Q&A: A Moral Question about the Amoraim
A Moral Question about the Amoraim
Question
Hello and blessings!
I wanted to ask about conduct that seems, on the face of it, immoral, which the Amoraim practiced.
In the passage about robbing a gentile, Bava Kamma 113b, Shmuel said: “His mistake is permitted” (a gentile’s mistake may be taken advantage of). For example: “Shmuel bought from a Cuthean a golden vessel as if it were an iron one for four zuz, and he swallowed one zuz from him” (Shmuel bought a gold vessel from a gentile and misled him into thinking it was brass, and also misled him in counting the money).
“Rav Kahana bought from a Cuthean one hundred and twenty barrels for one hundred, and swallowed one zuz from him. He said to him: See, I am relying on you” (Rav Kahana misled the gentile when buying one hundred and twenty as though they were one hundred, and also misled him in the counting of the money).
“Ravina bought a palm tree, he and a Cuthean, for beams. He said to his attendant: Go ahead and bring from the thick base first, because the Cuthean knows only how to count” (Ravina divided the tree he had bought jointly with a gentile in an unfair way, taking the better parts for himself).
“Rav Ashi was traveling on the road. He saw a vine branch in an orchard with clusters of grapes hanging on it. He said to his attendant: Go see—if they belong to a gentile, bring them, and if they belong to a Jew, do not bring them to me. That gentile who was sitting in the orchard heard and said to him: If they belong to a gentile, is it permitted? He said to him: A gentile takes money; a Jew does not take money” (Rav Ashi asked his assistant to pick grapes for him from a gentile’s field, and when the gentile heard this he explained that he had intended to pay; according to Tosafot, he indeed intended to pay from the outset).
How are these stories explained? Is this behavior moral?
Answer
One can add to this the laws under which cases between a Jew and a gentile are judged according to whichever legal system is more favorable to the Jew (Bava Kamma 37–38 and 113 there).
The Talmud itself (38a) explains this by saying that this refers to gentiles who do not observe their seven commandments, meaning they behave immorally. “He stood and released the nations” — He permitted their property to Israel.
And Maimonides explained this well in his Commentary on the Mishnah there (Bava Kamma 4:3):
[3] If a legal case occurs between a Jew and a gentile, then the manner of judgment between them is as I will explain to you: if under their laws we have an advantage, we judge them by their laws and say to them, “This is your law”; and if it is better for us that we judge by our laws, we judge them according to our law and say to them, “This is our law.” Let this matter not be difficult in your eyes, and do not wonder about it, just as you do not wonder at the slaughter of animals even though they have done no wrong; for one in whom the human qualities have not been perfected is not truly a human being, and his purpose is only for the human being. Discussion of this matter requires a separate book.
And indeed Maimonides wrote in Laws of Kings 10:12 that in his view this does not apply to a resident alien:
If two idolaters come before you to be judged by the laws of Israel, and both wish to be judged by Torah law, they are judged; if one wishes and the other does not wish, he is not compelled to be judged except by their own laws. If it is a Jew and an idolater, if the Jew has an advantage under their laws, we judge him by their laws and say to him, “This is your law”; and if the Jew has an advantage under our law, we judge him by Torah law and say to him, “This is our law.” And it appears to me that we do not do so to a resident alien; rather, he is always judged by his own laws. And so it appears to me that we conduct ourselves toward resident aliens with proper civility and acts of kindness as toward Jews, for we are commanded to sustain them, as it is said: “To the stranger within your gates you may give it, and he may eat it.” As for what the sages said, that we do not repeat a greeting to idolaters, this is not about a resident alien. Even regarding idolaters, the sages commanded that we visit their sick, bury their dead together with the dead of Israel, and support their poor together with the poor of Israel, for the sake of peace. Thus it is said: “The Lord is good to all, and His mercies are over all His works,” and it is said: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.”
And similarly in Laws of Damage to Property 8:5:
If an ox belonging to a Jew gores an ox belonging to a gentile, whether innocuous or forewarned, he is exempt, because the gentiles do not hold a person liable for damage caused by his animal, and we judge them according to their laws. But if an ox belonging to a gentile gores an ox belonging to a Jew, whether innocuous or forewarned, he pays full damages. This is a penalty imposed on the gentiles, because they are not careful about the commandments and do not remove sources of damage; and if you do not obligate them for the damage caused by their animals, they will not guard them and will cause people financial loss.
