Q&A: Does a Man Acquire a Woman?
Does a Man Acquire a Woman?
Question
Hello Rabbi Abraham,
My name is Meirav, age 31. I am a lawyer by profession. I am about to marry the love of my life in four months.
It is important to me to marry according to Jewish tradition. I believe in God who created the world, and I feel a connection and even a commitment to the tradition of the Jewish people and its customs.
However, I have read and learned that behind the innocent phrase, “You are hereby consecrated to me with this wedding ring,” the rabbis understand that the husband acquires the woman. It shocks me to think that a human being can be bought. And more than that, I saw the video that in books of Jewish law rabbis explain that this means he acquires me with regard to my obligation to him for sexual relations. It is clear to me that even religious people do not relate to a wife like a frying pan they bought. On the other hand, I believe that human beings cannot be bought, that this concept is totally inapplicable, and especially not for sex. Maybe that was the way Jewish law saw things 2,000 years ago, when a man would take his wife from her father’s house and the status of women was terrible. But today these things sound so absurd.
I do not want my husband to “acquire” me in my wedding ceremony. (And from that it follows that in divorce the husband has to “divorce” me. Also old and shocking terminology.) Therefore I told my fiancé that I do not find my place in such a ceremony, but rather in one in which the woman and the man are equal and enter into a covenant of love between them as equals and lovers. This bothers my fiancé מאוד, he wants a religious ceremony according to the rabbis of Jewish law.
A friend from work referred me to you, saying that you are a rational and moral rabbi who knows how to explain Jewish law in a logical, sensible way, and who also gives courageous halakhic rulings that are not mainstream.
A. Can you explain to me whether the husband really acquires the woman, and whether that means acquiring her in the sense that I am obligated in sexual relations? B. Why shouldn’t the ceremony be egalitarian, a mutual covenant?
C. According to Jewish law, am I permitted under the wedding canopy to say to my fiancé, “You are hereby consecrated to me with great love,” and give him a ring?
D. Is there any possibility of an egalitarian ceremony according to Jewish law? Can you refer me to a rabbi from the rabbinate who could conduct such a wedding canopy ceremony for us, according to our wishes?
Thank you in advance,
Meirav.
Answer
Hello Meirav.
Congratulations, and may you have much joy. What you wrote requires a great deal of elaboration on several different points, and it is hard for me to do that here. So I will answer relatively briefly, and if you wish I would be happy to speak with you orally and explain more. After the explanation at the beginning I will address your questions.
First of all, set your mind at ease. The husband does not acquire the woman in any sense whatsoever. No one in Jewish law thinks this and no one says it. People get confused because of the terminology (including people who are well-versed in Jewish law). In halakhic jargon, a “kinyan” means a legal act. For example, a person performs a kinyan in order to appoint an agent. The “acquisitional” act applies the agency agreement, but it is not true that the sender owns the agent. There is a contract between them. As a lawyer, you surely know that for a legal status to change, some act is required; otherwise it is hard to define the legal status and from when it changes. In Jewish law, the requirement for such an act exists for every legal effect, such as betrothal, ownership of property, agency, setting aside terumah, and the like. That is what is called an act of “kinyan.”
Therefore the term is used that the husband “acquires” the woman, but the meaning is that the husband performs a legal act in order to effect the betrothal. It is indeed true that in the halakhic definition specifically the husband performs the legal act, since that is how the Torah defines it, but this has absolutely nothing to do with ownership by the husband over his wife. Anyone who says so does not know what he is talking about. What exists between husband and wife is a halakhic contract, not ownership. The contract binds both parties with different obligations toward one another, like any contract. That is all.
A few years ago this mistake was presented in very detailed form in an article by Rivka Lubitch (a religious female rabbinical court advocate and lawyer), in the journal “Akdamot,” where she brought the sources, analyzed them, and argued that the husband acquires his wife in the sense of ownership. Therefore, as a feminist religious woman, she called on women and men not to perform a halakhic betrothal act. In the following issue I wrote a detailed article (link below) refuting all her claims, and I showed that this is a misunderstanding of the Talmud and the commentators. They write exactly the opposite and strongly reject the notion that the husband acquires his wife, and this happens long before it became unfashionable to say that the husband acquires the woman (there is evidence for this already in the Talmud itself, and in its commentators from the early Middle Ages). That is, this is not apologetics but an authentic description of the halakhic conception.
