If each concept by itself has no real definition for us, then how does the relation between concepts manage to do so?
Is there some kind of emergence here?

First, a definition is only a verbal formulation of understanding, so the fact that there are no definitions does not mean there is no understanding.
Second, what I wrote is that the grasp is of the web of concepts as a whole. Why do you assume it has to go from the concepts to the whole and not vice versa? By the way, among education researchers there was a big debate over whether it is preferable to teach letters and then words, or to teach words and from that they would learn letters. They even ran experiments in both directions.

You’re right about the verbal formulation, but regarding the rest the question comes up again: what is there in the whole that is not there on the level of the individual part, and if in each and every part there is no sufficient understanding, then how does the whole overcome that?
If you’re talking about our grasp of things in the real world around us, then I agree, because a real thing is usually complex and built from many definitions. So a single definition will not be able to capture the whole object.

I think letters and words are something a bit different. After all, the definition of letters is precisely not like the kind of definition you distinguished above, because it is דווקא a definition of a single symbol by means of sight. Just as with a letter in ancient Hebrew script, someone who is not used to it will not understand it. And every word is built from sounds that are built from letters… I think the disagreement was about what is preferable for memory. Especially since the idea is that the child already knows the meaning of the words from hearing them, not from reading. Otherwise we only made the world even more complicated for him…

1. Since there is no such thing as conceptual empiricism, how can one systematically test verbal claims and definitions?
2. Doesn’t the circular fate of language and logic indicate their inability to touch the things themselves? By “the things themselves” I do not mean the empirical phenomena, to which we never have absolute access anyway (Kant), but rather the a priori ideas, which also seem not to be accessible to definitional formulation because of the above circularity.

1. David, I didn’t understand. Definitions cannot be tested. One can think about whether they are apt or not. The test is conceptual.
2. Language describes things, and I don’t understand what it means to say that language cannot know the things themselves. Language doesn’t touch anything.

Language is conceived by us as a mode of knowing and grasping an idea or essence. Since it is circular, it is also closed and limited. That is, it knows how to explain things from within the verbal layer for the sake of verbal consciousness. It may be that there is a layer that is not verbal, but language does not know how to describe it. If so, language and definition are one dimension that may be small and limited relative to the essence itself, which tolerates other points of view that are not verbally accessible. One can always assume that such a layer may exist, but I am trying to prove from verbal circularity that it is reasonable to assume that this layer really does exist. Isn’t that so?

I truly don’t understand where you are drawing these statements from. Language definitely does describe the non-verbal layer. That’s the whole idea of language. There is thought which in itself is not verbal, and language describes it.