Question

Hello Rabbi, I read your first book in the quartet, and now I’ve started the second book, but there are a few issues for me that still haven’t been resolved, and I’d be glad if the Rabbi could explain them to me, sharpen my understanding, point out where I’m mistaken, etc.
1. In your book you argued that an analytic proposition is a proposition that adds nothing about the world, but only analyzes that which can be analyzed, and therefore it is empty — “it reveals only what we already know.”
Science, in using the analytic method, even if I do not grant its assumptions, and even if I do not accept its validity, will produce a cellphone through which I can communicate, or a computer with which I can correspond with you by email. Even if I were a complete skeptic and did not believe in “being” at all, I would still get the impression that there is a computer standing before me right now — again, even if it supposedly does not exist. So I ask: in what sense is it empty? If its emptiness is essential, that is, noumenal, then you are saying nothing, because we do not know the noumenon (at least according to the Tortoise’s claim, since we all know the world only in a synthetic way), but only the phenomena of things, that is, only their appearance in reality. In fact, what comes out from this is that what is empty of content is the synthetic, because we cannot speak about it or understand it. The synthetic only enables us to say that we cannot know everything. It is a symbol of lack of awareness, which is in a certain sense empty.
2. I agree with your claim that every encounter with reality is synthetic at first. If so, then the use of analytics is not pure, because it begins from syntheticity. But this claim regarding the negation of the analytic does not say anything at all. When the analytic necessarily appears after a synthetic encounter, then that is simply the definition of the analytic; that is, the analytic is not an encounter with reality in an immediate way, but necessarily has a synthetic mediation. When you negate the “pure” analytic, you are negating something that in the first place does not exist.
3. In your book you argued that postmodernism appears alongside the empty analytic, but I do not understand. After all, the authority of the postmodern person to draw his truth derives from the understanding that all our cognition of reality is necessarily synthetic, and we have no ability to know the truth, and therefore I believe in what I choose. That is, the synthetic is what is sanctified here, and it is what enables content in the life of the postmodern person. A person with postmodern thinking can also choose the Jewish narrative and live according to it only because of synthetic cognition.
4. You also argued that postmodernism does not allow active education to a certain extent, but in my opinion it is difficult to make such a sweeping claim about such a general concept. After all, a person’s openness depends on the truth in which he believes. If I choose to believe, for example, in the Jewish narrative, I can on the one hand understand that everyone has his own narrative, and therefore I cannot educate or prevent anyone from doing anything that stems from his own narrative; or, if I choose to cling to my narrative because it is the exclusive truth (for me), I will judge reality through my narrative, and measure the character of the people around me according to my standard, and perhaps even seek to influence them from within my narrative. The possibility of influencing depends on the degree of a person’s belief in his narrative, and the very fact that he chooses this or that narrative ties him to the postmodern method or way of thinking.