Q&A: Autonomy in Jewish Law
Autonomy in Jewish Law
Question
In the lesson on yeshiva-style conceptual Talmudic analysis, Rabbi, you say that someone with sufficient skill in conceptual analysis will not be able to decide between the two sides of an investigation (or between the two halakhic decisors, each of whom stands behind one side of that investigation), and therefore I am supposed to decide based on what feels more reasonable to me. If so, aren’t you basically turning the concept of halakhic ruling into a subjective concept or position—each person according to his own inclinations, right?
Answer
I didn’t say he won’t be able to, only that it will be difficult for him. In practice, the conceptual analysts usually really do not succeed in deciding. But I claim that there is a decision; it just is not made with logical-analytical tools, but through intuition. That does not mean it is subjective. I’ve written quite a bit about intuition and its significance.
Discussion on Answer
Not at all. I just remember what I think about the topic.
1. That is pluralism in Jewish law. See my article, “Is Jewish Law Pluralistic?” I do not agree with that approach, and I even think it is self-contradictory.
2. I wrote about this at length in my books Truth and Unstable, and In Two Wagons.
You did indeed say “difficult.” Do you remember by heart every word you say? hahaha
Do you agree that:
1) It could be that Rabbi So-and-so rules A and Rabbi Such-and-such rules B, and neither of them is mistaken or committing a transgression; rather, each one rules according to what he thinks.
2) Intuition is not subjective—how can that be? What is subjective, if not intuition? Maybe you can point me to a place where you wrote about this topic.