So if that’s the case, I understand that according to your view it’s like what Rabbi Michi said in the name of Sherlock Holmes: sometimes, after we’ve ruled out the impossible, all we’re left with is the improbable…
But don’t you feel serious discomfort with this kind of answer!?!?

Wouldn’t some other solution that coordinates the two clocks be preferable—something like perfect evolution from a pantheistic point of view, or something similar involving harmony in Leibniz’s style, or an omnipotent God from a deistic-theistic perspective in the style of Descartes?
True, here we would absorb a certain blow to the argument that this is only a conclusion and not a foundational premise, but I don’t know whether that is a substantive difference, because what difference is there to me between first-order skepticism and second-order skepticism. And after all, this is not all that different from the moral argument. Especially since the Rabbi quotes Bergmann in the fourth notebook exactly for this, and that is enough for the wise…
And even if it is not always clear how the coordination works, one can still think of all sorts of ways that from the outset the world would generally operate in accordance with how we were programmed to think.
In the end, doesn’t the Rabbi think that your answer, even if it is possible, does not sound reasonable in light of the fact that most of the world denies something that, according to your view, ought apparently to be so obvious?!

Not at all. Just as I experience sight and it is clear to me that it reflects reality even without my having any other indications of this, so too my intuition reflects reality. It is a different kind of sight. I explained this at length in the fourth notebook and in my books (Two Carts and Truth and the Unstable).
Pay attention to the precision in the fourth notebook. The direction of the argument is “theological” (disclosive) and not “philosophical” (inferential). The question is not how the coordination came about, but what I am relying on in my assumption that such coordination indeed exists.

Rabbi, you sound overly decisive here in your answer, but I’d be glad if you would explain, because I do not see a difference in the mode of disclosure:
In my opinion this is far too similar to two people who have moral intuitions.
Person A will say that these moral intuitions are objective because God implanted these intuitions in me and therefore they are correct. So this is not like a stomachache with a subjective meaning.
And person B will say: I have an ideal cerebral faculty of vision, integrated version 4 (moral understanding after the four kingdoms, like vegetarianism), which allows me to see the Idea of morality, which is a reflection of the divine nature together with His command, and therefore this is an objective understanding of the highest order.

You want to say that person A is mistaken in his thought process, because who says that just because he thinks this way it is really so; but the same can be said to person B: maybe you think you have a sensory mind, but perhaps you do not, and even if you do, you still have to infer that there is some factor coordinating it with the world and that this is not a completely defective system that is not even a beta version, and especially since most systems of rules will produce defective outputs, etc. etc.
That is, there is a difference in the order of the skeptical question, whether it is first-order or second-order, but is there really a difference in the answer? Both, following an inferential difficulty, provide a worthy solution. The only question is what indeed *sounds* right…

Everything was explained in the fourth notebook (the fourth conversation of the first book).