Q&A: Uncommon Cases in Torah-Level Law
Uncommon Cases in Torah-Level Law
Question
Hello Rabbi, I saw in several places that the Talmud says there was room to distinguish within a Torah-level law between common cases and uncommon ones. For example, in Bava Kamma 10b regarding depreciation of a carcass, the Talmud suggests that there might be a distinction as to whether it falls on the damager or the injured party depending on whether the case is common or uncommon. And similarly (though the Talmud there seems to imply something a bit different), on 61a regarding fire damages, there was an initial assumption to obligate specifically in the case of thorns because that is common.
To my mind, in Torah-level laws, which are principled laws, there does not seem to be so much room for these distinctions, no? If so, I would be happy if the Rabbi could point me to another example, please.
Answer
I did not see anything like that regarding thorns on page 61. As for depreciation of a carcass, that indeed requires a bit of further investigation.
However, in principle it is possible that even on the principled level there would be a difference between a common case and an uncommon one.
Discussion on Answer
Why not? Sometimes it makes sense to establish one law for a common case and another for an uncommon one. For example, when murderers became common, they abolished the death penalty. And likewise in Gilead regarding exile.
Beyond that, with rabbinic laws you agree that they did not enact a decree in an uncommon matter. But there are cases in which even Torah-level laws are a kind of decree. Atvan DeOraita discusses this: whether there is such a thing as a safeguard in Torah law. And he brings the Ran on “it shall not be seen” and on seclusion.
Thank you very much. Just for the sake of precision, the author of Atvan DeOraita discusses this, but if I remember correctly it appears in the book Lekach Tov.
Why?