Just for clarification, because I detest apologetics (and certainly apologetic corner-cutting), I am not claiming that Jewish law is egalitarian. It is not. And by the way, that bothers me a great deal too (and I have several suggestions for improving the situation within the framework of Jewish law). Still, I will add a philosophical note. This lack of equality has to be understood from the religious perspective. Think of a soldier who goes out to fight and kills enemy soldiers. That is an immoral act, but it is necessary in order to survive. That is, sometimes we are required to do immoral acts not because we think they are moral, but because there is some value standing opposite them and realizing it requires the immoral act (like a doctor who performs surgery and thereby causes pain to the patient, but does so in order to heal him). Now note something that secular people sometimes miss: in the religious “basket” there are several values beyond moral values. I call them “religious values.” The prohibition on eating pork does not come to achieve a moral goal, and neither does the obligation to observe the Sabbath (to many people’s surprise). These are religious values, not moral values (they are meant to achieve some spiritual goals). Sometimes a situation arises in which a religious value conflicts with a moral value, and in some of those cases (not always) Jewish law says that the moral value is overridden by the religious one. It is a mistake to conclude from this that Jewish law does not care about morality. The conclusion is that it also cares about the opposing value. In such a conflict one has to decide for one side, and in such a decision one of the opposing values is always harmed. This is true also in conflicts between moral values. A student of Jean-Paul Sartre lived in Paris under Nazi occupation and debated whether to stay there to care for his elderly, ill mother who lived alone, or to flee and join the Free French army to fight the Nazis. Suppose he decided to stay (or the reverse) — would that mean that in his opinion it is not right to fight evil (or care for his mother)? Of course not. The opposing value forces him to give up that value, but both values matter to him, and precisely because of that he is in conflict. So too in Jewish law: when saving a life overrides the Sabbath, the value of human life overrides the value of the Sabbath, but that does not mean that the value of the Sabbath is unimportant to Jewish law. I argue that this is also the case in the context of betrothal. There is inequality there, but I believe that this is because there are religious values opposite it that override it, not because Jewish law does not care about equality and morality. Thus, for example, Jewish law opposes marriage between members of the same sex (not only opposes it, but it is not even defined or valid according to Jewish law). That does not mean it is not egalitarian and that LGBT people do not matter to it. But there is an opposing value that forces us not to permit such marriages (in Jewish law. In the state, that is a completely different matter, which I will not get into here).
A secular person who is not committed to “religious” values but only to moral values naturally sees no conflict in such situations, and therefore when he sees such conduct he concludes that the halakhic person is immoral. But that is a mistake stemming from the secular person judging the religious person according to his own assumptions. To the best of my understanding, on the moral level one should judge a person according to the assumptions the person being judged believes in, not according to the assumptions of the judge. Therefore, in my view, even a secular person should understand that a halakhic person who behaves unequally may be mistaken (in the secular person’s opinion), but it is not correct to say that he is immoral. For according to the religious person’s own outlook, despite his commitment to morality, the opposing value forces him to harm the moral value, and not because morality is unimportant to him and he is not committed to it. The same applies to the example of war. Someone who opposes the justice of my war will see me as immoral. But he is mistaken. The conclusion he should draw is that I am mistaken (in his opinion), but if I truly believe in the justice of that war, then it is not correct to say that I am immoral. All right, enough philosophy.
In any case, although Jewish law is not completely egalitarian, I strongly argue that this myth about a husband’s ownership of his wife is nonsense. As you wrote, in practice no one certainly sees it that way, and as I showed in that article, for very good reason.
If you would like to read the article: https://mikyab.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA.pdf
And now to your questions:
A. See above. Absolutely not.
B. I don’t know, but apparently there is a religious value that overrides the value of equality. But the question of who exactly does what in the ceremony is not important in my view. The question is what the ceremony means and what its consequences are, and here it is clear that we are not talking about proprietary ownership. How the status of betrothal (the contract) is effected is only a technical matter.
C. There are limitations on when and how to do this, and the rabbi who conducts the wedding canopy ceremony will guide you.
D. In the Tzohar organization they conduct betrothal ceremonies in a more open way, though still committed to Jewish law. You can contact them, and I am sure they will be happy to help. If you want to marry according to Jewish law but not through the rabbinate, you can contact the organization “Mavoi Satum” (“Dead End”; search online). They will guide you and help you find a rabbi who does this. It is important to understand that marriage according to the law of Moses and Israel does not necessarily mean marriage through the Chief Rabbinate. The rabbinate is an institution whose validity comes from Israeli law, and it has no halakhic status whatsoever. If you married according to the law of Moses and Israel outside the rabbinate, you are fully married according to Jewish law, although there are certain legal implications (not many), and they will explain the situation to you there. As for me personally, I strongly oppose the Chief Rabbinate and the religious coercion it promotes, and the dark outlooks that guide it, and therefore I support marriages not conducted through it. But I am definitely in favor of marriage according to the law of Moses and Israel under the supervision of a rabbi.
