Q&A: The Acquisition Rights of Robbery
The Acquisition Rights of Robbery
Question
At what point do the acquisition rights created by robbery lapse? From the moment of admission, from the decision to return it, or only upon the actual return? Is there any discussion of this issue?
Answer
I don’t recall anything explicit at the moment. But simply speaking, the acquisition depends on liability for accidental loss or damage, since that is its purpose. So it stands to reason that as long as that liability remains, the acquisition rights of robbery remain as well. Therefore, simply speaking, it lasts until the item is actually returned. There are many discussions in the Talmud about what counts as returning stolen property—to his courtyard, to his wife, or to his adult or minor children, and so on—and it appears that as long as he has not returned it, he is still considered a robber who is liable for accidental loss or damage, and the acquisition rights of robbery still apply.
Discussion on Answer
I now saw that in the responsa Tzitz HaKodesh, sec. 6, he writes as follows:
“And one must examine the prohibition of robbery: does admitting it also rectify this prohibition? At first glance, from the words of Tosafot in Bava Metzia (6a, s.v. ‘Hikdisha’), who wrote regarding robbery that since he admitted it to him, it is like a deposit that he has in the hands of others, see there, it implies that this constitutes a rectification of the prohibition….”
Does he mean to say that the moment he admits it, the prohibition lapses and the acquisition rights of robbery lapse as well?
That is what his wording seems to indicate. But it really is strange in light of the Talmudic discussions I mentioned earlier about returning stolen property. With some difficulty, one could explain those cases as dealing with a situation where he did not admit it, but rather the religious court obligated him to return it, in which case the prohibition lapses only upon the actual return. But that is a very forced reading, since a ruling of the religious court is certainly no weaker than an admission in establishing that the object once again belongs to its owner.
This seemed suspicious to me, so I checked the source, and your quote is not accurate. “That this constitutes a rectification of the prohibition” are your words, not part of the quote itself. Tosafot there is discussing the ability to consecrate it, and that does not necessarily mean that the prohibition has been rectified. Once he admits it, it is considered sufficiently in the owner’s domain so that he can consecrate it. There is no proof from there at all for our issue regarding the acquisition rights of robbery.
Those are the words of Tzitz HaKodesh.
The words I quoted are the heading of the section: “And now one must clarify regarding the prohibition of robbery whether admission alone also rectifies this prohibition.”
Also, it is clear from his words that he is talking about mere admission, since he is discussing Tosafot in Bava Metzia 6a, and there all there is is silence as admission; it is not talking about an obligation imposed by a religious court.
Even so, the inference from Tosafot is neither plausible nor necessary.
What is the reasoning that they would lapse before the actual return?