Q&A: Two Verses That Come as One Do Not Teach
Two Verses That Come as One Do Not Teach
Question
Hello Rabbi, I’m having a bit of trouble organizing a certain topic in my head:
On the one hand, there is an inductive principle built from one verse or from two verses. On the other hand, there is a dispute whether two verses that come as one do not teach, or do teach.
I can’t get the different views straight:
1. Is the view that two verses that come as one do teach basically the same as an inductive principle from two verses?
2. What exactly is the meaning of “that come as one”?
3. Would someone who says that two verses that come as one do not teach disagree, for example, with the Talmudic derivation in Kiddushin that the laws of agency are derived from betrothal and divorce, since that is two verses?
I’d appreciate some help.
Answer
“Two verses that come as one” means two verses that teach the same law in two different contexts. In such a case, the halakhic ruling is that they do not teach about other contexts (beyond those two themselves), although this is a dispute in the Talmud. The standard explanation is that if the law were true in all contexts, it would have been enough to write only one of them, and the second would be superfluous. From this we infer that the Torah wrote both because the law applies only in those two contexts.
Therefore, when there is a necessary distinction between those two contexts—meaning that one cannot be derived from the other, nor the second from the first—then the two are considered like one verse, because there is no redundancy here. In such a case, they do teach. That is an inductive principle from two verses. Notice that an inductive principle from two verses is always constructed by way of the common denominator, which is based on that necessary distinction between the two source cases. That is also the situation in the Kiddushin passage you mentioned.