Again, congratulations to both of you, and much joy. Feel free to contact me with any question: 052-3320543.
Discussion on Answer
You can divorce through the rabbinate. As far as I know, today they also arrange divorces outside the rabbinate. Anyone interested should contact Mavoi Satum and get updated on the current situation.
Hello Rabbi Abraham!
This is Meirav again.
With great appreciation, I am deeply grateful for your long and detailed reply. Indeed, a great weight has been lifted from my heart upon hearing your answer that according to Jewish law the husband is not the “owner” of the woman.
If I may, a few follow-up questions:
A. You explained that “what exists between husband and wife is a halakhic contract, not ownership. The contract binds both parties with different obligations toward one another, like any contract.” When I enter into a legal contract, I very much want to read it beforehand and understand it. Where can one read it? Is this legal contract written down and given to the couple before the wedding canopy? Is it written in modern, readable Hebrew?
And from this to B. (and forgive the directness):
B. Does this contract include an obligation of sexual relations? It is clear to me that in every couple relationship, both partners understand that sex is a meaningful thing for both sides, and that there is an “unwritten agreement” that the relationship should also sustain (and wants to sustain!) the sexual desires of both sides. However, in general secular society, there is no “obligation” of sexual relations at any particular frequency. It just happens when it is good for both sides. It is clear to me that also among religious people, if the woman is not interested (I am presenting the more common side, but I mean both the man and the woman), then she is not forced into relations by force. But does this legal contract tell the woman something along the lines of: “Do everything in your power, with great effort, so that your husband will have regular sexual relations, even if you do not want or desire it”? [My question stems from the understanding that the halakhic prohibition on masturbation and pornography, and of course adultery, requires that the wife be the only way in which the man fulfills his sexual desires. Hence my question.]
C. Why can’t each of the parties, individually, cancel the partnership agreement (like any other partnership agreement)? My question is not only why the husband gives the get, because I know the woman’s consent is also required. My question is why each side cannot just leave when they want.
D. In a wedding through “Mavoi Satum,” is it possible to prevent women being chained to a marriage by refusal of divorce — through a prenuptial agreement and a conditional marriage — whereas through the rabbinate it is impossible?
Thanks again!
Meirav
Rivka Lubitch (a religious female rabbinical court advocate and lawyer), in the journal “Akdamot,” where she brought the sources, “analyzed them,” and argued that the husband acquires his wife in the sense of ownership. Therefore, as a feminist religious woman, she called on women and men not to perform a halakhic betrothal act.
Here you have a classic example of what Torah study by a woman leads to.
To Meirav,
1. The legal document is called the “ketubah,” and it is written in Aramaic.
Broadly speaking, the husband obligates himself to the woman in 3 things: food, clothing, and sexual relations according to her desire. (What is called in the language of the Torah “onah.”)
We were taught that the husband is actually granting his wife sexual relations according to her conjugal rights, and not, Heaven forbid, merely unloading his urges on her body.
That is, the required times that Jewish law sets for sexual relations are according to the capacities of the husband and the wife. And of course the matter depends on the woman’s desire, because the relations are granted to her and for her sake. (And not only for the purpose of having children.)
Every sensible woman should take to heart that if she locks the door against her husband, he will look for himself in foreign fields. (An extreme case in this regard is called in Jewish law “a wife who rebels against her husband” — look it up on Wikipedia and elsewhere.)
There are additional things that are not explicitly written in the ketubah, and apparently many people also do not know them. For that you would need to study tractate Ketubot. (But that will take time, and besides, I belong to the camp that opposes Torah study for women. So the simplest thing is — type into Google “a wife’s obligations to her husband” and everything will open up before you.)
2. In practice, many who marry — even religious and Haredi people — are not at all aware of the meaning of the “legal contract” being made here. As in many areas of law and contracts, they rely on Jewish law to do what is best for them.
From your side, I definitely identify with the desire to examine this “legal contract.” But the more you investigate, I fear you will probably discover things there that will not appeal to you from an egalitarian point of view. So maybe it is best for you to relate to it like the average secular person — it is simply a wedding ceremony, period. If you want, observe it; if you do not want, do not observe it.
3. In conclusion, I would recommend that you follow the slogan “no tricks and no shticks” — if you have decided to marry according to Jewish law, marry through the rabbinate by the book and do not create unnecessary problems for yourself.
I’d like to suggest a possibility I thought of.
