Question

Hello,
Rabbi, as is well known, defines “Judaism” as commitment to Jewish law and nothing more. I do not disagree with this definition, and it even seems astonishingly logical to me (after all, unique = particular), but in that case it is not clear to me how a secular Jew fits into this definition. In column 338 the Rabbi wrote in passing that according to this definition, secular people too are considered Jews, since according to Jewish law they are obligated by it, even though they do not recognize their obligation. If so, a Jew is not someone who is obligated to Jewish law, but someone whom Jewish law obligates.
That is to say, the secular Jew is defined as a Jew because Jewish law—which he is not committed to, either declaratively or practically—claims that he is obligated to it by virtue of his origin.
This is difficult for me from several angles:
A. The Rabbi, in one of the books of the trilogy, argued that “we compel regarding the commandments” was said only about a commandment-observant person who for some reason refrains from performing a particular commandment, but not about someone who declares that he is not bound by Jewish law at all. It is hard to argue that there is religious value in an act done under compulsion, but no value in an act done by a person who does not act מתוך commitment to Jewish law. Just as we consider him a Jew because Jewish law defines him as obligated to it, so too we should consider his act a commandment, despite his lack of commitment, because Jewish law recognizes him as obligated.
B. If that is the definition of Judaism, then one cannot derive from it that halakhic commitment is a necessary condition for conversion, as the Rabbi argues. If we assume that there is some mechanism of conversion, then a gentile who carried out that mechanism is considered a Jew and is obligated in Jewish law, even if he does not recognize that obligation. The Rabbi can of course argue that accepting the yoke of the commandments is part of that mechanism, but I understood from the Rabbi’s books and articles (I am not greatly expert in Jewish law itself) that this opinion is not based on any sources, but mainly on the definition of Judaism as halakhic commitment. And if the Rabbi wants to include secular people in this definition, then that definitely does not follow from the definition.
Though it must be admitted that even if what I wrote is correct, it is very logical that accepting halakhic commitment should be a condition for conversion, but that is a longer discussion.
C. According to this definition, any religion in the world that claims we are obligated to it would bring us unwillingly under its wings. If Christianity, for example, claims that we are all obligated to believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, then in that sense we are all Christians. After all, the Rabbi argues that secular people also identify themselves as Jews because Jewish law claims they are obligated to it, even though they do not recognize the authority of Jewish law to claim anything. By exactly the same logic, we are Christians even though we do not recognize the authority of the Church to claim anything. Admittedly, Christianity, and most religions in the world, do not have law in the Jewish legal sense, and even if they do, it is not the main thing; rather, they have binding principles of faith, and those are the essence of the religion. Therefore one cannot simply copy-and-paste the Rabbi’s definition of Judaism onto Christianity or any other religion (especially in light of the Rabbi’s well-known view about “binding principles of faith”). But in any case, I could invent a new normative system, halakhic at its core, and its name in Israel would be “Abrahamism,” according to which anyone whose family name begins with A is obligated by it (even if he does not recognize it), and then the Rabbi, according to that definition, would be a particularly exemplary Abrahamist.
The alternative to all this is to say that indeed the definition of Judaism is commitment to Jewish law, and not whoever Jewish law obligates, which would exclude from Judaism anyone who is not committed to it, namely secular people. Jewish law demands of them that they be Jews, but they choose not to obey it and in practice not to be Jews (this is of course on the essential plane of Judaism, which the Rabbi argues exists, and not on the ethnic-cultural-national plane).
But whether you accept the first formulation or the second, and whether my words are correct or mere empty and misleading burdens, I would like to ask: is the Rabbi’s definition of Judaism a halakhic ruling or an extra-halakhic one? And in any case, what halakhic and other implications does it have (apart from your position on the issue of conversion)?
I apologize for the rambling.