As I understand it, in one of your lectures you explained the canonization of the Talmud as a framework of discourse such that only within it, and according to its reasoning, can one issue halakhic rulings. Later you explained that the reasoning in the Talmud, or its ways of deriving conclusions, are such that one can work with them using all kinds of moral assumptions. So, for example, when slavery was considered “legitimate,” the Talmud provided the way to issue halakhic rulings dealing with slavery, but that does not amount to any justification or moral statement about slavery.
And in essence, Jewish law and morality are two separate things, and a conflict between them has to be decided like a conflict between two moral principles.
And as for the question: the Maimonides quoted above rules that in the case of a religious court that unanimously convicts a murderer, the murderer is acquitted. That seems like a moral statement to the effect that if the entire court thinks in a certain way, then something is not right with them, and Jewish law requires them to change their way of thinking if they want to convict the murderer.
It is a moral statement because it defines good and evil, and not just “if X, then Y.”
So the question is: how can you say that Jewish law is a mechanism of “if X, then Y”?

If God really wanted us to keep the commandments, He would have tailored them to human beings!

I am not familiar with the position you are describing. I explained above here my position regarding Jewish law versus morality.
But in any case, I still cannot understand what the problem is with the law Maimonides brings. The claim there is that if the entire religious court rules the same way, then there is apparently some bias there, and therefore the case should not be decided that way. This is a crooked trial. The Torah says, “Judge your fellow with righteousness.” Even if this were a moral principle, I do not understand what the problem with that would be. But beyond that, there is not necessarily a moral principle here. It simply says that what took place here was not a trial that the Torah would call a just trial. It is like not accepting a single witness, because that is not strong enough evidence.