That makes sense. That is why I asked in parentheses whether there is an aesthetic problem here.
So:

A. Is there really an “aesthetic problem” here, assuming that the person’s quality of life would improve greatly if they behaved in a way that does not match gender norms (that is, does the moral consideration of improving quality of life override the aesthetic consideration)?

B. Does it seem reasonable to you to relate to a person’s sex according to that person’s own self-definition?

A. Clearly, the status of aesthetic problems—if such a status exists at all—is low, and if there is a significant need, they are set aside.
B. That is a completely different question. I will relate to a person as I understand them, not as they want. Addressing someone as male or female depends on how I perceive them, not on what they want. In my opinion there is no moral basis for demanding that I relate to a male as female just because he wants that. Of course, you may comply with his request, and that too is not a moral prohibition.

The demand to relate to a male as a woman is because this male’s inner feeling really is a feeling of being a woman. If one understands what this inner feeling is (just as people say that most males have an inner feeling of being a man), then it is obvious that there is no principled reason it must always go hand in hand with the bodily organs. So why should one grasp a person’s feeling according to their form rather than according to their own testimony?

If so, why is there no basis for the demand:
1. Either to say that this feeling does not exist at all (personally, I really do not feel my being a man in any special or distinct way, even though I know of no issue with myself regarding my sex, gender, inclinations, etc. etc.).
2. Or to say that the feeling exists but always goes only together with bodily form.
3. Or to say that the feeling exists and it may not fit bodily form, but there is no reason to believe some particular person who claims that he feels like a woman (probably some weird liar chasing attention).
4. Or to say that the feeling exists and is sometimes separate from bodily form, and you also believe a male who claims that he feels like a woman, but you nevertheless use language specifically according to bodily organs and not according to feelings and consciousness (because that is how you feel like using language, or because the oh-so-sacred language has been determined according to bodily form for thousands of years).
5. Or that as a matter of principle it really is proper to address a person according to the feeling, but that might lead to some mysterious bad consequences (undermining the family, dismantling nationalism, a hole in the ozone layer, etc.).
6. Or some actual opinion of yours that I have not managed to identify?

My actual opinion is that the decision is up to me, not to him. It does not matter whether I decide according to form or feeling. My claim is that a person cannot demand that I change the definition of a concept contrary to my own view.

And what is the definition of the concept according to your decision?

Why does that matter? I do not have any special arguments, but my inclination is to go by physical form. But as I said, that is not relevant to this discussion. Let me sharpen it further: although there are no decisive arguments, and seemingly one could say that precisely for that reason it would be proper to accede to the demand of the person in question, I argue that it would not. Since this is a matter of defining a concept, I am not willing to accept demands concerning definitions.

Even before demanding something, first one tries to persuade.
What do you mean by “definition of a concept”? If there are two criteria (form and feeling), then there is no concept here to define (what concept is being defined?) but only a question of which of the two criteria should determine the rules of speech.

Possibly, though I am not sure (essentialism). Either way, the rules of my speech are up to me.

It was with essentialism in mind that I asked. What concept is there here, and why should that concept govern speech (rather than feeling, for example)?

Speech is a result of an opinion or an orientation, and that is what one is trying to clarify. The attempt to compel does not stem from coercing principles but from a claim (which personally does not sound solid enough to me) that the addressees are hurt by it and that it fosters an unwelcoming atmosphere, etc. etc. But in any case, I am not discussing coercion or demands here at all.

This thread was not about the question of what the correct definition is, but about a moral question. Do you want to open a discussion about the definition itself? As for that, I said that I am not sure. An essentialist can argue that there is a real concept of male or female, and that the question of its definition has one correct answer.

Let me put it this way: if we are speaking only about manner of speech, then indeed it is less likely that there is one correct answer. But the distinction between male and female can have consequences, and then there definitely can be a correct answer. For example: exemption from positive commandments dependent on time, who is permitted to compete in a women’s league, who is permitted to use women’s services, who is permitted to retire at age 62. Of course, there may be different answers in each context, and that will again raise the question of the definition of the concepts male or female themselves (must there be a connection between the answers in the different contexts?)

Indeed I wanted to open a discussion about the definition itself (except that it opened and apparently is already ending). The essentialist (I probably am one, wavering and returning to it against my will) will also argue that what governs speech is that concept and not the feeling, and will also argue that, surprisingly and strangely, for determining this elusive concept the feeling is less significant than the form. (My problem is that I have no such feeling of any kind, so I do not really understand what people are talking about. But once I thoroughly questioned a transgender woman in an attempt to understand the feelings; I came away with the impression that I had received recitations, but apparently I am not very good at eliciting feelings. In any case, she insisted that this was a feeling that had flooded her since childhood, along with all kinds of intense descriptions. Regular men and women whom I asked whether they experience gender identity told me various things that sounded offhand to me.)

I delayed in replying and did not see that you had added more. I completely accept the clarification you added. When there are consequences, one has to discuss them on their own merits according to the relevant reason.

A person whose chief concern is what to wear is not worthy of being called a human being.