In the past a man was allowed to marry more than one woman, and in ancient times there were also concubines (with everyone’s knowledge); sometimes a man would leave sexually satisfied without his wife. It may be that because of this, the man had an obligation of onah (marital relations) toward his wife, who has no other way to attain that satisfaction and longs only for her husband.
One should note that Judaism has consistently always been a bit more moral than human norms. And the enactments were made in accordance with that norm.
In the past it was accepted in all armies of the world that during conquest men raped women; the Torah added a moral layer on top of that flawed norm, so that the Jewish soldier would conquer his urge and there would be a gentler, more moral process for him (the beautiful captive woman). Is there anyone today (from the religious world) who thinks the matter of the beautiful captive woman is even relevant today? Of course not.
And in marriage too, it is clear to everyone that a proper relationship today is an egalitarian one, where the differences between man and woman create a healthy harmony, but certainly not through exploitation of gaps in power or status.
All in all, the wording is ancient wording; there is a lot of beauty in it and concern for the woman. I don’t understand people’s pressure about concepts…
By the way, I’m also a lawyer, so I know that being a “ba’al” is from the language of ownership, which is a property right and not a contractual right, one of whose characteristics is that it is public vis-à-vis everyone. The husband forbids his wife to the whole world, and that only indicates that this commitment and bond are extremely strong. As is known, a property right overrides a contractual right.
Hello Meirav.
A. It is hard to “read” this contract because it is spelled out in the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, and its commentators, and it is long and requires familiarity with Jewish law. But I do not think this is critical for you, because what you will actually observe depends more on you than on Jewish law. All in all, people know the practical meaning of this contract.
B. This contract does indeed obligate sexual relations. As for frequency, there are various laws, but that is a matter for agreement between you. Theoretically, from this perspective there is a bit of asymmetry between husband and wife. The husband owes the wife her sexual satisfaction, and she is mainly obligated to help him bring children into the world (the commandment of “be fruitful and multiply”).
C. This contract is very sensitive, and almost its entire meaning is that not everyone can just leave whenever they want. Even where there is a partnership contract, not everyone can leave whenever they want, since the sides rely on one another. Beyond that, stability is part of the foundations on which a healthy home rests, and that requires that it not be so easy to get up and leave. On this point I always דווקא wonder about secular society: how can it be that a couple signs a contract between them and society allows it to be violated with intolerable ease, and treats betrayal or wandering eyes with intolerable leniency?
D. As far as I know — yes. An agreement certainly, and I think also a condition. In the rabbinate, I believe an agreement is possible but not a condition.
And what about the words of Nachmanides, when he interpreted “and your desire shall be to your husband” as meaning that the woman longs to become the man’s maidservant and in effect his property, unlike a slave, whose custom is not to acquire a master for himself?
Or the halakhic decisors who even permit forcing the wife, such as the author of Atzei Arazim?
True, Jewish law does not follow them, but these views still exist in Judaism, and in fact quite a few medieval authorities and later authorities held this way.
You forgot a few more points: what about the murder of Arlosoroff, the Beilis blood libel, the Dreyfus trial, the plagues of Egypt, Caiaphas’s betrayal, King Solomon’s sin, the views of Plotinus, Pythagoras’s theorem, and so on?
I didn’t understand what Caiaphas’s betrayal has to do with anything.
In gematria it equals “In the beginning God created,” including the kolel.
With God’s help, 3 Kislev 5781
To Rabbi Mad"a — greetings,
All the corruptions you mentioned — the murder of Arlosoroff, the Beilis blood libel, the Dreyfus trial, the plagues of Egypt, etc. etc. — have a common denominator: they were all done by men.
Violence, aggressiveness, and oppressiveness are embedded in men’s DNA, and therefore it is no wonder that the male world looks like this. There is no cure for it except by strengthening women’s power.
This will happen when leadership is in the hands of Torah scholars, who are humble like women yet act bravely like men (in the words of Rabbi Berekhiah in Yoma 70).
With blessings,
Shterna Tsila Rotlinger
The half-year seminary “Shemen HaMor”
From what Nachmanides seems to be saying (I haven’t read him inside), it sounds like that is the curse in practice. That doesn’t mean he intends that this is how it should be. On the contrary, these are curses, which means it is not supposed to be this way. Do you have a feminist way to explain the verse “and he shall rule over you”?
To Rabbi Michi: are there halakhic decisors who permit rape?!
If you want a broader treatment of the topic, Rabbi Re’em discusses it in his lessons on tractate Kiddushin.
Rabbi, don’t you think this could create problems later with divorce if they don’t marry through the rabbinate?