Q&A: Questions at the End of Reading “Truth and Not Stable”
Questions at the End of Reading “Truth and Not Stable”
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I finished reading your book Truth and Not Stable and was left with a number of questions. I’d appreciate it if you find the time to answer them 🙂
- In your explanation in chapter 14, “The Synthetic Alternative,” about Euclidean geometry, you wrote: “How do we know that in our real world only one straight line passes between two points? How did we infer that two parallel lines in our real world will never meet?” You then explained that the initial tendency is to say that we can grasp this through observation, and you refuted that too.
I can understand why I really can’t say, based on observation, that two parallel lines never meet anywhere (rather, my intuition is operating here), but connecting 2 points by one line? That’s a finite and real matter. I see with my own eyes that this is the only line. - In chapter 18, “The Philosophy of Intuition,” you wrote that “there are intuitions that appear to us very strong (trust in our eyes, the geometric axioms), less strong (the principle of causality, the law of gravity), and even less so (everyday generalizations—if a person tells me the time when I ask, he is probably not lying).”
I’d be glad if you could give more examples of intuitions that seem to you as strong as geometric axioms. - In chapter 20, “Kal Va-chomer and the Objections to It,” you demonstrated the use of an a fortiori inference in order to obtain information about the world, and you always made clear that given additional data the picture can change, and therefore using an a fortiori inference never gives me certainty, but it does give me a certain degree of probability that allows me to go on accumulating knowledge about the world. Throughout the book you keep returning to the point that synthetic thinking obviously starts from the assumption that although things can be very probable, we must always be prepared to accept new data that will change the picture.
More than that—there is a necessity that things not be certain in order for them to allow me to accumulate further knowledge about the world.
As I understand it, that is how you proved (in The First Existent) the revelation argument as a very probable argument within synthetic thinking.
But on that I ask: is it really possible to use synthetic thinking for everything? Unlike the example you gave with a fortiori inference, the events and variables you are talking about regarding the revelation argument are almost not open to refutation at all. What objections could refute the revelation theory? - Still regarding the a fortiori inference—in the graph of F as a function of a, Newton’s second law is proven, and no matter how many more points we add, the law will continue to “stand.” In such a case the analysts’ claim that one can draw more lines through the points is indeed true, but in my humble opinion it’s ridiculous (precisely because of probability and synthetic thinking).
But in the issue of the exams (which you used to demonstrate a fortiori inference), the inference is much weaker. There really aren’t many “arrows” pointing in a certain direction. I’d even like to say that it’s so weak that you can’t really rely on the information it teaches me about the world because it’s so shaky.
I’m basically asking the same question again—is it really possible to use synthetic thinking for everything—only this time in the opposite direction.
What do you think? What am I missing? - In chapter 24, “Pluralism, Skepticism, and the Postmodern Condition,” you explain simply that if we can give lots of correct answers to the same moral question, then what meaning does ethics have at all? There has to be some boundary. I agree with you, but I run into a problem that won’t leave me alone, and I’ll try to explain it from two different directions:
- This intuition regarding the idea of morality would be the same for everyone at high resolutions (“do not murder”), but in more specific things it would already be a derivative of where we grew up (that is, it is subjective and relative), for example—the abortion issue. In the end, the ethical claims we have (that we want to say are facts and argue over) are a derivative of the place where we grew up, meaning “social construction.” It follows that only at high resolutions is there room for synthetic thinking and moral discussions, but at low resolutions the postmodern conception seems to me the only one that can work.
- You explain that we cannot show that our criteria of probability are reasonable, because regarding those criteria themselves we can ask who says they are correct. That is exactly postmodern skepticism.
And yet, even though I want to say that my criteria of probability are reasonable and that I have a presumption in favor of relying on them—we see that there is no end to it. The best example of this, in my humble opinion, is Aharon Barak’s constitutional revolution—the “reasonable” of one certain group within the people is blatantly unreasonable to others, and vice versa. The concept of “reasonableness” in the whole field of law has already become indiscriminate—something entirely different is reasonable to each person.
- Still on the matter of postmodernism as “social construction.” In your book The First Existent you explain in the fourth conversation that all philosophers (and really everyone) are “religious” in a certain sense because they decided what they think before entering the discussion (and of course you explain and substantiate this). If so, I see that too as a kind of “social construction”—after all, people have different assumptions; what other explanation can I give for that besides social construction?
Thank you, Shachar.
Answer
- I don’t understand how one can see that there is no other line. One can see what is there, not what is not there. That is clear to you from logic, not from observation.
- For example, that what I see really exists.
- For example, if I were to see additional traditions that turn out to be mistaken.
- I didn’t understand.
- 1. Not true. Most things, even at high resolutions, are agreed upon. I also don’t agree that everything is a result of one’s place of birth and environment. That is an unfounded assumption, and I do not agree with it. 2. I didn’t understand. The fact that there are arguments proves nothing. It is possible that intuition is mistaken, and on that there is no argument. There are columns on this site that discuss the question of whether anything can be proven from the existence of a dispute.
