Q&A: Note
Note
Question
Rabbi Michael,
I am reading the trilogy (and enjoying it very much), and I have a few comments. But I wanted to ask about a specific issue in “Walking Between the Pillars,” pp. 143–144.
Regarding the question of why the Talmud in Bava Batra says, “It is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners.” You write, “Therefore there is no prohibition at all in having children.”
But we know that in many scriptural-level cases it is forbidden, or at least there is discussion whether it is permitted or forbidden, to put yourself into a situation where you will end up violating a prohibition—even if right now you are fulfilling a commandment! The classic example is circumcision on the Sabbath when the hot water spilled out, and if you perform the circumcision you will have to heat it on the Sabbath. There is a well-known dispute between the Ba’al HaMaor and Nachmanides whether it is permitted to do the circumcision.
In our case, if you marry and have a son, you will have to violate a positive commandment whose neglect carries karet. True, there is no prohibition here, and it is also not certain that you will have a son. And right now no obligation has yet taken effect upon you. On the other hand, it is also not clear that you will fulfill the commandment of “be fruitful and multiply.” According to the views that one does not fulfill the commandment until he has both a son and a daughter, it could be that you would neglect the positive commandment of circumcision before fulfilling the commandment of “be fruitful and multiply.”
Even if we say that we reach the conclusion that it is permitted to marry, is it impossible that the Talmud in Bava Batra holds otherwise—that according to the law it is forbidden to marry and place yourself into a situation where you will neglect a positive commandment whose neglect carries karet? But they said, “It is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners.”
Answer
Hello D.,
Thank you. I am glad that my words are helpful.
If we are talking about a decree not to have children (to suspend procreation) at a time of decrees of religious persecution, then as long as the decree has not been enacted there is no prohibition, and the obligation to be fruitful and multiply remains in force.
According to your approach, that there is a prohibition against entering a situation of duress, why is there any need for a rabbinic decree forbidding procreation? It is already forbidden by the basic law. The Talmud says, “By rights we should decree upon ourselves,” meaning that this is a decree.
By the way, the prohibition against entering a situation of duress is the subject of a dispute among the medieval authorities, in the passage about “that infant whose hot water spilled out,” and elsewhere. But here, in my opinion, the dispute is irrelevant, because there is a commandment to be fruitful and multiply, and if afterward I am unable to circumcise, that is complete duress. When the Torah tells me that there is a commandment to enter this situation, there is no prohibition involved. In my opinion, the medieval authorities did not disagree in such a case, and according to everyone there is a commandment to be fruitful and multiply. For example, if I know that I will not have time to recite Grace after Meals, or that some other duress will prevent me from blessing, am I exempt from the commandment of eating matzah on the night of Passover? That is not reasonable.
It should also be added that perhaps a daughter will be born, who is not obligated in circumcision, so this is only a doubtful case of entering duress. (I did not understand why you wrote that it is not certain I will fulfill the commandment. Even if I am in the process of fulfilling the commandment of procreation, that is considered being engaged in a commandment. Moreover, in my opinion, bringing even one child is already a fulfillment of the commandment, except that I do not discharge the obligation until I have a son and a daughter. This is like the commandment of charity when one gives a small coin: that is certainly a commandment, except that Jewish law still set a minimum of one-third of a shekel per year.) Furthermore, even if the government has currently decreed against circumcision, who says I will not be able to circumcise him in a few years? Or decades? Is that enough of a basis to exempt me from procreation? In my opinion it is not reasonable.
However, in my conclusion there it really does appear that the Talmud holds that there is a prohibition against procreation by the basic law and not merely by rabbinic decree—but not because of entering a situation of duress in which one cannot circumcise the children. Rather, it is because they will not be able to keep commandments at all. Circumcision is only a symptom of the general condition. If the problem were only circumcision, it seems very unlikely to me that they would forbid procreation. In a case where three brothers died because of circumcision, there is no obligation to circumcise. I have never heard that in such a case the parents are exempt from procreation, or even from the commandment of “He created it to be inhabited.” According to your approach, there should be a prohibition there against bringing children into the world as well—because one is entering a situation of duress.
Discussion on Answer
Hello.
1. Indeed, in the straightforward reading of the Talmud, in both cases the Talmud is speaking of a rabbinic decree. But according to my suggestion, in the second case it is speaking of Torah-level reasoning. That is exactly why only pressure leads to this suggestion. But without my suggestion, there is an absurd use there of the expression “It is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners.” Therefore I argue that the use of the term “decree” really does appear in two different senses, and apparently the editor of the Talmud was carried along by the wording of the first case. As a side effect, he also used in the second case, “By rights we should decree upon ourselves,” when in fact the intention is that this is the proper Torah-level conduct.
