Q&A: A Question About Paradoxes
A Question About Paradoxes
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Is it correct to say that paradoxes of the self-reference type belong to the same family as Russell’s paradox? And if so, then is the solution of axiomatic set theory (which I know only by name…) basically to create a situation in which it is impossible to formulate self-referential paradoxes within the framework of set theory?
The course is fascinating and very enlightening,
Thank you very much,
Answer
Yes. But in mathematics that is exactly what one wants: to formulate a language that is free of paradoxes. Their goal is not to solve paradoxes. That is the business of philosophy.
With pleasure,
Discussion on Answer
That is of course true, but I’m not sure one even needs to go that far. Logic obligates all of reality and not only us, because the laws of logic are not laws in the ordinary sense. You can see about this in column 302 on my site and elsewhere.
This is unrelated to Russell’s teapot, because the teapot is not paradoxical or contradictory. It is just an entity for whose existence there is no indication.
Thank you for the reference to the fascinating post. I want to make sure I understood your intention —
All of our reality can be described by concepts. The concepts are not creations of the human mind, but have an independent existence. The laws of logic define the relations among the concepts, and therefore they obligate all of reality. In other words, logic obligates not only our perception of reality but reality itself.
Did I understand correctly?
There is no need to reach the assumption that concepts have an independent existence. Even if they were a convention, one could say the same thing.
If concepts are only a convention (products of our mind), and the laws of logic define the relations between them, then how can one infer that the laws of logic define reality itself (and not only our perception of it)?
If the concepts do not exist, then the relations between them are projected onto reality just as the concepts themselves are projected onto it/onto it. If a triangle cannot be round, or if a democracy cannot have a single unelected ruler, then their instantiations in the world are also subject to those rules. Therefore there is no necessity to assume the existence of concepts in order to say that logic compels reality.
So logic compels reality if everything that exists in reality can be conceptualized. And how do we know that everything that exists in reality can indeed be conceptualized (the Holy One, blessed be He?)?
By the way, regarding green frogs, my daughter once came back from kindergarten with a story about blue frogs, and that is how I discovered that there is such an animal:
I hope you understood the question. I didn’t.
Thank you for the answer. One more question —
One of the arguments one may encounter is that not everything is subject to the laws of logic. The question is why this cannot be accepted. Here is one possible line of thought —
Assumption: we can conceive only of things that obey the laws of logic (for example, one cannot imagine logical contradictions).
Conclusion: if there exists something that does not obey the laws of logic, then we will not be able to conceive of it.
In other words, the fact that we have never encountered anything that does not obey the laws of logic does not necessarily mean that no such things exist; perhaps our intellect/thought simply has no access to such things, somewhat like the fact that we cannot see radio waves (but there are other devices that can — there are people with a “spiritual device” that picks up things that are not logical).
Is this Russell’s teapot argument? And if we had gone to Newton and told him about the existence of the electron, which behaves quantum-mechanically (but without showing him experimental results), would he have been supposed to dismiss us with the teapot argument?
Thank you,