Q&A: One Prohibition Taking Effect on Another Simultaneously — Whatever Cannot Take Effect Sequentially Does Not Take Effect Even Simultaneously
One Prohibition Taking Effect on Another Simultaneously — Whatever Cannot Take Effect Sequentially Does Not Take Effect Even Simultaneously
Question
A prohibition cannot take effect on top of another prohibition, but if they take effect simultaneously then both do take effect. On the other hand, whatever cannot take effect one after the other does not take effect even simultaneously. This question is well known (Tosafot Rid, Kiddushin 50b). It seems to me that you are the most suitable person to clarify all the issues here. I am asking whether perhaps there is some place where, in your Talmud lectures or something, you dealt with the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another, and with the rule of "whatever cannot take effect sequentially does not take effect even simultaneously," and the relation between them? Thanks.
Answer
I don't recall having written about this.
Off the top of my head, Tosafot on Bekhorot 9b writes that regarding something that takes effect by Heaven, we do not apply the rule of "whatever cannot take effect sequentially." That is said only about human actions (such as freeing a slave and the like). As for prohibitions, they are of course determined by Heaven, and therefore this rule does not apply. And logic says the same thing: the whole problem with the second prohibition is that there is already a first prohibition, so it cannot take effect. But if both come at once, then there is no obstacle to both taking effect. Put differently: the rule of "whatever cannot take effect sequentially" is based on a situation of contradiction between the two legal effects. Here there is no contradiction; rather, there is simply a Torah rule that a second prohibition does not take effect when a first prohibition is already present.
Discussion on Answer
I didn't understand your question. This is not a distinction between legal effects and other things, but between two things that contradict each other and things that do not contradict each other. Two different prohibitions on the same object are not a contradiction. It is only a rule of the Torah that the second prohibition does not take effect. But ownership by two different people is a contradiction.
As for processes, read my article "Zeno's Arrow and Modern Physics," here on the site.
How are two legal effects a contradiction? If someone betroths two sisters, both of them will be betrothed to him; it's just the consequences that he won't be able to realize — after all, you have an article about that. I once read the article on Zeno's arrow (and I assume that in your view the ideal movie is simply like an egg, etc.), and I will read it again, although I remember that it is not acquired by mere pulling. Thanks.
By the way, I emphasized that in the case of legal effects this is a “contradiction,” and in the case of prohibitions this is “redundancy,” but for present purposes I can't see the difference. Contradiction or redundancy is a reason why things cannot coexist. So now, why is it obvious that contradiction is a matter of the state, while redundancy is a matter of process? (If the answer requires the article on Zeno's arrow, which I still haven't gone back to read, then I'll let it rest.)
Betrothing two sisters is a contradiction, because once he is married to one, he is forbidden to marry the second. “A prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition” means simply that the second prohibition does not take effect, not that it is forbidden for it to take effect.
All right, this is hard for me to understand, but I'll go out following in the footsteps of the flock.
Thanks, that's also more or less what I managed to understand from Tosafot Rid there, but I am still missing the most basic point: why, in the case of legal effects, do we infer from the rule that one legal effect does not take hold when another legal effect is already there that the problem is a state of contradiction between the two legal effects, and not just a problem in the process; whereas in the case of prohibitions, we do not infer from the rule that one prohibition does not take effect when another is already there that the problem is a state of redundancy between the prohibitions, but instead infer that the problem is in the process?
(Aside from that — though this really isn't so relevant — I personally instinctively dislike problems in “processes.” If the final state is valid, then why should it matter what route it took — whether it flew in by helicopter from the Megiddo Valley or rappelled down from the Clouds of Glory? In the end, now it is here standing beside me, and I am honored to tattoo its potential on its forehead. That's why, by the way, I am very happy with the rule that whatever cannot take effect sequentially does not take effect even simultaneously; דווקא the case of prohibitions is what makes me uncomfortable.)