Q&A: Investigating Intuition — Where It Lies Between the A Priori and the Empirical
Investigating Intuition — Where It Lies Between the A Priori and the Empirical
Question
With God’s help,
After I asked you about the possibility of approximate knowledge, I’d be happy to focus on the role of intuition in this whole story.
In short, then, after we make observations in an attempt to discover a scientific law, we perform some kind of generalization, carried out mainly
by focusing on the most intuitive explanation, (and consequently predictions can be derived from it that will test and confirm it, or perhaps the opposite).
I wanted to focus on the intuitive faculty.
A. Is that intuition directed “outward,” toward a true law? (That’s a bit strange, because the laws of nature are usually only a formalization of behavior and relationships between objects).
B. If so, how is it possible that Newton did not know Einstein’s equations? Seemingly, that makes sense because he did not have the same level of precision at all in obtaining observations from which to make such a generalization.
C. But why is there a point of relation between intuitive knowledge and empirical knowledge? Empirical knowledge seemingly cannot provide intuitive knowledge at all, and yet it is a condition for it?
For example, if someone were in a closed, dark room all his life, would he be able to know Newton’s laws purely by inference? That really seems unlikely. Maybe it would occur to him as a mere hypothesis, but he certainly could not know it. But on the other hand, there is no connection between empirical knowledge and intuitive thinking. If so, one might think that intuition works in such a way that through sensory observation we contemplate the general law.
But on the other hand, according to the stories, Einstein did in fact arrive at his discovery not through observation, but through thought. And only today do we sometimes hear that some of his claims have indeed been confirmed.
One can also speak about moral or religious intuition, which seemingly is much less connected to anything empirical.
So then, what is intuition — an ability on an a priori basis, or an empirical one, or both (with implications for approximate science)? And why is it specifically when we have many observations that it becomes much easier for us to conceive ideas?
Or perhaps these are simply patterns of thought that God coordinated between them and the world, as Leibowitz said in the homily:
“He has placed the world in their hearts; this is the essence of the theory of knowledge: here is the world before us, and here is the heart of man. Great are the works of the Creator who inserts them one into the other and includes them together, and because of this they correspond to one another.”
Answer
A. I didn’t understand a word.
B. I also didn’t understand. Newton didn’t know because he didn’t think of it, and he didn’t have the data that Einstein had.
C. Intuition processes information that comes to us from observations. In many cases it does not directly see abstract things.
But there may be situations in which we do have a direct view of abstract things. Belief in God is not necessarily such a case, since many of us infer it from contemplating the world.
Discussion on Answer
A. What is the difference between the two possibilities? If this is how we describe reality, then it behaves this way.
B-C. I explained that this is a matter of processing observations. It is not a completely a priori process.
D. I didn’t understand a word.
Thank you very much, and sorry — I’ll try to write in a slightly different and shorter way, and I hope it will be clearer.
A. Do the laws of nature reflect something real (= a law in heaven written in white fire, E=mc^2), or are they our description of the behavior of the components of the world? The reason to argue for the second approach is that the laws of nature are not conceived as entities, but only reflect the behavior of matter.
B-C. Is it correct to say, as you wrote, that intuition *processes information* that comes to us from observations, or is it the cognitive-logical component that processes the information while intuition serves only as an assumption for it?
If so, of course the question still remains how exactly these two planes work together (sensory observation with the non-sensory one).
C. If we put a person in a sealed, dark room with no time limit or difficulty, does the Rabbi think it is possible for him to arrive at *knowledge* of the laws of nature only by using rationalizing and intuitive tools alone (and not as a hypothesis out of countless possible laws that might occur to him, but that he would reach the conclusion that this law — for example Newton’s laws — is the correct one and actually governs reality)? If not, doesn’t that pose a difficulty for the intuitive approach, which holds that the source of knowledge is open to something external to us? An approach which, if so, contains a good deal of ad hoc-ness. As opposed to an approach more like Kant’s, according to which we have certain patterns of thought that are coordinated with the world.
D. After a person believes in God on the basis of the evidence, as you suggested, does he then grasp God ממש, like a person with direct observation, or does God still remain for him only in the category of a conclusion? If it is only in the category of a conclusion, then there is seemingly a clear advantage to those with simple faith.