Q&A: Another Possible Rationale for Permitting Male Homosexual Intercourse
Another Possible Rationale for Permitting Male Homosexual Intercourse
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Lately I’ve been thinking about another possible rationale for permitting male homosexual intercourse. In the Torah, the passages that prohibit male homosexual intercourse summarize the forbidden sexual relationships as a prohibition against following the statutes of the nations.
For example, in Leviticus chapters 18 and 20:
18:30: “Therefore you shall keep My charge, not to practice any of the abominable statutes that were practiced before you, and not to defile yourselves by them: I am the Lord your God.”
20:22: “You shall therefore keep all My statutes and all My ordinances, and do them, so that the land to which I am bringing you to dwell in it will not vomit you out.” 20:23: “And you shall not walk in the statutes of the nation that I am casting out before you; for they did all these things, and I loathed them.”
As is well known, a statute in the Torah is something done without an intrinsic reason of its own. The sages said: “They are statutes that I have decreed for you, and you have no permission to question them,” and a person’s inclination rebels against them, and the nations of the world challenge them—for example, the prohibition of pork, meat and milk, the beheaded heifer, the red heifer, and the scapegoat. That is unlike ordinances, which have an internal justification, like “do not murder,” “do not steal,” and so on. From here I conclude that in ancient times there were various customs without any internal rationale, and some of them included male homosexual intercourse or intercourse with animals. The Holy One commanded not to follow those statutes. But when male homosexual intercourse or intercourse with an animal is done not in the manner of a “statute” but because of an internal reason (a natural attraction to the act), then it is no longer considered an act of “statute” but an ordinary act, and perhaps the prohibition does not apply to it. Something along these lines, I seem to recall you mentioning that the whole prohibition of following gentile statutes applies only when the act in question is done without justification of its own; but, for example, if gentiles wear pants, there is no prohibition to wear pants too, because that has its own justification.
What do you think of this direction?
Answer
It doesn’t sound plausible to me. Male homosexual intercourse was indeed among the statutes of the nations, but it does not seem to me that it was prohibited for that reason. Moreover, it was not a statute among the nations; rather, there were some who did it among themselves. Would it even enter your mind that there was a statute requiring male homosexual intercourse? According to your approach, there would have been no need for this prohibition at all, since we were already commanded not to follow the statutes of the nations.
Discussion on Answer
Now that we’ve come to this, one could say that even the prohibition of a married woman applies only when it is a “statute” without logical reason, but for someone who loves his fellow’s wife, the matter is permitted 🙂
Best regards,
Poly Amor
The prohibition of a married woman is also mentioned in contexts that are not “statutory.” For example, in the Ten Commandments it says: “Do not murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal…” Clearly adultery is stated there as an ordinance, not as a statute, just as the prohibitions of murder and theft are ordinances and not statutes.
Similarly, there is the prohibition of “do not make yourselves detestable,” which forbids eating foods that disgust a person’s soul (creeping things, vomit, feces, urine, etc.). The prohibition applies when the thing disgusts the person. But if some person happens to enjoy eating feces, there is room to say that there is no prohibition of “do not make yourselves detestable” here. Detestable and abomination are fairly parallel according to the verse:
“And you shall not bring an abomination into your house and become devoted to destruction like it; you shall utterly detest it, and you shall utterly abhor it, for it is devoted to destruction.”
In the same way, in a sexual act too, when a person lies with a person/animal toward whom he has no attraction (and even feels repulsion), there is an abomination in it. But when there is no repulsion (and even attraction), there is no abomination in it.
According to this logic, even the prohibitions regarding insects are valid only when the person is aware of the insect’s presence in the food he is eating, and then feels disgust from it. But when the person is unaware of the insect and there is no feeling of disgust, perhaps there is no prohibition in the matter.
According to this logic, a gay man would be forbidden to sleep with a woman and a lesbian with a man, because from their perspective there is an abomination in it.
Because of “and there was no one to save her.” There applies there: “for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.”
That is, God, by the nature of His creation, murdered the sexual drive that is attracted to women and gave him a sexual drive attracted to men—“so is this matter”—and therefore “the young woman has committed no capital sin.”
