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Q&A: Formal Authority and the Acceptance of the People

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Formal Authority and the Acceptance of the People

Question

Honorable Rabbi,
I have a question about formal authority.
I didn’t understand why the acceptance of a norm by the entire people gives formal authority to that norm.
(I thought that if a group accepts a norm, then it’s possible that accepting the norm enters into the definition of the group. French people accepted drinking at leastone glass of wine with lunch. So anyone who doesn’t do that isn’t French. By definition. But that would mean that a Jew who doesn’t acceptthe Talmud as binding isn’t Jewish by definition. And that doesn’t seem right to me.)
I apologize in advance if you’ve already explained this (but I couldn’t find where).

Answer

If you are one of the group, then the group’s acceptance is as if you yourself accepted it upon yourself. You can’t exempt yourself from your own commitments. You signed a contract, and you are bound by it.

Discussion on Answer

Tolginus (2021-05-10)

There are two claims here: an ontological one (the group exists and the individual belongs to it), and a moral one (the individual is obligated by the “decisions of the group”). Even if we accept the ontological claim, I still at least don’t see any basis for the moral claim. Even before discussing why contracts should be upheld (and in my view the justification should be for the sake of the future and not because of the signing ceremony in the past), there’s a difference between contracts that I, as a small individual, decided on, and contracts that were imposed on me, as a small individual, in one way or another.

Unless one says that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us to uphold the acceptances of communities (He could just as well have commanded us always to do exactly the opposite of what communities accept), and then that would be fine by me.

Joseph (2021-05-10)

Can the Rabbi explain the mechanism a bit?

1. How do you sign?
It seems to me that many Jews (unfortunately) do not see themselves as obligated by the Talmud. So what happens in such a situation? Is only part of the Jewish people still obligated by the Talmud? What if 55% of the people accepted a norm upon themselves? Are the remaining 45% also obligated? What is the threshold?

2. What if the “signing” is coerced?
What if the group makes immoral decisions? Are you obligated by that too? Presumably not. So what are the limits?

Michi (2021-05-10)

Tolgi,
I’m not entirely sure an ontic assumption is needed here. It’s enough that he is part of the public in the normative sense (though one could ask about that too, why).
The consequentialist question is already an old debate between us.

Joseph,
What is there to explain? We signed at Mount Sinai as a people, and that obligates us. And if there are wrongdoers who do not uphold their obligation, that doesn’t exempt them. Just because someone ate garlic, should he go back and eat more garlic? There is no threshold.
If the signing is coerced, then it is not binding. If immoral decisions have religious justification, then they are binding. Morality is only one of the considerations.

Tolginus (2021-05-10)

But every example that comes my way makes me nurture false hopes that once people see the example, they’ll all admit and bow to consequentialism. There must be some name for that bias/deviation.
Do you think contracts should simply be upheld just like that, as a moral axiom? Maybe in your view it’s a derivative of a categorical imperative, like paying taxes?

Michi (2021-05-10)

Indeed, and the connection between the categorical imperative and consequentialism has already been discussed here at length.

Joseph (2021-05-11)

Thank you. I understood from what you said that formal authority that stems from the acceptance of the people is equivalent to acceptance by every individual in the people. And if I accepted a norm upon myself, it is as if it stems from an institution with formal authority.

Still, I have a few questions (which may stem from misunderstanding the concepts):
1. If someone accepted a norm upon himself and afterward decided not to accept it anymore, is he allowed to do that?
@ If so, then a group can also decide not to accept a certain norm anymore.
@ If not, what is the justification for that? The same mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. (If the people who signed a contract want to dissolve it, why can’t they do so?)
2. I don’t understand how a group’s acceptance can create an obligation for me. It seems like coerced signing.
3. How can my ancestors obligate me through their acceptance (as though I myself accepted it)? That too seems like coerced signing.

Michi (2021-05-11)

1. No. He obligated himself, and he cannot retract. Otherwise what is the meaning of that commitment? I already wrote that this is a commitment to another party (the Holy One, blessed be He). If both sides agree, then of course it can be changed, but one side cannot breach a contract. It’s not like a commitment you take on yourself (and even there Jewish law says it requires formal release, and without that you cannot retract).
2. You are part of the group. It is as if you yourself accepted it upon yourself. It is exactly like state law, which you cannot decide not to accept.
3. I already explained that the acceptance is that of the public and not yours, and everyone who belongs to that public is obligated by it. Exactly like a law that obligates future generations as well (so long as it is not changed).

