Maybe the questioner should have asked why nowadays we don’t recite: “Who has not made me secular.”

According to Jewish law, most of the nation are apostates with respect to the whole Torah, as Sabbath desecrators. Most of those who crown Bibi don’t really behave like Jews and perhaps have even gone outside the fold of Israel (though they are still obligated in the commandments).
Most of the religious people who accept his behavior are Haredim, who in any case see the state as an existing fact like any other state, and their envoys are merely intercessors representing the Jews before the wicked government.

The well-known question is why we don’t recite it in positive language—“Who has made me a Jew.”
And the well-known answer: you bless God that He has not made you a Gentile. But being a Jew—that’s work each person has to do himself.
From there I went on to think about the additional blessings. You bless God “Who has not made me a slave”—but being “free” is your own personal work.
But more deeply, this is the blessing where you bless God “Who has not made me a woman”—that is, being a man is your own inner work… (which really isn’t clear to everyone)

Tzahi et al.—whoa, what depth, wow wow!! Deep, deep, who can find it? We’ll wait for King David to rise at the resurrection of the dead and recite “A Song of Ascents” and all that, if only

With God’s help, Saturday night, Vayavo Yaakov Shalem, 5781

After all, in no country in the world did it ever occur to anyone that “favorable coverage” of a public official would be considered bribery.

The idea that “favorable coverage” should be considered bribery is derived from the idea that even a good word from a borrower to a lender is considered “verbal interest”; and from there perhaps one derives a pious practice that a judge should disqualify himself from judging the case of someone who spoke in his praise; and by a further extension of that extension, that we should also demand of a politician that he refrain from dealing with the affairs of someone who praised him or published a few positive articles about his wife.

The idea that “favorable coverage” should be considered a disqualifying “conflict of interest” may be considered proper conduct for a judge, who can always transfer the case to another judge to sit in judgment. There is even a law forbidding media discussion of a matter currently being heard in court, so that favorable or condemnatory coverage should not influence the judge while sitting in judgment. And even there they came to the conclusion that this is “a decree the public cannot abide by,” until Supreme Court President Justice Hayut determined that this law is “a dead letter.” A norm that cannot be demanded of judges—we are going to demand it of elected officials?

An officeholder elected by the public in a democratic way receives, on every decision he makes, either “favorable coverage” or “unfavorable coverage.” If he allocates money to settlement in Judea and Samaria, he will receive “favorable coverage” from supporters of settlement. By contrast, if he directs the budget to theaters and concerts, he will receive “favorable coverage” from consumers of culture.

If we claim that a decision by an elected official that is influenced by “favorable coverage” or “unfavorable coverage” counts as a decision made under a “conflict of interest,” then we would have to put every elected official on criminal trial for bribery or breach of trust, and outlaw democracy.

The idea that a politician’s actions, done in order to receive “favorable coverage,” constitute a criminal prohibition is ridiculous, but it does testify to a society in which the demand for objectivity and fairness from elected officials has been internalized. We thirst for a leader who will give his life for the good of his people, like Moses our teacher, who gave his life for the good of his people even when he stood in situations of “They are but a little away from stoning me.”

As an aspiration, that’s excellent. But to demand, under criminal threat, from an elected leader that “favorable coverage” not be one of his considerations—that is already an exaggeration.

With blessings, Ilu Hai Spiegel-Varkaheimer

Correction:
In paragraph 6, line 1
… for the sake of receiving “favorable coverage” constitutes a criminal prohibition—it is ridiculous, but it does testify to…

Note:
Even if the public official were to act with pious restraint and transfer the discussion regarding someone who spoke in his praise to some clerk, there would still be a problem. The clerk now knows that this person is one of those whom the supervising minister holds in esteem, and that too is a “conflict of interest.” All the more so since the clerk as well is under concern that if he rules one way or another, he will receive “favorable coverage” from one person or “condemnatory coverage” from another.

So the question returns to its place: under a demo-crazy regime, where every decision-maker’s decision receives “favorable coverage” from one side and criticism and condemnation from others, it is impossible to bring things to a state where the decision-maker is “clean” of considerations of “favorable coverage.”

With blessings, Ilan Hai Shfo”r

Paragraph 1, line 4
… that if he rules this way or that…

Paragraph 2, line 1
… in a democratic regime, where…

Judge Rachel Shalev-Gertel, in her article “On the Purity of Judgment and Judicial Disqualification” (on the Da’at website), discusses the difference between Hebrew law, which unequivocally requires a judge to disqualify himself if someone did him a favor or showed him honor, and the Israeli courts, which did not adopt this sweeping stringency but rather judge each case on its own merits according to “the practical-concern test.”

Judge Shalev-Gertel notes at the end of her article the lack of uniformity in the courts’ rulings on the issue of concern for “verbal bribery” among judges. The norm that judges are unwilling to demand of themselves—they are now being called upon to apply retroactively to Benjamin Netanyahu, so that he should be the first “Benjamin the Righteous” 🙂

With blessings, Ilan Hai Spiegel Varkaheimer

Regarding applying the norm of “practical concern” to the influence of “verbal bribery” on the decisions of an elected official: I already mentioned above that for an elected official this cannot be prohibited at all. After all, the entire democratic system is built on the fact that elected officials seek favorable coverage from their voters—or, to put it differently, “receive verbal bribery.”

This is one of the reasons a democratic state maintains many mechanisms for oversight and for limiting the freedom of action of elected officials. Even if the prime minister wants to make a decision in a certain direction, he will need the agreement of dozens of people: officials, professional experts and committee members, Knesset members and legal advisers. Is it possible to bribe all of them with the “verbal bribery” of “favorable coverage”?