- Different intuitions. How do you know that we are all born identical and only the environment differs?
Discussion on Answer
1. Not having seen something is not proof.
3. Each tradition has to be discussed in terms of how reliable it is. There is no sweeping principle here. You asked how this could be checked empirically, and I answered.
5.1 On most things we agree, and what is not agreed upon usually is not connected to morality but to Jewish law. For example, intermarriage is not a moral value.
3. I asked about our revelation tradition. My claim was that I don’t really identify refutations that could apply to all the arguments you gave for it, and from that I asked whether it even makes sense to call this “synthetic thinking” in the sense that I always have my “finger on the pulse” and am ready to change my mind once my theory is refuted (because in this case I claimed that I do not identify any possible refutation).
You answered that if we find additional traditions that turn out to be mistakes, and I think I didn’t understand your answer (or maybe you didn’t understand my question?)
5.1 And I want to say that דווקא the assumption that on most things we agree is the assumption that is unfounded. After all, if we go topic by topic we will find lots of opinions and different sides, and sometimes there will be a principled agreement at the higher resolution (again—not to murder).
But sexual permissiveness?? Economic policy? Modesty?
Also in specific issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (actually in many conflicts throughout history), how can one say there is agreement?
Intermarriage, in many people’s eyes, is a supreme moral value and not at all something connected only to Jewish law. And maybe one could also say that for many people, observing Jewish law is itself the moral thing to do.
You can certainly say that the overwhelming majority of us are tolerant as you describe, but do we agree?
This also connects to question 6—there is quite a stable connecting line between people’s different opinions and the places where they grew up / the education they received. Also, you yourself say that in the end our consciousness is limited and we must do everything in our power to do *within our abilities* regarding the clarification of truth. I don’t understand how synthetic thinking is relevant at low resolutions.
Sorry for the delay in responding; I couldn’t answer until now. Thanks, as always, for the response!
3. I argued that there is a way to refute the claim that traditions are reliable by examining different traditions.
3. But I wasn’t referring to refuting traditions in general, but to refuting the specific tradition of revelation
5.1. + 6. In case you didn’t notice—I’d be glad if you could answer these questions too.
If you consciously decided not to, I’d at least be glad to know why…
I noticed, and there’s nothing to answer. You say that in most cases there is dispute, and I say that in the great majority there is agreement. What do you want me to do now—conduct a study going through all the world’s values and all places?
Because I start from the assumption that you believe what you write, and that my question has some power to somewhat undermine what you write—I would expect at least a partial response. After all, I gave a list of topics that I think, if we go into them even a little deeply, we’ll see that it’s hard for us to form agreement even not at the high resolution. Maybe I’m wrong (honestly, I’d be very happy to discover that), but it seems to me worth a serious discussion.
I simply take very seriously the ideas you teach, and therefore I also seriously ask questions that I have—your ideas have the power to restore confidence that there is meaning in having discussions on subjects where it seems we disagree, because there really is a way to reach one conclusion that is more reasonable than another. I run into difficulties on the way to that understanding that you are trying to advance—so I’m surprised that in your answer you are basically saying the opposite right now…
I’d be very glad to receive answers / have a discussion on the 2 questions that remain. It’s clear to me that you don’t owe me anything, but my heart’s wish is that we can find more reasonable answers to the questions I raised.
Thank you, and Sabbath peace
Regarding what was mentioned at the beginning of the thread about two parallel lines: I didn’t understand how intuition comes in here. Isn’t it conceptually necessary that two parallel lines never meet? You wrote in the book that this doesn’t come from thought, because thought cannot teach us about the world, but here we are dealing with a conceptual definition.
How do you know that it is conceptually necessary? Intuition.
The moment the lines meet, they stop being parallel. Isn’t that so?
And how do you know that? Maybe they’re parallel here and meet there.
So there they aren’t parallel.
Is this axiom supposed to rule out the possibility that the lines will ever cease to be parallel, or is it only saying that as long as they are parallel they do not meet?
An axiom is not a tautology, nor is it a definition. It says that if there are two parallel lines in a certain place, they will not meet anywhere else.
1. I don’t understand—exactly the opposite. If I only see what is there, then clearly what I see is only from observation and not from logic. I don’t see another line—that’s the objective fact.
2. I meant theories.
3. Aren’t there “mistaken customs” among the Jewish people whose source, as their name implies, is mistakes?
5.1. Do we all agree about the place of gender equality? About intermarriage? About sexual permissiveness? About modesty? About economic policy?
6. One can find as a universal phenomenon that people who grew up in the same area tend to be on the same “line of thought” across a broad range of fields. This stands out in voting for parliament, in religious lifestyle, and in opinions on fundamental / “burning” issues (the refugee issue, separation of religion and state…)
I read your view against the “conditioning” argument in everything related to religious education, and I tend to agree, but I still added it here as a parameter because it points in the same direction (just as you brought many arguments in favor of revelation and explained that each one can be refuted separately, but together they can form a “presumption”)