That is, one should permit it because the Merciful One exempts one who is under duress. But this is not a blanket permission. Rather, a permission only when he reaches a state where he is compelled to it, perhaps like one forced by a demon. It needs discussion how far that goes.
Alternatively, just as they made a pruzbul and a heter iska—which are far more severe, because they nullified much more important commandments touching the very foundations of the governance of the Jewish people and the Land of Israel—so too this could be permitted under certain conditions. But for that you need some greasing of the rabbis by interested parties (various bankers) who make a lot of money from canceling the Sabbatical-year remission of loans and from canceling the prohibition of loans with interest.
Despite what I wrote, it should be mentioned that from the Torah’s perspective the matter is forbidden. But then again, it is also forbidden for a waiter to work on the Sabbath and make money from it. And for a cantor to lead services on the Sabbath in a synagogue and make money from it. And for a rabbi to give lectures on the Sabbath and make money from it. That too is forbidden. Yet people sin and do it in public.
So at least whoever does this should not learn from those rabbis who make money publicly for their work on the Sabbath, but should do it privately, so that those rabbis won’t know. Otherwise they’ll publicize it in the Sabbath sermon they give in exchange for money.
As I said, it doesn’t sound plausible to me. This is a very far-fetched derivation of the reason for the verse.
Another branch toward leniency is the wording: “And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman.” Would “the lyings of a woman” even make sense with someone who isn’t a woman? Technically that’s impossible. From here it follows that the prohibition was nullified before it was born. Analyze it carefully. So why was it written?! “Expound and receive reward.” (And seriously, Oren, see the book written by the gay rabbi from the U.S.—I forgot his name—maybe Love Your Neighbor as Yourself, who also interpreted the prohibition as applying only when it is done in the form of dominance and subordination, as between man and woman in their times. But mutual love is permitted.)
The reason I suggested is quite close to the possibility you suggested in the trilogy, that the prohibition applies only to straight people. I only suggested an additional explanation for why the prohibition applies only to straight people, namely because of the abomination (the subjective feelings of disgust) involved. For a straight person to sleep with a man involves disgust/abomination, but for a gay man it does not. And therefore, in the same way, for a gay man to sleep with a woman involves disgust/abomination, whereas for a straight person it does not.
True, but even regarding my suggestion there, I’m not sure, and I do not say it as Jewish law. But I don’t feel that the sense of disgust is the essential issue here. The distinction I suggested sounds more plausible to me.
So what is the essential issue here, in your view?
The question is whether it is done out of a sinful urge or out of a couple relationship. Like touching women, which may depend on whether this is affectionate touch or not. But as I said, this is a suggestion I’m really not convinced by.
What do you mean? Male homosexual intercourse is forbidden only in promiscuity but not in marriage? What kind of idea is that?? And why is promiscuity between a man and a woman forbidden as a prohibition or rabbinically?
That’s not what I wrote. My suggestion was that it depends on the person’s orientation.
The prohibition would apply only to someone who in any case doesn’t want to do it? That makes no sense.
Not someone who doesn’t want to, but someone who isn’t compelled to—for example, if he has a bisexual inclination, or if he does it because of a temporary impulse as in all sins.
Hello, is there some responsum or response by a rabbi to the things you wrote? You clearly seem to be an intelligent person.
The statutes of the nations were not something obligatory, but rather a practice without internal logic that became rooted in society for one reason or another. Some of them were in idolatrous contexts. My claim is that the practice itself is an abomination when it is done as a custom and not as a regular act that has a justification in itself. That is, the abomination exists only when a person lies with someone to whom he is not naturally attracted, but only in the name of accepted custom (a person’s relatives also fall under the same definition, and animals too). But when a person lies with someone to whom he is naturally attracted, there is no abomination in it. According to this logic, if a brother and sister were separated at birth and in adulthood met as a normal couple, there is no problem of abomination in that. Likewise regarding someone who has a natural attraction to animals: there is no abomination in lying with the animal.
I’ll give an example to sharpen the point. Suppose there were an accepted practice that every soldier had to be sexually penetrated by his commander to express acceptance of his authority. The Torah comes and says that there is a prohibition on such acts when they are done for the sake of something external to the sexual act itself (in this case—expressing acceptance of authority). But when the act is done for the sake of the act itself, there is no abomination here.