Q&A: On Multiple Universes and Teapots
On Multiple Universes and Teapots
Question
Hello again, Rabbi Michael Abraham,
I wanted to make two comments about the multiverse argument that you discuss in chapter 9 of the talk on the physico-theological proof in The First Existent (pp. 282–284).
A. You argue that the multiverse hypothesis is an ad hoc invention, that no one has seen and no one can see those other universes, and that this is baseless speculation since we know of no mechanism for the formation of universes. All true—but the same claims are also true of the God hypothesis (at least in the physico-theological proof). So when God is compared to Russell’s teapot, you rightly reply (on p. 225) that we have before us a complex world, whose spontaneous formation is improbable, and that this is a good reason to assume the existence of some factor that created it. If so, why not say the same thing about the multiverse hypothesis? The laws that govern our world are special, since they allow the formation of complex beings, and therefore we are forced to assume that many attempts were made to produce laws, and we happen to be in the universe where this succeeded. From that perspective, one could say that the multiverse hypothesis is the materialist parallel to the God hypothesis.
B. Later on, you argue that even if we assume a random universe-generator, the question would still arise: who created the laws that govern its operation? And then again we would arrive at God. But here there is no need to assume special laws, because any system of meta-laws that randomly creates systems of laws will, after enough attempts, produce special laws. It itself does not need to be special for that purpose. Therefore here one could assume that the mechanism that creates universes is self-caused, without attributing intelligence to it (or even relating to it as an entity).
I’d be glad to hear your response, and happy holiday,
Answer
Decide for yourself what seems more plausible: many universes that should apparently be visible, yet none has been seen, or God, whom in any case no one can see, so it is no surprise that He has not been seen. And this joins the tradition and the other arguments raised there (I explained that the arguments are cumulative, and it is incorrect to discuss them separately).
Discussion on Answer
Without an intelligent being, there is no explanation here. A non-intelligent being does not constitute an explanation for complexity.
The explanation for the complexity is that the laws in our universe really are special (let’s assume for the sake of discussion that this is the case). But as for the question of how the special laws came about—if there are infinitely many universes, then even if they were formed arbitrarily and randomly, wouldn’t you expect that in some of them there would be laws special enough to create complexity?
If I rolled a die enough times, special sequences would eventually come up even without assuming the die was loaded.
If there are such things, then yes. But a non-intelligent creator is not an explanation.
Beyond that, who created the infinitely many universes? Is there some cosmic universe-generator?
All this is discussed in the book.
What is not discussed in the book is the possibility that this universe-generator, if one is needed at all, is not intelligent—and that this is a plausible possibility, since a random generator does not require intelligence. As in the case of rolling a die infinitely many times—I assume you would agree that if within a sequence of a million rolls we found one hundred sixes in a row, that would not indicate intention or intelligence in the rolling of the die. The same applies to the creation of universes—if a blind mechanism creates more and more universes, that provides a non-intelligent explanation for the fact that one of those universes came out special.
A generator that produces infinitely many different universes has to be super-intelligent. Especially since this joins the other arguments.
It seems to me we’ve exhausted the issue.
Rabbi, I very much appreciate your response to my inquiries. That is far from obvious to me, and it matters to me, because as far as I know, you are one of the only believers in the country who wants, is willing, and is able to seriously and deeply engage with atheistic arguments.
In light of that, I’d be glad if at some point you find time to answer the question I raised above as well, which you actually still haven’t answered: why does a random process (a universe-generator in our case) have to be intelligent?
The other arguments for God have their place, but they are not connected to the multiverse argument. And note well: I am not trying to claim that the physico-theological argument is not a good one, but rather that the multiverse hypothesis is rationally equivalent to it, and that where Hillel in the book surrendered, I was left with an open question that the book does not answer.
Again, many thanks and happy holiday.
I’ll try to summarize my claims briefly:
When we see a complex universe, the reasonable conclusion is that it has some kind of creator. The complexity also indicates that it is intelligent. That is what we infer from every case of complexity: that it has some cause that created it. We do not assume that it is the product of an infinite number of events, none of which we have seen. If a person wins the lottery one hundred times in a row, the assumption is that there is cheating here. No one would say that there were infinitely many other invisible lottery drawings, and we just happen to be observing the special one.
The alternative of a universe-generator that creates random universes is an implausible fantasy. First, because there is no indication whatsoever of the existence of such a generator, nor of those infinitely many universes. At least some of them should have been detectable by us. Second, the existence of God is a simpler assumption. Simply: a complex thing exists, so it has a creator, and that’s all. A generator that creates a complex universe must itself be complex or intelligent—even if this is one universe among several others.
Therefore, even if there is such a generator, you can call it God and that’s that. It is far simpler and more plausible than resorting to some golem that creates infinitely many universes.
And this also joins the other arguments (revelation, tradition, the uniqueness of the Jewish people, etc.).
That’s it. As far as I’m concerned, the topic has been exhausted.
The additional universes also are not supposed to be visible, since by definition they are separate from our universe to such an extent that the physical laws there are different. But I agree that the argument in favor of God is rational too.
What do you think about comment B—that on this hypothesis one need not arrive at an intelligent being?