Regarding the law of fixed status, I seem to remember from my learning that it applies only to cases where there is some element of choice that changes the distribution. For example: someone who throws a stone at a group of Jews and gentiles may have some preference for a Jew or a gentile, and so the distribution of the stone throw is not uniform across the whole group. Also with the mouse, it may have some preference for leaven or matzah, so the distribution is not uniform across the pieces of bread. And with the ten stores too, the person who bought the meat may have preferred a certain store, so a uniform distribution across all the stores in the city is not relevant. Also in the case of one who betrothed a woman through an agent and the agent disappeared, it may be that the agent preferred a certain woman, so there is no uniform distribution across all the women in the world. But in a process of separation where no element of choice or preference is involved, the distribution should be uniform, and so the law of fixed status would not apply. Isn’t that so?
Best regards,

That’s a distinction I hadn’t thought about. Interesting.
Off the cuff, the case of the Pri Chadash brought in Shema’teta (half a cow separated from a mixture containing a non-kosher cow) deals precisely with that kind of situation, and they discuss there the law of fixed status.
Beyond that, why should this be connected specifically to situations of fixed status and not of separation? And in general, why is this stringency called “fixed” rather than a doubt between unequal possibilities?
Maybe because fixed status refers to a situation in which a choice is made. In a case of separation, the removal of the item selected happens naturally and not by choice. This needs more thought.

I just saw that we talked about this in the past too 🙂
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%94%d7%a6%d7%a2%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a1%d7%91%d7%a8-%d7%93%d7%99%d7%9F-%d7%a7%d7%91%d7%95%d7%A2

By the way, according to Rabbi Shimon, this is the principle behind why in monetary law we do not follow the majority. A majority regarding plowing depends on a person’s will and not on a random process, and therefore we do not follow the majority. And even aside from Rabbi Shimon’s interpretation, according to your approach the Talmudic discussion there is really a case of fixed status. So why does Shmuel disagree and hold that we do follow the majority?

I’m not sure I understood what you mean, but the fact that Shmuel disagrees is exactly what illustrates what I suggested: that where choice or preference is relevant, the distribution is not uniform. Shmuel says this:
If one sold an ox to another and it was found to be a goring ox—Rav said: this is a mistaken sale, and Shmuel said: he can say to him, “I sold it to you for slaughter.”
In other words, Shmuel claims that everything depends on the seller’s intention.

The Talmud later explains that the dispute is whether in monetary cases we follow the majority. Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains that even according to Rav, in monetary law we do follow the majority, but here it depends on a person’s choice, and in that case majority does not apply (it is a weak majority). That is exactly your reasoning, but it is not connected to the law of fixed status. And according to Shmuel, even in such a case we do follow the majority—directly against your reasoning.

I think that here Shmuel is claiming that we follow the majority of intentions. In other words, even according to Shmuel, what matters is the intention and not something incidental like where the ox was sold. That is, when we come to assess the likelihood of something, we can look either at the distribution of intentions/preferences or at the distribution of location. In a case where intention/choice is relevant, we need to look at the distribution of intentions and choices, even though the distribution of locations (or anything else) differs from it—that is the novelty of the law of fixed status. Even after we reach the conclusion that we need to follow the distribution of intentions (and not of locations), the question still remains whether in monetary cases we follow the majority of intentions or not, and on that Rav and Shmuel disagree.