Q&A: The Nature of the Transgression
The Nature of the Transgression
Question
Hello hello,
Following the film ‘Remember’ (a Holocaust film), a few questions came to mind, and I’d be glad to hear your opinion.
First of all, if you’re not familiar with the film, it’s worth seeing the plot summary here (although if you’re planning to watch the film, the spoiler there is really huge, and it fundamentally ruins the whole experience) – https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%99_%D7%96%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%A8_(%D7%A1%D7%A8%D7%98,_2015)
The film can be discussed from several angles, but I think the central question is this: is it right to conduct a manhunt for a Nazi who knows nothing of his past? Moreover, here we are talking about a person who recoils from the Nazis’ atrocities (and not merely someone who forgot his past). In a certain sense, the Nazi is dead, and before us stands a new person—is it justified to kill him?
In the film itself, the person has a choice. That is, after the Nazi discovered his past, he was not forced to kill himself, but one can still ask on the theoretical level—if there were an opportunity, would it be justified? Likewise, even within the film itself, one can wonder whether killing him is rationally justified or whether it is a purely emotional act. In other words: why should a person who truly repented for his past be punished?!
It occurred to me that this is connected to a right-wing versus left-wing outlook. Is there an essence of “transgression” that lies upon the essence of the “person” (right), or is every sin just a local problem in opinion and action (left)? If so, one could say, in two ways:
A. Even when the person lacks awareness and memory, that is not the whole “essence” of the person; there is in a person some component of responsibility that bears the transgression, and that is what must be destroyed (a judgment upon the person). B. The legal/metaphysical force of the transgression is greater than merely a mistaken position, and therefore what we destroy is the transgression, not only the person who is no longer that person or who has repented (a judgment upon the object, perhaps a metaphysical conception).
These two points may be connected to one another, and really there is just one point here. One can certainly sharpen and analyze it further, and of course the left would say the opposite.
What do you think?
Answer
In my opinion, there is no reason whatsoever to punish a person who has completely repented and undergone a total moral reversal. And that is true even if he is aware of and remembers his past.
In my article on the two types of repentance, I wrote that when a person repents out of love with full repentance, forgiveness is required by הדין, not merely beyond the letter of the law, and I even brought this very example: if you yourself knew that someone who harmed you had completely regretted it in his heart and had fully repented, it is obvious that you would forgive him. Then all the more so with the Holy One, blessed be He. I cited Maimonides’ words, “I am not the same person,” as a metaphor for this idea. A person is not punished for the deeds of another person, and if he has changed, he is another person. However, as I said, I maintain that repentance also turns you into someone else, not only forgetting. On the contrary, repentance makes you more of a different person than someone who merely forgot through no fault of his own.
One can discuss the status of someone who forgot his past but still identifies with Nazism. If he is another person (according to your approach), then he too should not be punished.