From this you can understand that these difficulties are an anachronism. We are talking about gentiles who behave immorally and inhumanely, and therefore we do not behave toward them in a humane way. Therefore, when gentiles do behave humanely, there is no permission to act this way toward them (at least morally, and in my opinion halakhically as well). And this is the essence of Meiri’s well-known innovation regarding the gentiles of his time, who were bound by the norms of civilized nations: all these laws apply to them exactly as they do to Jews (including desecrating the Sabbath through Torah-level labor in order to save them). In my opinion the source is this Maimonides, and that removes the scholars’ difficulties as to why Meiri disagrees with Maimonides without saying so explicitly. See my article on enlightened idolatry:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%99%D7%A9-%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%A0%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%97%D7%A1-%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%95%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95/.
Discussion on Answer
That is, does his immorality permit me too to behave that way toward him?
Absolutely. Someone who would not return my lost item and robs me gives me no reason to return his lost item. In Maimonides’ sharp language, one who behaves like an animal is not entitled to be treated like a human being.
Following up on what you said, can you sharpen what kind of immoral behavior justifies similar behavior in return?
Here’s an extreme example—would you justify it?
https://www.kikar.co.il/275814.html
I don’t think we should behave differently regarding a gentile or a convert when it comes to returning a lost item. Because if we don’t return a lost item to the person who lost it, that’s a kind of theft that causes pain to the person who lost it. And even if the person who lost it was an immoral gentile, that doesn’t mean we’re allowed to behave toward him in the same way. “Justice, justice shall you pursue.” And “Do not bring an abomination into your house”—which includes things you didn’t earn honestly. And it is forbidden to take revenge or bear a grudge against any creature.
You can’t justify something illegal. But those thieves had a choice—that a police case be opened against them. Any thief should be prepared for that possibility, no matter what he stole. I’m glad that’s the case. I hate thieves—they cause damage to the chains, and it’s hard to prevent them from stealing. So if they were caught, let them pay.
Aharon, it’s hard for me to give a general criterion. As a rule, one should distinguish between a moral positive obligation and a moral prohibition. A moral positive obligation (such as returning a lost item) does not obligate one toward an immoral person. But harming him (a moral prohibition) is not permitted. The distinction between moral positive obligations and moral prohibitions is not simple, and in a certain sense it’s a somewhat circular definition. In my article on the sixth root I defined these concepts on the halakhic plane; take it from there.
As for the case you brought, I think it’s not okay. If there is an obligation to complain to the authorities, they should have complained and not waived it. But taking compensation money from them seems immoral to me (though I do not think it is forbidden halakhically. “He suspended him until he gave”?). By the way, I assume legally and juridically this is forbidden. In the definitions above, taking money from someone is a moral prohibition toward him, not a moral positive obligation.
If the complaint to the police is meant to fine the thief, then perhaps there is room to take money from him and not complain. I am fining him in place of the police (and even here there is room to debate, since the fine is supposed to go to the state). But if the complaint is meant to prevent future criminal behavior against others, on what grounds should one waive the complaint? Perhaps if you could be convinced that he repented and would never return to this sin, there would be room to waive it, but that is very hard to know.
Moshe, not returning a lost item to a gentile is not revenge or punishment. His lost item is ownerless as far as I’m concerned, and I am certainly not obligated to trouble myself to return it to him. Therefore, in my opinion the commandment to return it here is beyond the letter of the law (what I defined as a moral positive obligation, not a prohibition), and therefore it depends on his moral standing.
I admittedly haven’t read the Rabbi’s article on the sixth root, but it seems to me there is no such thing as a moral positive obligation. All morality is prohibition. When I hear the word “morality,” I always get a picture in my head of an angry face saying, “You’re not okay.” It also seems to me that this is the general human feeling. Anything the Rabbi defines as a moral positive obligation could really be described by saying that the moral act is not to negate it. And even the meaning of the word morality is connected to rebuke and punishment, which essentially belongs to violating a prohibition, not to neglecting a positive obligation (even though there is punishment for that too, but as I said, that would not be for failing to fulfill the positive obligation but for actively nullifying it).
What may be true is that regarding a wise act (or a correct act) or not, there is an option of a positive obligation and not only a prohibition. Although here too someone might argue that not doing the correct act is doing an incorrect act, because there is no vacuum. But one can speak about the advisability of an act (that it is worthwhile to do it, but if one does not, no harm will be caused, only profit will be prevented—as opposed, for example, to not brushing one’s teeth).
Eilon, it will be hard to decide this, because basically these are matters of definition. But returning a lost item seems to me plainly a positive obligation and not a prohibition. If I didn’t return a lost item, I didn’t do anything bad. I am not obligated to make an effort for someone else. But if I did do it, I did something good.