Joseph (2021-05-11)

Thank you for your answer. It’s clearer. But unfortunately the concept of “accepting upon oneself” is still vague to me.

1- It seems to me that people don’t accept things upon themselves “out of the blue.” Rather, from certain data, through a process of thought, people arrive at a state where they accept things upon themselves.

What if there is a problem with the data or with the thought process? Isn’t that like a mistaken transaction? Can the contract be void?

An example from the giving of the Torah:
@ Data: the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded us commandments.
@ Thought process: the concept of God implies that whatever God commands obligates me.
@ Conclusion: I accept upon myself to be obligated by the commandments (the word of the Holy One, blessed be He).

What if one thinks the data are not correct? For example, many of the Jewish people think the revelation at Sinai never happened. Can the people decline to accept upon themselves the obligation of the commandments?

What if the people have a different concept of God? For example, the people think God is unfair and therefore there is no obligation to obey Him. Can the people decline to accept upon themselves the obligation of the commandments?

(Maybe you’ll answer that in truth they are mistaken. Therefore the truth is that they are obligated in the commandments without being aware of it, because in fact there is no mistaken transaction, but they are under compulsion.)

2- I don’t accept many of my country’s laws. I think they are harmful and stupid. But I won’t violate them because I simply don’t want to be punished.

3- Understood. Thanks!

Michi (2021-05-11)

1. I really don’t understand this insistence. Who spoke about acceptance “out of the blue”? The Jewish people accepted upon themselves commitment to the Torah. If in your opinion there was a mistaken transaction there, then you are exempt, just as in any contract.
If someone thinks the event did not happen, then there is no need to void the contract, because no contract was ever signed.
You’re asking me whether, if you do not believe in God or in the revelation at Sinai, you are supposed to observe the commandments? Obviously from your point of view, no (and indeed, in my opinion you are mistaken and you are obligated). What is the question?

Joseph (2021-05-11)

1- The question was: what if one of the two parties to a contract is convinced there was a mistaken transaction (even though in truth there wasn’t)?
If I understood correctly, the answer is that that party is indeed obligated, but under compulsion.

2- Sorry, but I couldn’t understand what you said: “You are part of the group. […] It is exactly like state law, which you cannot decide not to accept.”
I wrote that there are laws of my country that I do not accept (because I think they are stupid), but I do not violate them because I simply don’t want to be punished.
Do you also call not violating a law out of fear of punishment “accepting a law”?

Michi (2021-05-12)

1. That’s not a question. If the contract is valid, he is obligated. If he himself thinks the contract is invalid, then of course he will not keep it (even though he is obligated). What is the question here? Could anyone say anything different about this question?
2. Even a stupid law must be obeyed because you, as a citizen, are signed onto the contract. That doesn’t mean you need to be extremely orthodox about it, but there is a principled obligation to the law as such, whether stupid or not. If you don’t think one must obey the law, then we have a dispute. But again I don’t understand the question.
It seems to me we’ve exhausted this.

Joseph (2021-05-12)

1- I understand. You’re right. It’s simple.

2- I’m truly sorry, but I can’t understand your doctrine.

From what you said I understood that there is some kind of categorical imperative: whether you like it or not, you belong to the group, therefore whether you like it or not, you are obligated by the group’s decisions. That’s it.

Personally, I think one should obey the law for a consequentialist reason: if people don’t obey the law, then the group is in danger. And why shouldn’t the group be endangered? For three main reasons:
A) An “egoistic” reason: people benefit from the group and need it in order to live (if there is no protection, no bakers, no doctors, people can’t live)
B) An “essential” reason: I don’t want society endangered because I see value in its standing (in what it represents, its messages, etc.)
C) I feel gratitude toward it because it enables me to live a good life. As a matter of gratitude, I see myself as obligated to do what is necessary to preserve it (or at least not to endanger it)
But this has nothing to do with the moral claim (in Tolginus’s terminology) that the decision of the public obligates me as an individual member of that public!

For example: I’m a redhead. Whether I like it or not, I belong to the group of redheads. What if all redheads (except for me) accepted upon themselves to eat one carrot every morning. According to you, am I obligated to eat a carrot every morning?

Michi (2021-05-12)

It’s not that you didn’t understand. You disagree. I claim that my own acceptance obligates me (a contract), and by the same token the public’s acceptance, which I belong to, obligates the public (and me within it). Quite simple. It is not some categorical imperative, at least not beyond the imperative that underlies my obligation to uphold what I myself committed to.

