Q&A: Contradiction Between the Bible and the Talmud
Contradiction Between the Bible and the Talmud
Question
Hello.
How do you explain the contradiction between the plain meaning of the biblical text and the Talmud’s words regarding “an eye for an eye”?
In the Bible it says:
“And to the children of Israel you shall speak, saying: Any man who curses his God shall bear his sin. And one who pronounces the name of the Lord shall surely be put to death; the entire congregation shall certainly stone him; whether stranger or citizen, when he pronounces the Name, he shall be put to death. And if a man strikes down any human life, he shall surely be put to death. And one who strikes the life of an animal shall make restitution for it, life for life. And if a man inflicts an injury on his fellow, as he has done, so shall it be done to him: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As he inflicts an injury on a person, so shall it be inflicted on him. And one who strikes an animal shall make restitution for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death. You shall have one law, for stranger and citizen alike, for I am the Lord your God.”
But the Talmud in tractate Bava Kamma (link to the passage: https://he.m.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%91%D7%90_%D7%A7%D7%9E%D7%90_%D7%A4%D7%93_%D7%9) claims that it refers to monetary payment?
It looks as though these sages preferred their own reasoning over the plain meaning of the Torah’s words, and in effect changed it. Especially since Rabbi Eliezer, who is considered “a plastered cistern that loses not a drop” and a transmitter of ancient traditions from his teachers, maintains that it is meant literally (even though the Talmud explains the baraita differently)?
Thank you
Answer
People think that midrashic interpretation usually departs from the plain meaning, and therefore there’s no point asking questions like these because they’re two different planes of interpretation. But that is not so. This happens only in very few cases. Usually, the midrash adds another layer on top of the plain meaning and does not contradict it. In this case, however, it does seem that the midrash contradicts the plain meaning, and therefore this is an exceptional case that requires explanation.
The midrash itself can of course be explained, because there is a verbal analogy between “under” and “under,” and there are textual inferences (we do not take ransom for the life of a murderer, implying that we do take it for the limb of one who causes injury; otherwise why would there be a need to warn us not to take ransom for a murderer’s life?). Still, the question remains why the Torah itself wrote it in a different way here—indeed, in a contradictory way.
Here I like the Vilna Gaon’s answer: when there is a difference between the plain meaning and the midrashic interpretation (whether it is a contradiction or not), both interpretations are to be taken together. The Torah wrote things this way intentionally, so that we should not use the plain meaning alone nor the midrash alone, but both together. Rabbi Menashe of Ilya, a student of the Vilna Gaon, brings a nice example of this from the midrashic dispute over the verse “If there is anxiety in a man’s heart, let him suppress it / speak it out.” Right now I’m thinking that maybe I’ll write a column about this.
So, for example, in this case this is the only way to formulate the law that we take the value of the injurer’s eye, not the victim’s. If the plain sense itself had written that one takes money, we would have taken the value of the victim’s eye as compensation. If it had written only the plain meaning without the verbal analogy and the midrash, we would have taken out an eye. But when it is written in a way that has both plain meaning and midrash, then we take money—but the value of the injurer’s eye, not the victim’s, as a result of the plain meaning, since the money is a substitute for removing the injurer’s eye and not compensation to the victim.
In practice, however, Jewish law rules according to the view that he pays the value of the victim’s eye. But even in practice there is significance to both interpretations, especially in Maimonides’ view. David Henshke discussed this at length in a wonderful series of three articles in Hamaayan 5737–38, when he was 19 years old. It is very worthwhile reading for anyone interested.
It seems to me that I also have a series of lectures on the relationship between plain meaning and midrashic interpretation.
Discussion on Answer
By the way, this looks like part of that same dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the Oven of Akhnai case: do we always go by what we received from our teachers, or do we use our own reason (“It is not in heaven”)? And perhaps that itself is why later the sages insisted on including Rabbi Eliezer in the camp as well. And now I’m thinking maybe it wasn’t a holy lie, but that Rabbi Eliezer retracted after accepting the ruling of his colleagues (on the day of his death). And so they recorded his view after his death and established that he too agreed with the midrashic approach, even though it contradicted the tradition that had reached them.
With God’s help, 2 Iyar 5780
Aside from what Rabbi M. A. mentioned, the monetary payment is ransom redeeming the bodily punishment of “an eye for an eye” that otherwise should have been carried out (as we see in the case of an ox known to gore that killed a person, where the punishment of “and also its owner shall be put to death” can be commuted through payment of ransom, and only in the case of an intentional human murderer did the Torah warn not to take ransom).
It should be noted that from the Torah’s wording, “life for life, eye for eye…,” it appears that just as “life for life” is said only in the case of intentional action, with witnesses and warning, so too “eye for eye” applies only when intentional, with witnesses and warning, with all the stringencies of capital law—which is very rare in practice. In most cases it is impossible to prove intent “beyond reasonable doubt,” and therefore all the courts from the days of Moses preferred the option of monetary ransom.
Best regards, S. Tz.
They say in the name of the Chatam Sofer that the vengeance against the nations for what they did to Israel will be “an eye for an eye” literally, as it says: “to execute upon them the written judgment.”
Best regards, S. Tz.
S. Tz.,
One cannot infer from an ox known to gore that killed, because there it is the property of the damager. “Eye for eye” is said of a person who causes injury, which is more severe (he is liable even for accidents and for the five categories of payment).