That’s also complicated. The question is whether you have responsibility toward that person (indeed, if he is immoral then you don’t, because such responsibility seems to be a reciprocal matter). Because if so, then you need to ask whether you would want your lost item to be abandoned and damaged by the forces of nature (assuming that taking something that isn’t yours for your own use is not okay, so then no one would take the lost item. Actively returning it indeed is not morally required unless the owner demands it from you), while someone who saw it could easily gather it into his house. True, taking care of it beyond that already seems excessive to me. But indeed, if there is no responsibility toward an immoral gentile, I’m not sure returning his lost item is a good act. Immorality turns a person into an animal (and a bit worse. And even an animal may not be harmed for no reason—in line with the Rabbi’s statement that there is a moral prohibition even with respect to an immoral person), and then this is the destruction of property that could have served good and now will go toward evil.
That is of course a general claim that doing good to a bad person is a bad act. And regarding a moral person, we already said that this (the moral positive obligation) is included within the moral prohibition. In any case, there cannot be a moral positive obligation.
With God’s help, 33rd day of the Omer, 5778
To Eilon—many greetings,
I do not think one needs to get into distinctions between a “moral positive obligation” and a “prohibition.” In my humble opinion, the distinction is between what is a “categorical imperative” binding on all human beings (= the seven Noahide commandments) and unique obligations that the Torah imposed only on the community of “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (= the 613 commandments).
Therefore it is forbidden to rob a gentile, because the Torah forbade robbery to the children of Noah; but there is no obligation to return a lost item to a gentile, since the commandment of returning a lost item is not part of the “seven Noahide commandments,” and is not a “categorical imperative” that obligates a person simply as a person, but rather a unique obligation toward “your brother.”
However, since among the seven Noahide commandments there is the commandment of “laws,” which authorizes the government to enact laws and regulations for the benefit of society, beyond the basic requirement of the “seven Noahide commandments,” it follows that a norm accepted by society as a binding “categorical imperative” would count as “the law of the kingdom is law,” which also binds the Jews in that state (and after all, Shmuel is the author of the dictum “the law of the kingdom is law”).
The commandment of “laws,” and in its wake the halakhic rule “the law of the kingdom is law,” open the door to raising interpersonal demands beyond what the Torah required, and thus the world advances to a state in which norms that the Torah could demand only as piety become “equal for all persons.”
With blessings,
S.Z. Levinger
To Shatzal,
You’re mixing two levels of discussion. The discussion here is not about Jewish law (Torah) but about morality. Morality belongs to proper human conduct, which preceded the Torah, and the seven Noahide commandments are the “Torah” of the gentiles. Piety is something the Torah came before (another level on top of it, but there is a connection between it and the level of proper human conduct, just as primordial man’s head is revealed above the four worlds of Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, which clothe him from the neck down to the soles of his feet, and the soles of his feet are in this world below all those worlds. Generally speaking, those four worlds are “Torah”). Morality is universal.
The categorical imperative belongs to morality. And if you put it into the commandment of laws, then there’s duplication here, like a building with two stories. It is forbidden to rob a gentile because it is forbidden to rob. Period. Besides that, there is a commandment from God (for a gentile, and apparently for a Jew too) not to rob a gentile. Like “do not murder” with respect to a Jew—which belongs both מצד morality and מצד God’s command.
Rabbi Michi,
There is permission to press a gentile creditor, and his morality does not matter to us at all; and if here the gentile’s morality does not matter, then why in the case of returning a lost item to a gentile does his morality matter to us?
Why should we corrupt our own morality? By the way—the civil law requires returning a lost item to any person, including a gentile—and if you did not return it, then according to the law it is as if you actually stole it.
Eilon argues, and rightly so: is it permitted to murder a gentile? Certainly not—so why is it permitted to steal from him indirectly (= under a legal dispensation)?
Moshe, it is a bit hard to respond to the collection of baseless declarations you tossed out here. If you want to assume something, assume it. But what do you want from me? I think otherwise.
1. There is no permission whatsoever to press a gentile who is bound by the norms of civilized nations. And so too regarding all commandments between one person and another. That is Meiri’s view, and I, the small one, am with him in distress.
2. According to the law, not returning a lost item is not theft.
3. I gave above (in my reply to Aharon) a fairly general criterion for which moral rules depend on the morality of the other person and which do not.
Thank you very much.
Is it morally permissible to behave immorally toward a gentile who generally behaves immorally?