Q&A: Two Questions
Two Questions
Question
A. “Anything fit for mixing, mixing does not invalidate it,” etc. — I haven’t sufficiently understood the reasoning, and I also didn’t find whether Rabbi Zeira’s intent is that ideally it is unnecessary, or only after the fact. I thought in two directions: 1. Similar to “anything that is fit to be sprinkled,” etc.; but to the best of my knowledge that rule is not said about the thing itself (the sprinkling, and in our case the mixing), but only about other things that depend on it. 2. Indeed, there is really no need for mixing at all, only for something fit for mixing — meaning that what is required is not a specific act but a property in the object itself. But that seems a bit difficult to me conceptually, and it is also difficult from the Talmud in Nedarim (73a), that the husband need not hear his wife’s vows in order to annul them because “anything fit for mixing,” etc.; and there it is even harder for me to understand this as a property of the husband’s hearing.
B. Something forbidden because of appearance to onlookers is forbidden even in the innermost private rooms — seemingly there is no inherent problem with something forbidden because of appearance to onlookers, and accordingly the whole reason not to do it in private would be concern that one may come to do it in public as well. Does the Rabbi have an additional explanation?
Answer
I always thought that, simply speaking, this rule is said in a place where the requirement is not for actual performance but only for a state in which performance is possible. But that does not seem to fit the plain meaning of the Talmudic passages (for if not, then why perform it at all?).
Another possibility is that these are cases where what matters is your effort, not the result. But fitness for mixing is not always in cases that involve effort.
Bottom line: this principle באמת is not clear to me.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t have any additional explanation. In some cases there is something unseemly about the thing itself, and therefore it is forbidden in public, and automatically there is a reason not to do it even in private rooms. But that is not true in all cases.
Another question: if a person causes someone else to neglect a positive commandment, for example by tying up someone who is obligated to take the lulav, is the one who caused the neglect considered to have neglected the positive commandment of taking the lulav, or did he only violate “do not place a stumbling block”? [The question came up בעקבות Tosafot on Bava Kamma 69 regarding nullifying another person’s obligation of returning a lost object.]
Regarding private rooms, there is also the concern that someone may walk into the room and see you doing the act.
Simply speaking, according to the midrash brought by Rashi at the beginning of Parashat Mattot, it appears that he has neglected a positive commandment. The same also emerges from Maimonides’ words about directly causing someone to consume a prohibition (in Sefer HaMitzvot, Kilayim, and likewise in the parallel passages regarding corpse-impurity and naziriteship). In both types of sources they speak about punishment and prohibitions, but I do not see a reason to distinguish.
Thank you.
Isn’t the opposite implied from Sefer HaMitzvot, Kilayim? All the commentators there struggle with why he receives lashes, and bring specific verses for the warning regarding kilayim in the one who dresses another being like one who wears it himself. Does the Rabbi mean that their difficulty is only with the lashes, but the prohibition itself is obvious to them?
And I didn’t find the Rashi in Mattot. Could the Rabbi please point me to the exact opening words?
In Maimonides this is presented as a general principle, not a specific law about kilayim (on the contrary, in the laws of naziriteship a source is brought showing that there it does not apply. See the Frankel edition on Kilayim in the source references). And so too in Rashi at the beginning of Parashat Mattot (30:16), who writes that one who causes his fellow to stumble enters in his place for punishments.
According to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Maimonides, that is indeed not correct. There is “do not place a stumbling block” here, but no neglect of a positive commandment. Clearly.
What about the second question?