Beyond that, taking money is not a custom but a Torah law. And this is not because of uncertainty but as a certainty. We have never heard of anyone ever having an eye put out.
And finally, the money being discussed is not ransom but damages; that is not the same thing. True, in Maimonides’ view there is a lot to discuss here, but this is not the place.
“‘The insistence on excluding Rabbi Eliezer too from among those who disagree is, in my opinion, purely educational (a holy lie), meant to remove from the hearts of those who challenge the midrashic interpretation (Sadducees?).’ Following the above quote from Rabbi Michi’s words, ‘Sadducees?,’ I would like to draw attention to the approach of the historian Yitzhak Baer in his book Israel Among the Nations, where he resolves historically mishnayot and disputes of this sort, as well as the approaches of the tannaim and amoraim.
‘Eye for eye,’ if I remember correctly, is in chapter 6 of his book.
I don’t have the book in front of me at the moment, so I can’t quote.
Best regards,
Binyamin ‘Good Eye’ Gurlin”
Rabbi Michi,
If you think the plain meaning of Rabbi Eliezer’s words is indeed that they actually put out the injurer’s eye, then ostensibly it would be better to rely on his words. In the prologue to the book Walking Among the Standing Ones, you show that Rabbi Eliezer was a pure transmitter of traditions, not an innovator, whereas from him onward they began introducing innovations. I would therefore say that Rabbi Eliezer is transmitting the original tradition that this means “an eye for an eye, literally,” while the other sages changed the commandment for various logical reasons.
But there I showed that despite this, Jewish law was not ruled in accordance with him. Jewish law is determined by the decision of the authorized institution and the sages, not by the authenticity of the traditions. I’ve written here several times already that authenticity—what came from Sinai—is not the criterion for the correct halakhic ruling. We do what emerges from the Torah we received through the tools of the Oral Torah, not what is most certainly what was said to Moses at Sinai. Of course, the goal of halakhic inquiry is to understand God’s will, but it is not carried out through the tools of authenticity of tradition, but of proofs. That is what we see in that very episode of “It is not in heaven.”
For my own part, it seems quite clear to me that reading the verse literally was the accepted reading in the distant past, and only the sages changed this law. Even if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion had not been brought in the Talmud, I would think so.
By the way, if I remember correctly, Maimonides in his introduction brings this example of “eye for eye” as an example of a law accepted by tradition from Sinai (the midrash supports it and does not create it). It may be that rejecting the literal interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer’s words is what caused him to think this. In my view, as I said, Rabbi Eliezer’s position implies the opposite.
More power to you, Rabbi Michi and Shai; this is the direction taken by Professor Yitzhak Baer (BAER), who brings abundant evidence for his approach throughout the above-mentioned book. Highly recommended.
But if Rabbi Eliezer symbolizes the true tradition, then does he also symbolize the true tradition of halakhic ruling?
So if that’s the case, then yes, it is in heaven.
Rabbi Eliezer’s words are brought in the Mekhilta (Nezikin, section 8). The reading in some manuscripts is: “Rabbi Eliezer says: ‘An eye for an eye’—should I understand this to mean whether intentional or unintentional, he pays only literally? But Scripture excludes one who intentionally caused a blemish, that he pays only literally…” (This is the reading of two manuscripts in the Horovitz edition of the Mekhilta, unlike the printed editions, which read: “that he pays only money…”).
According to this, Rabbi Eliezer holds that “an eye for an eye, literally” applies specifically when intentional, which is a rather rare situation. Therefore the de facto tradition was to impose monetary liability—either because, like Rabbi Yehoshua, they understood that “an eye for an eye” fundamentally means money, or because of the difficulty of proving the “criminal intent” that Rabbi Eliezer would require in order to carry out “an eye for an eye” literally.
Best regards, S. Tz.
Later in his comments in the Mekhilta, Rabbi Eliezer expounds by means of the hermeneutic rule of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and it does not seem that he had any sweeping reservation about the sages’ methods of midrash.
That’s exactly the point at issue. That itself is the position of the opponents: that we do not rule according to tradition. So even on the question whether to rule according to tradition, we do not rule according to it.
S. Tz.,
That does not appear that way in our Talmudic text. Otherwise they should have reconciled his view the way you did.
I didn’t say that Rabbi Eliezer opposed midrashic interpretations. Only where they contradicted the tradition (he never said anything he had not heard from his teacher).
Everyone seems to have overlooked Maimonides’ words in The Guide for the Perplexed, part 3 chapter 41, where he explains the verses according to their plain meaning and not in the way of the Talmud—see there—and many have already cried out against him.
If I’m not mistaken I once saw several articles about this, or even a whole book, but this is not the place to go into it.
There is no such thing as “transmitting tradition.” And the sages knew that. The only tradition that gets transmitted is the masoretic text.
Everything that is not written in the Torah is rabbinic.
The whole business of “Moses received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it…” refers to the transmission of the Torah itself. And then it starts, “They said three things…” — things that are not written in the Torah. Otherwise there would be no need to say them.
And it is quite clear that the plain meaning in the Torah is literally an eye for an eye. Measure for measure.
“As he has done, so shall it be done to him.”
The sages knew that in their time they could not accept this command, so they had to interpret it against the plain meaning because “it is a time to act for the Lord.”
The insistence on excluding Rabbi Eliezer too from among those who disagree is, in my opinion, purely educational (a “holy lie”), meant to remove from the hearts of those who challenge the midrashic interpretation (Sadducees?).