All the reasons you raised do not withstand critical scrutiny, and I’ve already written about that. But it’s not important to our matter. If that’s what you think, good for you. What is your question to me?

Joseph (2021-05-13)

Because what you are saying seems to me so obviously wrong, it proves that I didn’t understand you correctly (or that there is some hidden assumption I don’t agree with).

Here are my assumptions:

Assumption 1- The group does not exist as an entity between persons.
The group exists only in people’s minds; it has no existence of its own. Unlike human beings. I exist regardless of whether someone thinks I exist.
Despite the problem of personal identity, it seems simple to me that what I committed to yesterday obligates me today. It does not seem simple regarding a group that what existed yesterday morally obligates it today (after its members have changed).

Assumption 2- The meaning of the expression “a person accepts a norm upon himself” is fairly clear. We have all experienced it. And it is binary: either I accepted it or I didn’t. The same expression regarding a group, “a group accepts upon itself,” is less clear (because it may be that only part of the group accepted something). Therefore, since acceptance is binary and a group is only the sum of its individuals, I thought that “the group’s acceptance” means “acceptance by every individual in the group.” Therefore, by that definition, if the majority of the group accepted something, that does not obligate me.

My question: do you disagree with my assumptions? Presumably yes 🙂

P.S. I’d be happy to read your critique of the reasons I raised. Did you write a column about it?

Michi (2021-05-13)

You identified the points of disagreement well. Which is exactly what I said: you certainly understand, you just don’t agree.

Joseph (2021-05-13)

Thanks for the confirmation.

Joseph (2021-05-13)

May I dare ask one more thing?

The concept of “accepting upon oneself” with regard to an individual is fairly clear. We’ve all experienced it. But what does it mean for a group to have accepted something upon itself? In what ways is a group’s acceptance similar to an individual’s acceptance?
I wanted to know how you define the concept of “accepting upon itself” regarding a group.
What is the criterion for knowing whether a certain group accepted a norm upon itself? (A percentage of the individuals in the group who accepted it, acceptance by individuals who represent the group, something else…)

My questions:
1- What is your definition of the concept “to accept upon itself” with regard to a group?
2- What are the shared features between a group’s acceptance and an individual’s acceptance?

Michi (2021-05-13)

I don’t know what definition you’re expecting. Did the residents of Israel accept upon themselves the laws of the Knesset? How did you determine that? If an entire people stands and accepts upon itself an obligation at Mount Sinai, then it accepted it upon itself. That’s all. No Jew ever doubted this, including the idol worshippers in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh).

Joseph (2021-05-14)

Maybe through an example the definition I’m expecting will be clearer.

Here are my definitions:

1.1- Definition of the concept “to accept upon oneself” regarding an individual: a person accepts a norm upon himself when he decides to be obligated by that norm. Meaning: to behave in accordance with what the norm requires.
1.2- A protocol (one of many possible ones) for testing whether a person accepted norm ‘N’ upon himself:
@ check that he is not lying
@ check that he understands the concept “to accept upon oneself”
@ ask him whether he accepted norm ‘N’

2.1- Definition of the concept “to accept upon itself” regarding a group: a group accepts a norm upon itself when an overwhelming majority of the group’s individuals (say more than 95%) decided to be obligated by that norm. Meaning: to behave in accordance with what the norm requires.
2.2- A protocol (one of many possible ones) for testing whether the group accepted norm ‘N’ upon itself:
@ repeat protocol 1.2 for all the individuals in the group

According to my definition, of course the Jewish people accepted the Torah upon themselves.
And it is likely that an overwhelming majority of the residents of Israel accepted upon themselves the authority of the Knesset (in my opinion because of the reasons I mentioned: not to endanger the state, etc.). Therefore, according to my definition, that means that it is likely that the residents of Israel accepted upon themselves the laws of the Knesset.

I understood that you do not agree with my definitions. I just wanted to know why and what your definition is. If you don’t have definitions (because everything is self-evident and intuitive), then fine.

Michi (2021-05-14)

You understood incorrectly. That is exactly what I wrote, apart from the number (95). So what is the discussion about?

Joseph (2021-05-14)

Now I understand.

So the discussion is about the reality of an abstract entity, like a group. And also about the problem of personal identity regarding such an entity. I think I’ll find material on this in your book That Which Is and That Which Is Not (which I have not yet read, to my great shame).
I won’t bother you anymore on this topic.

Thank you very much for your answer, and Sabbath peace.

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