Q&A: Separation of Religion and State
Separation of Religion and State
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Before coming to ask you about religion and state, I looked over an article you wrote on the subject (“Jewish and Democratic…”), and I want to ask based on what you wrote there.
Let’s assume I agree with you that separation would indeed solve problems in the areas of conversion and kashrut, for example, and would reduce the tension created by the need for the rabbinic establishment to “sweep aside” the decisions of the civil system.
Still, how would you deal with the fact that separating religion from the state could create inclusion of those same “Israeli citizens,” and therefore increase assimilation in the country? Once there is recognition of the status of an Israeli citizen with civil regulations, without the question of who is a Jew and so on, many non-Jews could ostensibly become citizens, creating a danger of harming the Jewish majority and the struggle against assimilation. See, for example, the United States and the like, where such separation naturally exists.
So true, people came from Russia who are the children of a Jewish father and complicated things for us somewhat, but on the other hand Judaism served as a mechanism of protection and balance. It could be that if we adopt your proposal we’ll have two clear and very convenient lists to distinguish who is Jewish by the tests of Jewish law and who is not. But on the other hand, what good will two lists do us if in the end our children choose not to regard those two lists as something meaningful in their eyes? Then, in terms of the final result, we have failed.
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef permitted agunot through leniencies that other rabbis would never have dared permit. I think one of the beautiful things about Judaism is that it has the ability to choose the lenient path when, in balancing values, the question sometimes becomes the importance of preserving the national values within Judaism as against the question of Jewish law pure and simple. They permitted the entire Ethiopian community, conversions of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and so on—fine—but in the end they kept the house intact.
Jabotinsky said, “You do not conquer the mountain if there is no grave on the slope below,” and I think this can be said on the plane of the struggle to preserve the Jewish nation as well: sacrifices in the realm of Jewish law for the sake of collective identity are sometimes an ideal in themselves and not merely ex post facto compromise.
Therefore, in my humble opinion, in this context embedding Judaism as a national value is immeasurably more important than defining Judaism as a religion alone. History teaches that Judaism survived because of the unique combination of preserving Jewish law at home and national conceptions outside.
Sometimes the enemy of the good is the best. It’s easy to point to problems; one has to make sure that the solutions are not worse than the models that preceded them. And in general, it’s hard for me to connect with an approach that conveys: my solution is good (or at least better) because the current status quo has problems.
Your view?
Thank you very much.
Answer
I disagree with several of your assumptions. First, in my opinion this will not increase assimilation. Current policy contributes to it no small amount. The rabbinate’s takeover of the marriage market causes many people not to marry, and when they do not marry formally there is nothing to prevent intermarriage and children of mixed marriages. In my view, when we stop coercing Jewish identity, more people will choose it of their own free will. The state is supposed to be Jewish according to national definitions, and there is quite a bit of overlap between them and the halakhic definition, even among people who are not committed to Jewish law. Embedding Judaism as a national value may perhaps be important; I do not see it as such a value. Nationality is a fact, not a value. The current situation also does not contribute to that embedding, and perhaps quite the opposite.
And after all, even if you are right, why do you assume that this consideration outweighs the other considerations? In what you accused me, I accuse you: seeing only half the picture and ignoring the other half.