinion, there is no obstacle to conceiving of the Holy One, blessed be He, as existing even without having experienced Him (there is a difference between thinking of God as existing and as not existing. What is in the atheist’s mind when he thinks about God is not identical to what is in the believer’s mind).
But I do not see any begging the question here. If I assume that He can be conceived as existing even without experiencing Him, does that necessarily mean that I am assuming He exists? In my opinion, no. And if you say so, that itself is begging the question.
Meaning, it depends on how I approach the proof intuitively? If I am biased toward the believer’s side, then I will accept the argument, and if I am biased toward the atheist side, I have no reason to accept it? And if I approach this proof neutrally? For that matter, if I am agnostic (and not only for that matter), then I have no ability to decide on the basis of the ontological proof and draw a conclusion. Second, the very core of the argument hangs on accepting the premise of cognition of the second kind (cognition of a concrete being), so I think that if I approach the proof from the outset biased toward the believer’s side—that is, I already intuitively assume that He does indeed exist—then of course I am begging the question (because from the outset I accept the cognition of the second kind). No? Of course this works on the atheist side too. That is, if I have no intuition regarding the existence of God, then I have no reason to accept cognition of the second kind. If I am neutral (not intuitively biased either way), then this proof does not help me draw a conclusion in any way. Am I understanding correctly?
Thank you very much to the Rabbi for the response.
Have a peaceful Sabbath.
I will repeat myself again. You present this as begging the question, and I keep saying that it is not. It does not depend on whether you are a believer (because then it would indeed be begging the question), but on whether you assume that it is possible to conceive of an existing God without having experienced Him. That is a completely different assumption, one that does not depend on belief. Therefore there is no begging the question here.
I will try to restate what I said more briefly and clearly. At the heart of the argument, Anselm tries to distinguish between two kinds of cognition in the intellect: cognition of a being in our mind that does not exist (grasping the abstract concept), and cognition of a being in our mind that does exist (grasping the concrete being, understanding + translation neurons). I certainly agree that we have no problem at all bringing to mind a being we have not experienced (the first kind of cognition), but my question is: what is the justification—in the case of God—for the second kind of cognition without the idea having been realized in reality and perceived by me through my senses? In the other examples you bring in order to sharpen the point, there is a very clear distinction between the two kinds of cognition in the intellect. In the initial state, the concept exists only in my imagination, and afterward the concept is realized in reality and the second kind of cognition is created in my mind. You present Anselm as someone who claims that we have no problem bringing into our mind an image of God existing (cognition of the second kind). My question is: what is the justification for that? Isn’t that begging the question?