Question

Hello Rabbi,
In your book The Science of Freedom, you compare the circumstances that affect a person's "power of decision" to a kind of topographic map. For some people, refraining from a bar of chocolate would be like climbing a hill, in terms of how hard it is to reach such a decision, while for others it would be like an easy downhill walk. Something like that.
You also described that, in certain extreme cases, given particular physiological-psychological circumstances, the climb may be so difficult as to be practically impossible. In such a case, we would say that the person acted without free choice.
My question is this: suppose there is a person who has a certain "mountain" on the topographic map—something that is practically impossible for him to do. But he refrains from doing it for a different reason. Did he act with free choice?
That is: X has two possible courses of action before him—Y and Z.
X will never be able to do Y, given his mental state. Even so, X has no interest at all in doing Y, without being aware of his inability to do so. He chooses Z for his own reasons. Can we say that X's choice of Z is free?