Q&A: The Torah Has Changed
The Torah Has Changed
Question
I read your interview in Makor Rishon [sorry for the anachronism…], and you said there that in your view today one can find grounds to permit same-sex couples, since at the time it was connected to idolatry, or because it was not originally forbidden, etc.
I am puzzled, because Maimonides in Sefer HaMadda writes that there is no possibility whatsoever of changing anything from the words of the Torah, even though in The Guide he gives many reasons for the commandments that relate to the idol worshippers of his time. [And Maimonides' statement that regarding something from the Torah any religious court can expound would, seemingly, refer to interpretation and not to what is written explicitly in the Torah]
Answer
I never said such a thing. I said that such a direction might be possible in my view, but it depends on a consensus among halakhic decisors, and that is not the direction you mentioned here. In my opinion it has nothing to do with idolatry. It comes from the section on forbidden sexual relations, not idolatry. The direction I was speaking about is that perhaps the Torah prohibits only someone who does this out of an urge to sin, and not someone for whom this is his nature. I supported this with an argument based on a statement of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who was extreme in the opposite direction. He said that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not give a person a trial that he cannot withstand, and therefore it is clear that there is no natural/inborn homosexuality. And I argue that if I have become convinced that there is such a thing, then according to his premise it follows that apparently it is not forbidden. But as stated, this is a novel approach and I am not certain about it, and the permission requires broad agreement from halakhic decisors.
As for changes in Jewish law, see at length in the third book of my trilogy.
Discussion on Answer
When it is far-reaching and has broad public implications, and when I myself am not certain about it, it requires broad agreement. That has always been the accepted practice in Jewish law. Shall we act merely because we imagine so?
A. What here is far-reaching, and what broad public implications are there in whether male homosexual relations are permitted or forbidden for someone whose orientation that is? It seems to me not far-reaching at all and devoid of public implications from a halakhic standpoint. Maybe part of the religious/Haredi public will rage and storm because it will seem to them like a terrible distortion of Jewish law and the like, but it is not that the content of the ruling itself will create significant implications; rather, opposition to the ruling will cause quarrels.
B. When you yourself are not sure, what good will broad agreement do? If all the halakhic decisors join in and agree with the view, will you suddenly become sure? Or rather, you yourself will remain unsure, but objectively there will be a better chance that you have hit upon the monistic truth?
C. Not acting is also an action, with costs, since it prevents religious people with that orientation from doing what they want. Is there some prior presumption in favor of Jewish laws based on simplistic conservatism? In other words: are we now going to take action to forbid them because we imagine that perhaps we are imagining incorrectly? That is something impossible to say.
A. That is, unlike a ruling on recognizing certain conversions, for example, which has broad public implications because it assimilates men/women in Israel, they and their children and their descendants. Or annulment of marriage, which by its nature stirs up polemics and likewise may assimilate mamzerim and descendants of mamzerim into Israel to the end of all generations. Those are examples of things with broad public implications, that also lack broad agreement, and are also far-reaching (in the view of those who disagree). Clearly you distinguish between a 'technical' application of the Jewish law we have inherited (which is done without agreements and regardless of broad public implications) and a creative application of Torah-level interpretation (which is done only with agreements if there are broad public implications), but what is the explanation for that distinction? Both are applications that depend on the reasoning of the halakhic decisor.
These are just feigned ingenuousness.
A. If you do not understand the implications, then I have nothing to explain.
B. When I am not sure but many others join in, that means I probably have not missed something significant and that there is real substance to my reasoning. Again, this is self-evident and needs no explanation. [You probably mean monistic truth, not monotheistic truth.]
C. To permit something that the Torah forbade is to take action. Otherwise, one could not say about anything, “Shall we act merely because we imagine so?” The reasoning that every decision or non-decision has implications has been stated by me more than once. That is obvious.
Could you please tell me what the (negative) implications are?
Such a permission could lead people who could manage without it to permit it to themselves as well. It prevents the possibility of determining that someone is violating a prohibition, and of course also of educating youth to observe this halakhic obligation. It has social and public implications (legitimization, funding, and complications in having children, among other things). There are debates about the quality of raising children in such a family unit (without my taking a position on that). The entire couple structure looks different.
Up to the point about public implications, this is no different from any other permission, such as the permission to open bottle caps on the Sabbath. Same with legitimization—it follows from the permission itself and is not some special implication. As for funding—when Jewish law starts determining budgets here, we'll talk, and anyone hearing that a few tens of millions for the state are involved will not think this is such a major issue that it requires the Council of Torah Sages.
The issue of the quality of child-rearing and the couple structure is of course extremely flimsy.
So my conclusion remains that there is nothing special here: whoever reasons that this is correct (I, for example, think the permission is unconvincing) should act accordingly and merit in the World to Come preserved wine still in its grapes, because he acted according to the Jewish law that seems correct to him, and his reward will be doubled from Heaven. And this is very simple.
Michi, are you aware that the context in which the word “abomination” appears in the Torah is almost always idolatry and idol worship?
Idolatry, male homosexual relations, and—
and eating non-kosher animals, consulting ghosts and inquiring of the dead, everyone who acts unjustly in commerce, and more
“The homosexual issue is of course a prominent example. The Torah’s command on this matter is sharp and clear. On the other hand, it is also clear that morally speaking, to demand of a person that he not realize his sexual identity, not live a life of partnership and sexuality as his heart is drawn to, is a very problematic demand. Therefore I will try to interpret Jewish law in a way that brings it as close as possible to the moral dimension. For example, perhaps the biblical prohibition on male homosexual relations stems from the fact that in the biblical period such relations were an expression and mode of idol worship, but once they are not used for that purpose perhaps they can be permitted. Or alternatively, today we know that there are people who can be attracted to both sexes and there are those who can be attracted only to their own sex. So perhaps the Torah forbade male homosexual relations for someone who has another option, and did not forbid it for someone for whom this is his unequivocal identity.”
That is the quote from the Makor Rishon website, and idolatry is mentioned there, so apparently this is a mistake by the writer in understanding your words.
Flusser,
I am definitely not aware of that, and Schrodinger has already answered you appropriately. Perhaps you have a different version of the Torah. Worth checking.
Tx,
If that is a quote, then indeed it is a distortion by the writer.
When does a permission/prohibition require broad agreement from halakhic decisors, and when not?