2. A prohibition that emerges from reasoning is a full-fledged prohibition. If someone does not think so, he is an inadvertent sinner, but he still violates a prohibition. For example, the blessing over benefit before eating, where the Talmud’s conclusion in Berakhot is that it is based on reasoning. Suppose someone lacks that reasoning—does that mean he is not obligated to bless? He is obligated, but he will not bless because he does not understand that he is obligated. Reasoning is not a subjective matter. When there is a dispute about reasoning, one side is right and the other is wrong. Therefore, if someone does not know the reasoning, in principle one should inform him of it; but the Talmud says that here they adopted the rule that it is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners.
3. Interesting, because just now I posted on my website a column about the story of Isaiah and Hezekiah. I do not think there is a contradiction, because there too the reason Hezekiah accepted Isaiah’s rebuke was not because of “What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One,” but because he pinned his hopes on the possibility that his son would in fact be righteous (see there in my column). Beyond that, there is a difference between a private individual and the Jewish people as a whole. Also, in Manasseh’s case, it was his own choice to be wicked, and then perhaps it is fitting to bring him into the world because maybe he will choose good. But in the end, in the case discussed in Bava Batra, this is duress imposed by gentiles.
It is possible to elaborate on this at great length, since we have already discussed in the past the two answers in Yoma regarding desecrating the Sabbath to save a life, which apparently disagree on whether life is a means for commandments or commandments are a means for life. But in my opinion, even from there there is no proof for our issue. Even according to the view that commandments are a means for life, the intention is that they are the means to live properly. But without commandments, perhaps life really has no point, because it is not proper life.
4. Indeed, their words are very strained formalism, and in my opinion actually completely implausible. Moreover, in my opinion, even if this originally was a rabbinic decree, once it lapses it is obvious that one must return to fulfilling the commandment, even if there is no Sanhedrin able to change the law. This is an a fortiori argument from the law of “the colleagues,” which I discuss in the chapter on changing enactments (end of the sixth part). Is it reasonable that because there is no authority to change the decree, the Jewish people would disappear from the world and the commandment of procreation would be nullified?! It is plainly unreasonable.
Rabbi Abraham,
I was very busy and not able to respond last week. I type much faster in English, so forgive me if I answer in English. I do not want to take up much of your time, so do not feel obligated to respond to this email.
Your response makes sense for the most part, but I still have difficulty with your explanation. If what is meant by “By rights we should decree upon ourselves” is that every individual should derive for himself that one should not marry under those circumstances, there are several problems I see:
1. It is not consistent with the meaning cited previously, where the same words meant that a religious court should make the decree. In one case it refers to a decree of the religious court and in the other case it refers to an individual’s reasoning (logical derivation). You will have to say that the expression cited in one passage means two related but different concepts.
2. If there is no decree but an obligation on each individual who realizes he should not get married, then for an individual who does not realize this—his logic does not dictate a prohibition—there should be no prohibition for him to marry. The whole obligation comes from a person’s logic, and if he does not see the logic, there is no obligation. Then what does it mean by “It is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners”? He is not an inadvertent sinner—he has no obligation! It seems stretched to say that if we would inform him, he would come to realize this on his own, but then would not be able to comply. Why should we inform him if he has no obligation to begin with? You will have to say that is exactly the meaning of “It is preferable that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners,” but it does not seem to be the plain meaning.
3. I do not understand the logic itself. Your explanation is a sort of existential reasoning: a person should realize that it is better not to live than to live without Torah and commandments. And therefore he should not bring children into the world without Torah and commandments. This seems to me to run against the broader pervasive “philosophy” of Judaism, as seen in many places. I will cite one: the famous story about Hezekiah when he was ill and did not want to have children (Berakhot 10). The conclusion of the Talmud is that we do not question the outcome of having children—we do our part and God will do His part.
4. Finally, I do not understand the Mordechai and the Chatam Sofer according to your explanation. What was said at the time of the Romans was no longer true in their day. Even if there were pogroms, it was not the same as the time of the Romans, when one could not practice Judaism. So why should this still be applicable today? If you say there was a real decree then one can understand it. But if it is reasoning, it would no longer be applicable—the reasoning no longer applies.